Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

them. It is further of importance regarding the operational actions of Dutchbat thatKarremans advised the ABiH on 11 July 1995 to withdraw its forces because otherwiseABiH targets could be hit by the aerial bombardment. That was effectively the end of theresistance that the ABiH offered (see page 2404 of the NIOD Report). Dutchbatrepeatedly dangled air strikes before the population but they never materialised.Following the promises of air strikes and the advice to leave their positions the ABiHleft its positions in very large numbers, as set out under the facts above.Demilitarisation321. The UN actively insisted that the ABiH should conclude a demilitarization agreement.That is confirmed by the UN Report, which reveals that the ABiH agreed to thedisarmament under pressure from UNPROFOR. The Report makes clear that the ABiHagreed to the demilitarization only because in exchange therefor it expected and wasentitled to expect to be protected by UNPROFOR (number 59 of the UN Report):‘UNPROFOR commanders, (…) convincing the Bosnian commanders that they shouldsign an agreement in which Bosnian forces would give up their arms to UNPROFOR inreturn for the promise of a cease fire, the insertion of an UNPROFOR company intoSrebrenica, the evacuation of the seriously wounded and the seriously ill, unimpededaccess for UNHCR and ICRC and certain other provisions. (…) President Izetbegovicwas in favor of the UNPROFOR proposal, which, as he understood it, meant that theBosnians would hand over their weapons to UNPROFOR in return for UNPROFORprotection.’322. The demilitarisation was a success – as far as the disarming of the inhabitants and armyunits within the Safe Area was concerned. Under number 62 of the UN Report it isstated:‘On 21 April 1993 UNPROFOR released a press statement entitled “Demilitarisationof Srebrenica a success”.’The Bosnian Serbs (VRS) were, by contrast, not disarmed by the UN. That had the© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com138