A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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Congo crisis began well before America had even taken notice of the new nation, andviolence continued after the American-backed Mobutu was deposed, with Kabila fightinga second war in 1998 before dying under mysterious circumstances.Yet there is no evidence that the United States set out to sow disarray or conflictin the Congo. Neither Eisenhower nor Kennedy had anything to gain through the chaosand brutality that characterized the Congo for much of 1960 and 1961. Indeed, the goal ofboth Administrations was quite the opposite, to establish a stable and peaceful state in theCongo, both for access to the country’s mineral resources and also to deny the spread ofcommunism into central Africa. The United States realized that in the Congo, as in muchof the Third World, it could pursue its interests strongly without enduring much scrutinyfrom the international community. Worldwide attention was rarely focused on the Congo,certainly less than it might have been given the years of violence and political turmoil.Indeed, G. Mennen Williams found that the U.S. standing in Africa was improved by itshandling of the Congo Crisis, itself a stark commentary on the neglect of the EisenhowerAdministration.In the end, the policies of Eisenhower and Kennedy were substantially similarbecause their points of view on Africa turned out to be more similar than either mighthave anticipated. Kennedy considered the question more carefully than Eisenhower, buthe ultimately joined his predecessor in the belief that meaningful cooperation with thecountries of Africa was not worth its costs, if it led to tensions with America’s Europeanallies or the possibility of a communist victory on the continent. For all the effortexpended by the U.S. to deal with the Congo Crisis, genuine American interests in thecountry were fairly weak, something that Kennedy came to realize. This meant that for95
(at least) two successive presidential administrations, it made sense to try to exertinfluence in order to arrive at a favorable resolution in the Congo, but that it was notworthwhile to fundamentally shift course. It was an excellent campaign strategy forKennedy to present himself at the forefront of this emerging issue in world affairs, and itwas a successful one. Kennedy may have been willing to adopt a more supportive stancein the best of circumstances, but that scenario did not come to pass. Kennedy and hisAdministration treated the Congo almost the same as Eisenhower and his Administrationhad.In their stances on Lumumba, in their efforts to replace him and in their responsesto the Katanga secession, Eisenhower and Kennedy acted like world leaders and lookedout primarily for their own national interests. Unfortunately, their national interestsseldom lined up with the national interests of the Congo, especially when the country wasruled by Patrice Lumumba. The great triumph of Kennedy’s personal charisma is that hewas able to convince so many skeptical people, in media, in the international arena or inthe historical profession, that he was doing something else.96
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TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
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adical and his party had won a plur
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Kennedy intended it to apply to for
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in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13:
found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15:
willingness to tolerate him because
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advisers were paying much attention
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A year later, responding to the pre
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On July 11, a few events dramatical
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Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
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Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27:
the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29:
Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31:
position from which they conspicuou
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Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35:
the President, especially in writte
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took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39:
to outside world that Lumumba was b
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embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
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ather than take a ministerial post
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Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
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assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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