Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
‘The care taken in preparing the report, its comprehensive sources and theindependence of those responsible for its preparation all lend considerable authority toit. As will appear later in this Judgment, the Court has gained substantial assistancefrom this report.’316. A number of conclusions were drawn in the UN Report that are of significance for thepresent case. Those conclusions relate, among others, to the weapons embargo, thedemilitarisation, the refusal to return weapons, the consequences of the failure ofDutchbat to offer resistance, the air strikes, and the failure of Dutchbat to report warcrimes. The UN recognises that it made mistakes (see point 5 of the UN Report):‘(…) I am fully cognizant of the mandate entrusted to the United Nations and only toopainfully aware of the Organization’s failures in implementing that mandate.’317. The population of Srebrenica had the choice itself to fight, to flee or to trust in theagreements made with the UN and the State of the Netherlands, or at least to trust inDutchbat. Many refugees chose for that last option and that trust was grievously shamed.In addition, many refugees were in fact left with no other possibilities by Dutchbat thanto trust in the protection of Dutchbat. As was shown above, Dutchbat maintained orderamong the refugees in and around the UN compound, seized the last of the weapons andeven took part in the separation of the men or boys from the women. As was shownabove, Dutchbat never at any time raised the alarm, preferring to preserve some form oforder and to protect its own position at all costs. The exercise of authority over therefugees entailed an enormous responsibility for the fate of those refugees. It is in partthe neglect of that responsibility for which Plaintiff is presently suing the UN and theState of the Netherlands. The failure to fulfil promises made in respect of the safety (andthe unlawful conduct to be discussed below), must be viewed against the fact that theUN and Dutchbat actively disarmed the Safe Area (in which no Bosnian Serbs anylonger lived). As was shown above, repeated requests for the release of surrenderedand/or seized (heavy) weapons were constantly refused. As Dutchbat and the UN had amonopoly of force in the Safe Area, the responsibility for the promised protectionweighed all the greater. The UN and Dutchbat had the possibility to destroy the (heavy)© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com136
weapons of the VRS, or at least to stem the advance of the VRS. The fact that that didnot happen is due to the unwillingness of the UN and the State of the Netherlands.318. Plaintiff will presently deal with the adherence to the weapons embargo against theinhabitants of the Safe Area, that the UN actively impeded the resistance of theinhabitants of the Safe Area, that the UN insisted on demilitarisation, that there was noresponse to the requests for return of the seized (heavy) weapons, that there was noquestion of any defence of the Safe Area, that no air strikes took place or that thoseattacks were halted, and that there was no reporting of observed war crimes.Adherence to the weapons embargo319. The UN wrongfully adhered to the weapons embargo. That is also one of theconclusions drawn by the UN (see number 490 of the UN Report):‘The arms embargo did little more than freeze in place the military balance within theformer Jugoslavia. It left the Serbs in a position of overwhelming military dominanceand effectively deprived the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of its right, under theCharter of the United Nations, to self-defense. It was not necessarily a mistake toimpose an arms embargo, which after all had been done when Bosnia and Herzegovinawas not yet a Member State of the United Nations. Once that was done, however, theremust surely have been some attendant duty to protect Bosnia and Herzegovina, after itbecame a Member State, from the tragedy that then befell it. Even as the Serb attackson and strangulation of the “Safe Areas” continued in 1993 and 1994, all widelycovered by the media and, presumably, by diplomatic and intelligence reports to therespective Governments, the approach of the members of the Security Council remainedlargely constant. The international community still could not find the political will toconfront the menace defying it.’Actively hindering resistance320. The UN ensured that the Bosnian Army (ABiH) could not defend themselves andconsequently – because of the weapons embargo – were dependent on the UN. The UNcommitted itself to protection and gearing its actions to that. The population of the SafeArea was helplessly left at the mercy of the attacks after the UN did not protect it against© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com137
- Page 85 and 86: 193. It is incomprehensible that Du
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- Page 103 and 104: 239. Plaintiff Hotič states (see E
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- Page 117 and 118: ‘We were deported to Tuzla later
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- Page 123 and 124: 277. Plaintiff Hasanović was born
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weapons <strong>of</strong> the VRS, or at least to stem the advance <strong>of</strong> the VRS. The fact that that didnot happen is due to the unwillingness <strong>of</strong> the UN and the State <strong>of</strong> the Netherlands.318. Plaintiff will presently deal with the adherence to the weapons embargo against theinhabitants <strong>of</strong> the Safe Area, that the UN actively impeded the resistance <strong>of</strong> theinhabitants <strong>of</strong> the Safe Area, that the UN insisted on demilitarisation, that there was noresponse to the requests for return <strong>of</strong> the seized (heavy) weapons, that there was noquestion <strong>of</strong> any defence <strong>of</strong> the Safe Area, that no air strikes took place or that thoseattacks were halted, and that there was no reporting <strong>of</strong> observed war crimes.Adherence to the weapons embargo319. The UN wrongfully adhered to the weapons embargo. That is also one <strong>of</strong> theconclusions drawn by the UN (see number 490 <strong>of</strong> the UN Report):‘The arms embargo did little more than freeze in place the military balance within theformer Jugoslavia. It left the Serbs in a position <strong>of</strong> overwhelming military dominanceand effectively deprived the Republic <strong>of</strong> Bosnia and Herzegovina <strong>of</strong> its right, un<strong>der</strong> theCharter <strong>of</strong> the United Nations, to self-defense. It was not necessarily a mistake toimpose an arms embargo, which after all had been done when Bosnia and Herzegovinawas not yet a Member State <strong>of</strong> the United Nations. Once that was done, however, theremust surely have been some attendant duty to protect Bosnia and Herzegovina, after itbecame a Member State, from the tragedy that then befell it. Even as the Serb attackson and strangulation <strong>of</strong> the “Safe Areas” continued in 1993 and 1994, all widelycovered by the media and, presumably, by diplomatic and intelligence reports to therespective Governments, the approach <strong>of</strong> the members <strong>of</strong> the Security Council remainedlargely constant. The international community still could not find the political will toconfront the menace defying it.’Actively hin<strong>der</strong>ing resistance320. The UN ensured that the Bosnian Army (ABiH) could not defend themselves andconsequently – because <strong>of</strong> the weapons embargo – were dependent on the UN. The UNcommitted itself to protection and gearing its actions to that. The population <strong>of</strong> the SafeArea was helplessly left at the mercy <strong>of</strong> the attacks after the UN did not protect it against© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com137
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