A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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also warned the State Department about the imminent arrival of two top officials in theBelgian Communist Party, saying that their efforts might result in a “substantial increasein effectiveness and coordination communist influence in Congo government.” TheEmbassy feared that these imports might take over key governmental responsibilitiesfrom its “present collection of fly-by-nights, carpet baggers, embittered ex-civil servantsand African communists.” 21Lumumba’s more-or-less open break with the U.N. and Hammarskjoldhighlighted his increasingly isolated position even among the independent African states.Almost all African leaders, including his role model, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah,encouraged Lumumba to work within the U.N. framework. Nikita Khrushchev, perhapsworried that an increasingly marginalized Lumumba would be replaced by someone lesssympathetic to the Soviet cause, opted to increase his involvement. Although the Sovietshad been flouting the U.N. restrictions on bilateral aid from the beginning, by the end ofAugust, Khrushchev was ready to increase Soviet assistance beyond food and trucks, toinclude weapons, ammunition and technicians to support Lumumba’s army. 22With the knowledge that this aid was forthcoming, Lumumba acted boldly tosever his relationship with the U.N. and “settle the Katanga problem with our ownforces.” 23 On August 24, Lumumba demanded that the United Nations turn over controland security at the Leopoldville airport to his troops, threatening the use of force if theU.N. would not comply. Bunche tried to arrange a meeting with Lumumba to remind thePrime Minister that the U.N. had only been maintaining order since the violent attack onCanadian U.N. personnel a week prior, but Lumumba refused to meet with him. This21 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 6122 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 5823 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 6377

proved to be the last straw for Bunche, who declared “I’m a patient man, but my patiencehas worn thin.” 24 He returned to New York to brief his ill-fated successor RajeshwarDayal.On the same day, Lumumba seized planes from Air Congo to send soldiers toKasai, as part of a force intended to defeat Kalonji’s secession and then move on toKatanga. On this account, the Prime Minister again displayed his trademark impetuosity,preempting Gizenga’s plan to act a week later. Gizenga had publicly announced a targetdate at the end of August, since Belgian troops were expected to be removed by then.Lumumba even confirmed American fears by responding to a journalist’s question thatthe Congo had long “enjoyed the moral support of the Soviet Union…Today we arereceiving not only moral but also material support.” 25The next day, August 25, a collection of Africa’s foreign ministers arrived inLeopoldville for a conference whose purpose was to encourage Lumumba to back awayfrom his aggressive stance. The conference turned even more negative after the PrimeMinister invited his guests to join him on a visit to his base of power in Stanleyville.There, the ministers witnessed Lumumba’s review of the eight hundred troops heintended to send to Katanga as well as the aftermath of an unprovoked beating, bymembers of the Congolese army and police force, of ten U.N. airmen from the U.S. andCanada. Although Lumumba’s campaign in Kasai had an auspicious beginning, takingKalonji’s capital at Bakwanga and threatening the Katangese border under the commandof Czechoslovakian advisers, it quickly fell apart. When the Soviet planes showed up totransport reinforcements to Bakwanga on September 5, they were too late to stop the24 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 6225 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 6378

also warned <strong>the</strong> State Department about <strong>the</strong> imm<strong>in</strong>ent arrival of two top officials <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>Belgian Communist Party, say<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>ir efforts might result <strong>in</strong> a “substantial <strong>in</strong>crease<strong>in</strong> effectiveness and coord<strong>in</strong>ation communist <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>in</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> government.” <strong>The</strong>Embassy feared that <strong>the</strong>se imports might take over key governmental responsibilitiesfrom its “present collection of fly-by-nights, carpet baggers, embittered ex-civil servantsand African communists.” 21Lumumba’s more-or-less open break with <strong>the</strong> U.N. and Hammarskjoldhighlighted his <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly isolated position even among <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent African states.Almost all African leaders, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g his role model, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah,encouraged Lumumba to work with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.N. framework. Nikita Khrushchev, perhapsworried that an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly marg<strong>in</strong>alized Lumumba would be replaced by someone lesssympa<strong>the</strong>tic to <strong>the</strong> Soviet cause, opted to <strong>in</strong>crease his <strong>in</strong>volvement. Although <strong>the</strong> Sovietshad been flout<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> U.N. restrictions on bilateral aid from <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, by <strong>the</strong> end ofAugust, Khrushchev was ready to <strong>in</strong>crease Soviet assistance beyond food and trucks, to<strong>in</strong>clude weapons, ammunition and technicians to support Lumumba’s army. 22With <strong>the</strong> knowledge that this aid was forthcom<strong>in</strong>g, Lumumba acted boldly tosever his relationship with <strong>the</strong> U.N. and “settle <strong>the</strong> Katanga problem with our ownforces.” 23 On August 24, Lumumba demanded that <strong>the</strong> United Nations turn over controland security at <strong>the</strong> Leopoldville airport to his troops, threaten<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> use of force if <strong>the</strong>U.N. would not comply. Bunche tried to arrange a meet<strong>in</strong>g with Lumumba to rem<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong>Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister that <strong>the</strong> U.N. had only been ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g order s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> violent attack onCanadian U.N. personnel a week prior, but Lumumba refused to meet with him. This21 Qtd. <strong>in</strong> Kalb, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Cables, 6122 Kalb, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Cables, 5823 Qtd. <strong>in</strong> Kalb, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Cables, 6377

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