Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef
war crimes is, however, in reality incomprehensible. The Report of the FrenchParliament concluded that there was but one reason for not reporting the war crimeswhich was that the priority of the Dutch government during the entire crisis was theprotection of the Dutchbat soldiers held by the Bosnian Serbs. For that same reason TheNetherlands was also unresponsive to French proposals for military interventionfollowing the fall of the Safe Area (see the Report of the French Parliament, Part I, page102):‘L’explication est e realité assez simple: tout au long de la crise, la priorité dugouvernement néerlandais est de garantir la sécurité des soldats du Dutchbat détenuspar les Serbes. D’où une discrétion volontaire sur les exactions serbes. Dans le mêmeesprit, les Pays-Bas se montreront très réticents face aux propositions françaisesd’intervention military après la chute de l’enclave.’[Lawyer’s translation :The explanation is in reality pretty simple: the priority of the Dutch government duringthe entire crisis lay with the protection of the Dutch soldiers who were held by the Serbs.That was the reason for the deliberate silence about the Serb acts of violence. In thesame spirit The Netherlands showed itself to be very unresponsive to French proposalsfor military intervention after the fall of the enclave.]I.13. Role of Dutchbat in the separation of men from women and deportation253. The Bosnian Serbs began the process of deportation of the refugees on 12 and 13 July1995. To that end the Serbs wished to separate the men and boys from the women.Dutchbat did not stop that. Nor did Dutchbat report the separation, or at leastinsufficiently reported it. Instead Dutchbat soldiers even assisted with the separation anddeportation. The failure to report various matters was discussed above. Plaintiff willexamine below the co-operation given by Dutchbat soldiers in the separation and thedeportation.254. One Dutch officer, who was not prepared to co-operate with the separation anddeportation, stated on this before the Dutch Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry as© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com114
follows:‘An alternative position was that of observer. That is then what I did: do nothing,observe, note down names, record facts. If you find yourself in a situation in which youhave no weapons any more and you walk about in a T-shirt but you can still fill in those«millimetres», then that has to be your position. If you refrain from doing that orchoose another position, then you take a certain responsibility on yourself. I expresslydid not want to take on that responsibility. I tried to record what was actually going on.That was, to put it bluntly, a deportation. There is no other word for it.’That attitude led to a heated discussion on the spot between this officer and his superiors(see pages 2738 and 2739 of the NIOD Report). The officer in question stated that therewere Dutchbat soldiers who rendered assistance to the VRS with the separation anddeportation (see page 2740 of the NIOD Report).255. The then French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hervé de Charette, said on Frenchtelevision on 13 July 1995 that the Dutch blue helmets were accessories to ethniccleansing by virtue of their having co-operated with the deportation of the civilianpopulation (see page 2425 of the NIOD Report).256. Plaintiff will discuss below the role of Dutchbat at the time of the separation anddeportation. In addition to that the following matters will be discussed, inter alia,actively ensuring that the refugees proceeded towards the buses and trucks standingready, that they did not leave the rows leading to the buses and that men and boys couldnot enter the buses of the women.257. Plaintiff Fejzić states (Exhibit 1):‘We heard from the Dutch soldiers in the morning of 13th July 1995 that we were to betaken somewhere else. The Serbs and the Dutch soldiers had formed a sort of humanwall on two sides. We had to pass along this corridor of Dutch and Serbian soldierstowards the buses and trucks that stood ready. My son and I held each other tight.© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com115
- Page 63 and 64: Brantz, to establish that there was
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- Page 81 and 82: 180. Plaintiff Mujić states (see E
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- Page 103 and 104: 239. Plaintiff Hotič states (see E
- Page 105 and 106: People had no food or water, nor we
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- Page 123 and 124: 277. Plaintiff Hasanović was born
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war crimes is, however, in reality incomprehensible. The Report <strong>of</strong> the FrenchParliament concluded that there was but one reason for not reporting the war crimeswhich was that the priority <strong>of</strong> the Dutch government during the entire crisis was theprotection <strong>of</strong> the Dutchbat soldiers held by the Bosnian Serbs. For that same reason TheNetherlands was also unresponsive to French proposals for military interventionfollowing the fall <strong>of</strong> the Safe Area (see the Report <strong>of</strong> the French Parliament, Part I, page102):‘L’explication est e realité assez simple: tout au long de la crise, la priorité dugouvernement néerlandais est de garantir la sécurité des soldats du Dutchbat détenuspar les Serbes. D’où une discrétion volontaire sur les exactions serbes. Dans le mêmeesprit, les Pays-Bas se montreront très réticents face aux propositions françaisesd’intervention military après la chute de l’enclave.’[Lawyer’s translation :The explanation is in reality pretty simple: the priority <strong>of</strong> the Dutch government duringthe entire crisis lay with the protection <strong>of</strong> the Dutch soldiers who were held by the Serbs.That was the reason for the deliberate silence about the Serb acts <strong>of</strong> violence. In thesame spirit The Netherlands showed itself to be very unresponsive to French proposalsfor military intervention after the fall <strong>of</strong> the enclave.]I.13. Role <strong>of</strong> Dutchbat in the separation <strong>of</strong> men from women and deportation253. The Bosnian Serbs began the process <strong>of</strong> deportation <strong>of</strong> the refugees on 12 and 13 July1995. To that end the Serbs wished to separate the men and boys from the women.Dutchbat did not stop that. Nor did Dutchbat report the separation, or at leastinsufficiently reported it. Instead Dutchbat soldiers even assisted with the separation anddeportation. The failure to report various matters was discussed above. Plaintiff willexamine below the co-operation given by Dutchbat soldiers in the separation and thedeportation.254. One Dutch <strong>of</strong>ficer, who was not prepared to co-operate with the separation anddeportation, stated on this before the Dutch Parliamentary Commission <strong>of</strong> Enquiry as© <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com114