A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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military action from turning into a wholesale slaughter of the region’s Balubapopulation. 26The Soviets sent hundred of trucks, first to the Atlantic port of Matadi and thenoverland to Luluabourg, the starting point for Lumumba’s campaign in South Kasai.They also provided ten Ilyushin IL-14 airplanes with crews of eight, including someSoviet technicians. 27 These considerations were crucial for the invasion of South Kasai;Lumumba almost certainly would not have been able to transport his troops through thethick jungles without them. The Soviet Union dispensed the aid directly, in flagrantdisregard of the clear requirement for all foreign aid to be administered through the U.N.However, it is clear that this was not a particularly meaningful aid package, especially inCold War terms. Khrushchev realized that the Soviet Union was not capable of providingsignificant military might to a nation that distance from Russia. Flights had to choosefrom two routes across Africa, one across the Sahara through Rabat and Accra andending in Leopoldville, and another from Cairo to Khartoum to Stanleyville. Neither wasdesirable nor feasible on a regular basis. 28Ultimately, Khrushchev opted for very limited Soviet aid, on the grounds that itmight improve Lumumba’s situation without being likely to provoke militaryintervention by Western powers that had already shown their commitment to a U.N.-ledsolution. Khrushchev was correct to doubt U.S. or European military intervention, but hedid not realize the alarm that his actions would cause. The Eisenhower Administrationregarded Lumumba’s turn to the Soviets as an ominous one and began devoting a greatdeal more attention to addressing the Congo Crisis, possibly through assassinating26 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 7027 Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 11028 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 5779
Lumumba. This turned out to be unnecessary because Lumumba’s use of Soviet planeson September 5 prompted the slow-moving President Kasavubu to oust Lumumba asPrime Minister that night.The limited nature of Soviet intervention did not prevent the EisenhowerAdministration from regarding it as a first-class threat. In a National Security Councilmeeting during the Congo’s tumultuous August, Maurice Stans, Director of the Bureau ofthe Budget, offered a racially-charged explanation for the Congo Crisis. “Mr. Stans saidthat it was the consensus of people who know the Congo that it was the objectiveof Lumumba to drive the whites out and to take over their property; that Lumumba hadno concept of the implications of such action for his country.” 29 Allen Dulles added hissuspicions that Lumumba was on the Soviet payroll, evidently considered it hisresponsibility to do so in each meeting of the NSC. The CIA’s man in Leopoldville,Lawrence Devlin, remarked that “we were convinced that we were observing thebeginning of a major Soviet effort to gain control of a key country in central Africa foruse as a springboard to control much of the continent.” 30The Board of National Estimates made a more thoughtful and realistic forecast ofLumumba’s future actions.Lumumba’s foreign policy would probably be opportunistic and quixotic. Hisprobable dependence for support and advice on the Bloc and on such Africancountries as Ghana and Guinea, coupled with his underlying anti-Belgian, antiwhitefeelings, would make him a left neutralist, but he would probably be hard tokeep pinned down…His wild behavior would probably irritate the older lineneutralists and pro-Western governments [in Africa]. 3129 Memo of National Security Council Meeting, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:42330 Qtd. in Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 11131 Memo from Board of National Estimates to Dulles, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:43980
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TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7:
adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9:
Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11:
in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13:
found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15:
willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17:
advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19:
A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21:
On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23:
Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25:
Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27:
the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29:
Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31:
position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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