A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
announced to the press that “this was the last time he would ask [Tshombe] to meet withthe Leopoldville leaders.” 43Hammarskjold and O’Brien saw Operation Morthor as the last step in ending theKatanga secession and thus, the Congo Crisis. Unfortunately, it turned out to besomething of a disaster, especially when compared to the efficient, decisive and bloodlessOperation Rumpunch. Members of the Katangese delegation in Leopoldville had warnedTshombe about the resolution, an easily-foreseeable outcome that crucially underminedthe element of surprise that had made the difference in Rumpunch. 44 Tshombe, afterexpressing a willingness to cooperate with O’Brien on the telephone, disappeared fromhis residence and fled to Rhodesia. O’Brien called the failure to secure Tshombe’sresidence the “fatal flaw” of Operation Morthor. 45 Without Tshombe’s presence on theradio to discourage resistance, fierce fighting broke out between the U.N. troops andmercenaries. O’Brien had planned the operation for the early morning of September 13 sothat it would be finished by the time Hammarskjold landed, but the fighting meant thatthe Secretary-General had to move on to Elisabethville almost immediately after landingin Leopoldville.The U.S. and the U.K., displeased with a much easier and more successful U.N.operation in Rumpunch, found themselves in a very difficult situation as fighting brokeout between the U.N. and the various Europeans and Katangese in Elisabethville.William Canup, the U.S. Consul in Elisabethville, identified the conflict by explainingthat the “situation places members of Consulate completely on side of UN despite our43 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 29144 Hoskyns, The Congo: A Chronology of Events, 1645 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 29285
willingness to recognize that UN has committed inexcusable blunders.” 46 Ralph Bunchetold Hammarskjold that the Americans were upset that Hammarskjold had not consultedwith them, even though they were the primary financial backers of the U.N. Operation inthe Congo. Ultimately, the U.S. and U.K. did not want to see an expanded role for theU.N. in Katanga, particularly a military one. Ambivalent about Tshombe in the firstplace, they were openly hostile to the notion of putting U.N. troops in danger to force hissurrender. Trying to address the U.N.’s aerial inferiority (Katanga had a single fighterplane, and thus one more than the U.N.), Hammarskjold asked for help from nearbyEthiopia, but the British refused permission for the Ethiopian planes to fly over Ugandaon the way. 47In an unenviable situation, Hammarskjold agreed to travel to Rhodesia to discussa cease-fire with Tshombe in person, an action attributed by some of his aids to a privateultimatum that threatened the end of British support for the U.N. Operation in the Congo.On the night of September 17, the Secretary-General’s plane checked in with airportofficials in the Rhodesian city of Ndola to announce its descent as expected, but thenradio communication ceased unexpectedly. After some waiting, the officials on theground surmised that Hammarskjold had changed his plans abruptly and went home. Itwas not until the next morning that the wreckage of the Secretary-General’s plane wasfound a few miles from its destination; one security guard was alive to tell the story buthe died a few days later. 48The U.N. would not rule out the possibility of attack or sabotage, and aninvestigation concluded in 1962 made the same conclusion, although it found no46 Telegram from Canup to State Department, FRUS, 1961-63, 20:21347 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 29548 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 29886
- Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
- Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
- Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
- Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
- Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
- Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
- Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
- Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
- Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
- Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
- Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
- Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
- Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
- Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
- Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
- Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
- Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
- Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
- Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
- Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
- Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
- Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
- Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
- Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
- Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
- Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
- Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
- Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
- Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
- Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
- Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
announced to <strong>the</strong> press that “this was <strong>the</strong> last time he would ask [Tshombe] to meet with<strong>the</strong> Leopoldville leaders.” 43Hammarskjold and O’Brien saw Operation Morthor as <strong>the</strong> last step <strong>in</strong> end<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>Katanga secession and thus, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Crisis. Unfortunately, it turned out to besometh<strong>in</strong>g of a disaster, especially when compared to <strong>the</strong> efficient, decisive and bloodlessOperation Rumpunch. Members of <strong>the</strong> Katangese delegation <strong>in</strong> Leopoldville had warnedTshombe about <strong>the</strong> resolution, an easily-foreseeable outcome that crucially underm<strong>in</strong>ed<strong>the</strong> element of surprise that had made <strong>the</strong> difference <strong>in</strong> Rumpunch. 44 Tshombe, afterexpress<strong>in</strong>g a will<strong>in</strong>gness to cooperate with O’Brien on <strong>the</strong> telephone, disappeared fromhis residence and fled to Rhodesia. O’Brien called <strong>the</strong> failure to secure Tshombe’sresidence <strong>the</strong> “fatal flaw” of Operation Morthor. 45 Without Tshombe’s presence on <strong>the</strong>radio to discourage resistance, fierce fight<strong>in</strong>g broke out between <strong>the</strong> U.N. troops andmercenaries. O’Brien had planned <strong>the</strong> operation for <strong>the</strong> early morn<strong>in</strong>g of September 13 sothat it would be f<strong>in</strong>ished by <strong>the</strong> time Hammarskjold landed, but <strong>the</strong> fight<strong>in</strong>g meant that<strong>the</strong> Secretary-General had to move on to Elisabethville almost immediately after land<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> Leopoldville.<strong>The</strong> U.S. and <strong>the</strong> U.K., displeased with a much easier and more successful U.N.operation <strong>in</strong> Rumpunch, found <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>in</strong> a very difficult situation as fight<strong>in</strong>g brokeout between <strong>the</strong> U.N. and <strong>the</strong> various Europeans and Katangese <strong>in</strong> Elisabethville.William Canup, <strong>the</strong> U.S. Consul <strong>in</strong> Elisabethville, identified <strong>the</strong> conflict by expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gthat <strong>the</strong> “situation places members of Consulate completely on side of UN despite our43 Qtd. <strong>in</strong> Kalb, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Cables, 29144 Hoskyns, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>: A Chronology of Events, 1645 Qtd. <strong>in</strong> Kalb, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Cables, 29285
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