A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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Kennedy intended it to apply to foreign policy as well. One of the new frontiers to whichAmericans could look in 1960 was that of Africa, with its abundance of newlyindependent countries, and it was a frontier for which the new President was uniquelywell-suited. As a Senator, Kennedy had made his name with an impassioned speech in1957 in support of Algeria’s attempt to gain independence from France. The speech wasdeeply unpopular with the French press as well as Americans of both parties, includingPresident Eisenhower and Eisenhower’s two-time Democratic opponent, AdlaiStevenson. 2 Yet it made a name for Kennedy in both domestic and international circles,and led him to be appointed Chairman of the brand new Senate Foreign RelationsSubcommittee on Africa in 1959. Kennedy’s adviser Ted Sorensen wasted no time inlooking for ways to “exploit” this position, hoping to establish Kennedy as a “concerned,farsighted, progressive American leader” as well as “the Senator who knows aboutAfrica.” 3 Kennedy used his familiarity with Africa to great effect in attacking theEisenhower Administration, particularly as his opponent in the 1960 presidential electionwas Vice-President Richard Nixon. In his speech on Algeria, Kennedy had describedEisenhower’s policy on the Third World as “cautious neutrality on all the real issues, anda restatement of our obvious dependence upon our European friends…and our obviousdesire not to become involved.” 4 After this scathing condemnation, Kennedy turned hisstatus as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa into a series of thirteen speechesabout the continent before a variety of interested bodies in 1959 and 1960. The speechesusually made the same general points, connecting Africa’s independence movement to2 Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 203 Memo from Sorensen to Kennedy, President’s Office Files, Box 114, Folder 64 Qtd. in Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, 205
the revolutionary history of the United States and establishing that America’s proper rolewas to offer education, food and development capital for the new countries.During the election, Kennedy tried to use Nixon’s reputation as a Cold Warrioragainst him, turning the Vice-President’s own words against him. “Our leaders may talkof ‘winning the battle for men’s minds,’ which the Vice President stressed upon hisreturn from that continent…but the people of Africa are more interested in developmentthan they are in doctrine. They are more interested in achieving a decent standard ofliving than in following the standards of either East or West.” 5 Yet he was just as quick tocondemn the Eisenhower Administration for losing Africa to communism; in one of hisdebates with Nixon, Kennedy said “I have seen us ignore Africa.” 6 His example was theradical regime in Guinea, which he used to bemoan the failure of the U.S. to reach out toAfrica and secure the continent in the anti-communist camp. Another common criticismof Kennedy’s was that Eisenhower tended to select political cronies as ambassadors toThird World countries, something he portrayed as an especially dangerous gamble giventhat such states were rarely considered safe from communist plots.On one level, this strategy was designed to appeal to African-American voterswho had noticed his poor record on civil rights while not alienating the white Southernwing of the Democratic Party. The fact that Kennedy could couch his agenda in anticommunistrhetoric made it practically beyond reproach. At the same time, it is clearfrom internal documents of the Kennedy Administration that the campaign’s focus onAfrica was not just a cynical political calculation. The Kennedy campaign’s briefingpaper on Africa declared that “American policy toward Africa has failed to either operate5 Kennedy’s Remarks to Conference of American Society on African Culture, Pre-Presidential Files, Box1030, Folder 236 Qtd. in Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, 306
Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59:
Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61:
overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63:
ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65:
States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67:
government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69:
he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71:
Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73:
stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75:
eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77:
gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79:
without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81:
also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83:
military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85:
The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87:
pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89:
announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91:
evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93:
after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95:
especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97:
ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99:
Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101:
BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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