Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

More documents

Recommendations

Info

247. The reporting of war crimes, the raising of the alarm and not co-operating with theseparation of men/boys from women, could yet have made a great difference. As shownon page 69 et seq. of the Decision of the Yugoslavia Tribunal at first instance in the caseKrstic, the majority of executions took place between 14 and 17 July 1995 (see also page2545 of the NIOD Report), with the result that a report made and an alarm raised on 12to 13 July 1995 could have meant that still many of the lives could have been saved. Inthe UN Report it is stated under points 361-374 that the mass executions were begun on14 July 1995. Before that unarmed men and boys were murdered ‘only’ in theirhundreds.248. It emerges from the statement of Deputy Battalion Commander Franken, cited on page339 of the Summary of the NIOD Report, that not reporting and not acting against warcrimes were prompted by the wish ‘to keep the peace’. Franken stated:‘At the moment when you announce: “We are indeed afraid that the men will all bekilled”, there definitely will be panic among the crowd of Displaced Persons. Underthose circumstances we gave priority to the fate of the women and children. Weaccepted that the fate of the men was uncertain and that they indeed might end up in themost deplorable of circumstances.’That the desire to keep the peace was apparently sufficient justification for Franken topermit men and young boys to be taken away (whose fate was, according to Franken,sealed) is a balancing of issues that is not justifiable. Dutchbat wished to keep control ofthe refugees and not to protect them. In the light of the above the declaration of the ‘miniSafe Area’ was a conscious deception. Dutchbat ensured to the very end that therefugees did not themselves offer resistance to the VRS, which ultimately proved fatalfor so many.249. Scores of refugees in the mini Safe Area committed suicide from despair while Frankenattempted to ‘keep the peace’ (see page 332 of the Summary of the NIOD Report). Thatshould have been for everyone also an indication of the gravity of the situation. It isstriking that Dutchbat reported so few cases of suicide among the refugees. For example,there was an older man who returned from questioning by the Serbs, who was so© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com112
shocked by what he had evidently seen that he did not wish to talk about it. He ended hislife during the night by hanging himself. Dutchbat removed his corpse the following day(see page 2688 of the NIOD Report).250. A Dutchbat soldier anonymously stated in 1995 that a couple of refugees had hangedthemselves in despair. First a Dutchbat soldier openly stated before the YugoslaviaTribunal at first instance in the case Krstic that he had seen three to four suicide victims,two of whom he had cut down. An UNMO (UN Military Observers) stated also in thoseproceedings that he had cut down two men. The NIOD concluded in its Report that theprobability was that Dutchbat soldiers had seen more suicides but had not formallyreported them (see page 2688 of the NIOD Report).251. The Dutch ministers who were in the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCBC) inThe Hague on 11 July 1995 learned that the Serbs had overrun the Safe Area, and thatthirty hostages were in the hands of the VRS. There were other dispatches that all thewomen and children would be allowed to leave and that raised grave fears for the menand for wholesale slaughter (see page 2296 et seq. of the NIOD Report). It is stated onthat page also that the Spanish President of the EU was preparing a statement onSrebrenica and that Spain was of the opinion that Dutch soldiers must continue toprotect the local population. In its view The Netherlands was faced with a choice ofcontinuing with the humanitarian task or of ensuring the safety of its own soldiers. TheNIOD Report states on page 2299 that Dutch Prime Minister Kok declared that theprinciple was that Dutchbat was responsible for the fate and the future of the civilianpopulation. Despite that utterance the priority of the State of the Netherlands remainedcentred, however, on its own soldiers. By making that choice the State of theNetherlands failed to appreciate that the observed crimes should somehow have beenreported. If the alarm had been raised, action – by others if needs be – could have beentaken.252. The UN Report concluded (under points 346 through 358, as well as under point 474)that it was incomprehensible that Dutchbat did not report the war crimes where Dutchbatwas a witness. The UN Report will be discussed below. The reason for not reporting the© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten 2007www.vandiepen.com113
Page 1 and 2:
WRIT OF SUMMONSDISTRICT COURT, THE
Page 3 and 4:
IN ORDER:on Wednesday, thetwo thous
Page 5 and 6:
- every request by the inhabitants
Page 7 and 8:
8. The fate of the civilian populat
Page 9 and 10:
IV Tender of evidence 446I Facts5.
Page 11 and 12:
NIOD. This Report is referred to as
Page 13 and 14:
12. The Yugoslav People’s Army (o
Page 15 and 16:
‘Prior to departing, he addressed
Page 17 and 18:
- UN resolution 816 (31 March 1993)
Page 19 and 20:
No. 4:Decides to ensure full respec
Page 21 and 22:
…Should UNPROFOR’s presence pro
Page 23 and 24:
30. To reiterate here, the question
Page 25 and 26:
UN and the State of the Netherlands
Page 27 and 28:
Brigade. In addition, the State of
Page 29 and 30:
43. The choice in favour of deploym
Page 31 and 32:
The government parties replied to t
Page 33 and 34:
population during the training as
Page 35 and 36:
Potocari/Srebrenica. This chain of
Page 37 and 38:
63. As appears from the above, and
Page 39 and 40:
eference to the failure to act of D
Page 41 and 42:
‘I have been directed, today 29 M
Page 43 and 44:
leaders (Milosevic, Karadzic and Ml
Page 45 and 46:
observation post was not carried ou
Page 47 and 48:
attack on the Safe Area on 6 July 1
Page 49 and 50:
single shot being fired and OP-F wa
Page 51 and 52:
immediate and robust reaction Nicol
Page 53 and 54:
know what Dutchbat itself would do
Page 55 and 56:
that the enclave was continuously e
Page 57 and 58:
‘You are to use all means at your
Page 59 and 60:
Commander therefore gave the order
Page 61 and 62: he proposed to have Karremens arres
Page 63 and 64: Brantz, to establish that there was
Page 65 and 66: officers and the State of the Nethe
Page 67 and 68: had any purpose to go ahead with th
Page 69 and 70: Voorhoeve (see also number 307 of t
Page 71 and 72: y VRS soldiers in Dutch uniform and
Page 73 and 74: population: medical matters (Dutchb
Page 75 and 76: OP-N161. The capture of OP-N is des
Page 77 and 78: Brantz (Tuzla)↕Karremans, Franken
Page 79 and 80: ‘The first line of resistance to
Page 81 and 82: 180. Plaintiff Mujić states (see E
Page 83 and 84: The flight to the UN compound189. D
Page 85 and 86: 193. It is incomprehensible that Du
Page 87 and 88: soldiers let that be known when the
Page 89 and 90: Other points concerned forced evict
Page 91 and 92: ‘On 12 and 13 July 1995, upon the
Page 93 and 94: statements put in the proceedings a
Page 95 and 96: lying on a wagon. The Dutchbat sold
Page 97 and 98: 228. Only one Dutchbat officer was
Page 99 and 100: ‘UNMO source about 1,000 men take
Page 101 and 102: night-time. I did not dare to leave
Page 103 and 104: 239. Plaintiff Hotič states (see E
Page 105 and 106: People had no food or water, nor we
Page 107 and 108: During all of this the Dutch soldie
Page 109 and 110: group and they were raped. I was ve
Page 111: four or five Dutchbat soldiers were
Page 115 and 116: follows:‘An alternative position
Page 117 and 118: ‘We were deported to Tuzla later
Page 119 and 120: I arrived at the barrier shortly th
Page 121 and 122: encountered objections from the Dut
Page 123 and 124: 277. Plaintiff Hasanović was born
Page 125 and 126: Subašić282. Plaintiff Subašić w
Page 127 and 128: IILegal characterisationIntroductio
Page 129 and 130: the United Nations, Advisory opinio
Page 131 and 132: 302. The UN and the State of the Ne
Page 133 and 134: acting arise, respectively). In add
Page 135 and 136: of the Safe Area and was not immedi
Page 137 and 138: weapons of the VRS, or at least to
Page 139 and 140: consequence that the VRS could depl
Page 141 and 142: 326. Instead of taking action from
Page 143 and 144: ‘(…) I had spent days lying on
Page 145 and 146: 23 July 1995 (see H. Praamsma, J. P
Page 147 and 148: (a) (…) encouraging the progressi
Page 149 and 150: ‘Article 3 - General Principles1.
Page 151 and 152: control of UNPROFOR from the moment
Page 153 and 154: ‘The presumption can be rebutted
Page 155 and 156: ecame entwined. In his view, it was
Page 157 and 158: Conventions obliges the Contracting
Page 159 and 160: Article 8 of the ILC Articles for I
Page 161 and 162: - secondly, it was evident that the
Page 163 and 164:
international customary humanitaria
Page 165 and 166:
civilians, deportation and murder.
Page 167 and 168:
‘(…) confirm that Article I doe
Page 169 and 170:
also be assessed by legal criteria,
Page 171 and 172:
‘(14) UNPROFOR had participated a
Page 173 and 174:
under customary law. A duty on stat
Page 175 and 176:
and the State of the Netherlands ac
Page 177 and 178:
for International Organisations com
Page 179 and 180:
‘(c) Provide those who claim to b
Page 181 and 182:
the State of the Netherlands must p
Page 183 and 184:
of the Netherlands. The UN and the
Page 185 and 186:
‘militairement avait mal conduit.
Page 187 and 188:
UN but also to the purposes that ar
Page 189 and 190:
possible immunity on the part of th
Page 191 and 192:
‘The United Nations shall make pr
Page 193 and 194:
‘In spite of this provision of th
Page 195:
THEREFORE:If it pleases the Court t
show all

Writ of summons - Van Diepen Van der Kroef

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?