A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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evidence for such an outcome. On this premise, the Soviets suggested that Tshombemight be responsible, but O’Brien said that this was unlikely. He blamed the troublesomeMunongo, possibly in conjunction with European mercenaries in Katanga. Cyrille Adoulafelt that Hammarskjold was “the victim of certain financial circles for whom a human lifeis worth less than a gram of copper and uranium.” 49 Ironically, the plane crash may havebeen the result of the pilot taking an unfamiliar and circuitous route to avoid interferenceby the single Katangese jet plane that had been causing so many problems.Hammarsjkold was quickly replaced by the Burmese diplomat U Thant, whomHammarskjold himself had mentioned as a possible successor. Thant had also been listedamong the possible U.N. envoys to the Congo after the debacle with Rajeshwar Dayal.Yet Thant did not have the same personal investment in African decolonization thatHammarskjold had shown, and was willing to leave Congo policy to his deputy RalphBunche. Bunche had remained deeply involved in the events in the Congo even after heleft Leopoldville, and the Americans were very satisfied to see him take an even moreprominent role under Thant. 50Tshombe continued his intended cease-fire negotiations with other U.N. officialsafter Hammarskjold died. On September 20, the U.N. and Tshombe reached a deal thatwould end the fighting and leave Tshombe in clear control of Katanga. In Leopoldville,Adoula made it clear that the cease-fire did not apply to his forces, a position which metwith support from the Soviet Union, which had decried the cease-fire as a form ofsurrender to Tshombe. The British, meanwhile, were glad that a cease-fire had beenreached, seeing it as a validation of their blocking the arrival of Ethiopian fighter planes.49 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 29850 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 300-187
A British official remarked to the press “If it is imperialist to try to halt fighting before itgets out of hand, then we’re imperialist.” 51Perhaps unsurprisingly, the reaction of the United States was more ambivalent.After Hammarskjold’s death, the Kennedy Administration had been anxious to bolster thelegitimacy of the U.N. and so demonstrated a new willingness to support its militaryactions in the Congo. The U.S. reversed course on its previous policy and allowedAmerican planes to be used to carry United Nations soldiers within the Congo for thefirst time. Hammarskjold had requested this capability before his death, but the UnitedStates was only willing to acquiesce on the evening of September 18, in the hope that theuse of the planes would “enhance chances achievement early cease fire under conditionsfavorable to UN achievement its basic objectives in Congo.” 52 The next day, Kennedyapproved a contingent offer of eight U.S. fighter jets to support and defend U.N. transportplanes, but not to intentionally seek out and engage enemy aircraft. In the end, the ceasefireand the arrival of airplanes from other U.N. nations meant that the Americancontribution was not needed.Nevertheless, Kennedy’s action was a major shift from the previousdiscouragement of any active involvement, and it is telling that it happened in response toa change in the U.N. structure and not a change in the ground situation in Katanga. Ifanything, Kennedy’s newfound resolve reflected his desire to end the fighting in Katangaas soon as possible. Although this was a shift in American objectives, it is consistent withEisenhower’s earlier realization that the Katanga secession represented a untenablesituation for the Congo. This attitude informed American readings of Tshombe’s actions51 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 30352 Telegram from Bowles to Gullion, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:22788
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TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7:
adical and his party had won a plur
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Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11:
in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13:
found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15:
willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17:
advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19:
A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21:
On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23:
Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25:
Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27:
the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29:
Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31:
position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33:
Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35:
the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37:
took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39:
to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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