Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
entire Safe Area only after there was no defence by Dutchbat and it was also madeimpossible for the inhabitants of the Safe Area to defend themselves. It can be deducedfrom the UN Report that the Safe Area would not have fallen if there had beenresistance. Even the Bosnian Serbs were surprised by the absence of any form ofopposition offered by the UN and Dutchbat. When the attack took place it was not atfirst, according to the UN, directed at capturing the entire Safe Area in one push. Thatchanged as a consequence of the absence of defence (see number 264 of the UN Report):‘The report of the United Nations military observers concluded with an assessment that“the BSA offensive will continue until they achieve their aims. These aims may even bewidening since the United Nations response has been almost non-existent and the BSAare now in a position to overrun the enclave if they wish”. Documents later obtainedfrom Serb sources appear to suggest that this assessment was correct. Those documentsindicate that the Serb attack on Srebrenica initially had limited objectives. Only afterhaving advanced with unexpected ease did the Serbs decide to overrun the entireenclave. Serb civilian and military officials from the Srebrenica area have stated thesame thing, adding, in the course of discussions with a United Nations official, that theydecided to advance all the way to Srebrenica town when they assessed thatUNPROFOR was not willing or able to stop them.’It is likely that the Bosnian Serbs had planned their attack some time before and that theUN was aware of that. If that is so then it is established that the UN and Dutchbat didnothing with that information.325. It follows from the above that by offering even some resistance the UN and Dutchbatcould have prevented the entire Safe Area from falling. Even the UN accepts thatresistance could have made the difference (see number 472 of the UN Report):‘It is true that the UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica never fired at the attacking Serbs.They fired warning shots over the Serbs’ heads and their mortars fired flares, but theynever fired directly on any Serb units. Had they engaged the attacking Serbs directly itis possible that events would have unfolded differently.’© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com140
326. Instead of taking action from the moment that the Safe Area was attacked, every effortwas made precisely to avoid fighting. Instead of demonstrating decisiveness, the UN andDutchbat made clear to the Bosnian Serbs that force would be used only as a final resort.That moment was apparently not reached even on 10 July 1995. That was when theForce Commander Janvier telephoned General Mladic in the evening of 10 July 1995and informed him that he would do everything to avoid using force but that thatpossibility had its limits. With this the UN more or less gave the Bosnian Serbs carteblanche just the day before the fall of the Safe Area. Nummer 289 of the UN Reportstates in that regard:“At 2120 hours, UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo reported that the Serbs hadbypassed the Dutchbat blocking positions, and that Dutchbat and the Bosniacs werenow coordinating a joint defence. The Force Commander called General Mladic’sheadquarters again at 2125 hours to tell them that the situation was impossible, andthat he would do everything he could to avoid the use of force, but that there werelimits.”This attitude surpasses Plaintiff’s comprehension. Two years of obstructinghumanitarian relief and supplies preceded General Janvier’s communication. To thismust be added that on 10 July 1995 the direct attack on the Safe Area had already beengoing on for five days, with the result that there were many dead and wounded under thecivilian population that was to be protected.Air Strikes327. The UN Report established that it was an error to deploy air power so late and not tocarry out air strikes. Further, the Report leaves no doubt that even with the mostrestrictive interpretation of the mandate, all conditions for the deployment of air powerwere met from the beginning of the attack (see number 480 of the UN Report):‘Even in the most restrictive interpretation of the mandate the use of close air supportagainst attacking Serb targets was clearly warranted. The Serbs were firing directly at© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com141
- Page 89 and 90: Other points concerned forced evict
- Page 91 and 92: ‘On 12 and 13 July 1995, upon the
- Page 93 and 94: statements put in the proceedings a
- Page 95 and 96: lying on a wagon. The Dutchbat sold
- Page 97 and 98: 228. Only one Dutchbat officer was
- Page 99 and 100: ‘UNMO source about 1,000 men take
- Page 101 and 102: night-time. I did not dare to leave
- Page 103 and 104: 239. Plaintiff Hotič states (see E
- Page 105 and 106: People had no food or water, nor we
- Page 107 and 108: During all of this the Dutch soldie
- Page 109 and 110: group and they were raped. I was ve
- Page 111 and 112: four or five Dutchbat soldiers were
- Page 113 and 114: shocked by what he had evidently se
- Page 115 and 116: follows:‘An alternative position
- Page 117 and 118: ‘We were deported to Tuzla later
- Page 119 and 120: I arrived at the barrier shortly th
- Page 121 and 122: encountered objections from the Dut
- Page 123 and 124: 277. Plaintiff Hasanović was born
- Page 125 and 126: Subašić282. Plaintiff Subašić w
- Page 127 and 128: IILegal characterisationIntroductio
- Page 129 and 130: the United Nations, Advisory opinio
- Page 131 and 132: 302. The UN and the State of the Ne
- Page 133 and 134: acting arise, respectively). In add
- Page 135 and 136: of the Safe Area and was not immedi
- Page 137 and 138: weapons of the VRS, or at least to
- Page 139: consequence that the VRS could depl
- Page 143 and 144: ‘(…) I had spent days lying on
- Page 145 and 146: 23 July 1995 (see H. Praamsma, J. P
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- Page 149 and 150: ‘Article 3 - General Principles1.
- Page 151 and 152: control of UNPROFOR from the moment
- Page 153 and 154: ‘The presumption can be rebutted
- Page 155 and 156: ecame entwined. In his view, it was
- Page 157 and 158: Conventions obliges the Contracting
- Page 159 and 160: Article 8 of the ILC Articles for I
- Page 161 and 162: - secondly, it was evident that the
- Page 163 and 164: international customary humanitaria
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- Page 167 and 168: ‘(…) confirm that Article I doe
- Page 169 and 170: also be assessed by legal criteria,
- Page 171 and 172: ‘(14) UNPROFOR had participated a
- Page 173 and 174: under customary law. A duty on stat
- Page 175 and 176: and the State of the Netherlands ac
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- Page 181 and 182: the State of the Netherlands must p
- Page 183 and 184: of the Netherlands. The UN and the
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- Page 187 and 188: UN but also to the purposes that ar
- Page 189 and 190: possible immunity on the part of th
326. Instead <strong>of</strong> taking action from the moment that the Safe Area was attacked, every effortwas made precisely to avoid fighting. Instead <strong>of</strong> demonstrating decisiveness, the UN andDutchbat made clear to the Bosnian Serbs that force would be used only as a final resort.That moment was apparently not reached even on 10 July 1995. That was when theForce Comman<strong>der</strong> Janvier telephoned General Mladic in the evening <strong>of</strong> 10 July 1995and informed him that he would do everything to avoid using force but that thatpossibility had its limits. With this the UN more or less gave the Bosnian Serbs carteblanche just the day before the fall <strong>of</strong> the Safe Area. Nummer 289 <strong>of</strong> the UN Reportstates in that regard:“At 2120 hours, UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo reported that the Serbs hadbypassed the Dutchbat blocking positions, and that Dutchbat and the Bosniacs werenow coordinating a joint defence. The Force Comman<strong>der</strong> called General Mladic’sheadquarters again at 2125 hours to tell them that the situation was impossible, andthat he would do everything he could to avoid the use <strong>of</strong> force, but that there werelimits.”This attitude surpasses Plaintiff’s comprehension. Two years <strong>of</strong> obstructinghumanitarian relief and supplies preceded General Janvier’s communication. To thismust be added that on 10 July 1995 the direct attack on the Safe Area had already beengoing on for five days, with the result that there were many dead and wounded un<strong>der</strong> thecivilian population that was to be protected.Air Strikes327. The UN Report established that it was an error to deploy air power so late and not tocarry out air strikes. Further, the Report leaves no doubt that even with the mostrestrictive interpretation <strong>of</strong> the mandate, all conditions for the deployment <strong>of</strong> air powerwere met from the beginning <strong>of</strong> the attack (see number 480 <strong>of</strong> the UN Report):‘Even in the most restrictive interpretation <strong>of</strong> the mandate the use <strong>of</strong> close air supportagainst attacking Serb targets was clearly warranted. The Serbs were firing directly at© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com141
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