A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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pointed out he had taken major risk re security Europeans.” 37 Linner confidentlydismissed this point, which only worried Godley more. He reported to the StateDepartment that he was “considerably concerned” about the “extended arrests anddeportation Belgian advisers which could mount to some 100 or 150 key men in allbranches of government who currently assuring some semblance of governmentaladministration. Action might also extend to technicians who keep public works,communications, transport operating.” 38Secretary of State Dean Rusk responded with an unsurprising take on Americaninterests in the Congo.While we approve removal of Belgian military personnel Katanga at earliestpossible date and believe this action will reduce Tshombe ability remain insecession we believe current situation requires great care and careful assessmentsubsequent UN steps if eventual political reconciliation is not to be jeopardized…We believe that Tshombe could provide conservative counterweight neededin Adoula government, and we hope UN will use new position of strength toinduce Tshombe's cooperation with central government and not to destroy him. 39Just days after securing the ascension of Adoula to the Premiership, Kennedy’s StateDepartment was undermining his most important goal because it feared the possibility ofa leftist majority in Leopoldville. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was evenmore explicit in his memoirs, “We wanted a united Congo, but not a CommunistCongo.” 40 Once again, the United States showed itself to be willing to accept undesirablecandidates for leadership positions based primarily on their anti-Communist credentials.Although the actions of the consular corps in Elisabethville calmed things down atfirst, the failure to round up all the foreigners meant tensions were not relaxed for long.37 Telegram from Godley to State Department, FRUS, 1961-63, 20:19938 Telegram from Godley to State Department, FRUS, 1961-63, 20:20039 Telegram from Rusk to Godley, FRUS, 1961-63, 20:20140 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 29083
On September 8, the U.N. found that 104 foreigners were missing and unaccounted for,presumably laying low among the European civilian population. 41 On September 9, theCongolese Parliament met in a secret session to approve a wide range of measuresintended to put an end to the Katangese secession. These included the suspension of theKatangese provincial assembly, the expulsion of all foreign military advisers, theoccupation of various government buildings, and the confiscation of all militaryequipment. The resolution passed in secret also had the effect of declaring a state ofexception in Katanga province, and issuing warrants for the arrest of five Katangeseleaders, including Tshombe and Munongo. These actions, including the arrests, would beundertaken by the U.N. troops in Katanga, although the plan called for O’Brien to use thethreat of arrest to convince Tshombe to negotiate an end to the secession, with thewarrant only being exercised if he refused. 42The operation, codenamed Morthor, would take place a few days later, onSeptember 13. In the few days between the resolution and its execution, the situationwould deteriorate even more. The belligerent Munongo apparently acted on his ownauthority to use the secret police, the Sureté, to arrest Michel Tombelaine, the deputyU.N. representative in Elisabethville. Although Tombelaine was quickly released,O’Brien’s demand that Tshombe dismiss Munongo was refused. By September 12,Tshombe had disregarded two other U.N. requests, that he meet with representatives ofthe Leopoldville government and then with Hammarskjold, who would arrive in theCongo on September 13. O’Brien’s patience with Tshombe had run out, and he41 Hoskyns, The Congo: A Chronology of Events,1642 Telegram from Gullion to State Department, FRUS, 1961-63, 20:20784
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TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7:
adical and his party had won a plur
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Kennedy intended it to apply to for
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in terms of American interest or to
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found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15:
willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17:
advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19:
A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21:
On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23:
Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25:
Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27:
the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29:
Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31:
position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33:
Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35:
the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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