Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

Dutchbat observation posts with tank rounds as early as five days before the enclavefell.’And furthermore, number 483 of the UN Report states:‘At the same time, we were fully aware that the threat of NATO air power was all wehad at our disposal to respond to an attack on the Safe Areas. (…) For the reasonsmentioned above, we did not use with full effectiveness this one instrument at ourdisposal to make the Safe Areas at least a little bit safer. We were, with hindsight,wrong to declare repeatedly and publicly that we did not want to use air power againstthe Serbs except as a last resort, and to accept the shelling of the Safe Areas as a dailyoccurrence.’328. The UN thus itself recognises that it deployed insufficient means. As shown by the factsabove, the UN and Dutchbat did not make even a beginning with the defence of the SafeArea. Resistance could have been offered with the means that were available. Besides, itshould also be taken into account that the VRS never fired directly at Dutchbat soldierswith intent to kill. The Dutchbat soldiers were aware of that (see, for example, H.Praamsma, J. Peekel, T. Boumans, Herinneringen aan Srebrenica, 171Soldatengesprekken, (Memories of Srebrenica, 171 Conversations with Soldiers), page68):‘(…) they fired over our heads, they never blew us away, even though they could easilyhave done so.’And another statement of a Dutchbat soldier at OP-F (see page 73 ibid.):‘I was not afraid of the Serb bullets, they always fired deliberately wide (…)’And finally a Dutchbat officer (see page 177 ibid.):© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com142