A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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without too much damage in Europe.” 16 This kind of calculation would be taken up,albeit reluctantly, by Kennedy when he came to office.Lumumba was unwilling to accept the argument made by representatives of theU.N. and the U.S. that the situation in Katanga could only be resolved slowly, withcareful negotiations. For Lumumba, the matter was clear: Katanga was a province of theRepublic of the Congo, and its secession was illegal. When the U.N. and the U.S. brushedoff his concerns, he elected to turn quickly to the other alternative, the Soviet Union.Lumumba recognized the danger to the Congolese state and acted in a way that hethought might minimize that danger. Without Katangese mining, the nation would beimpoverished and insignificant. Lumumba also felt that a strong centralized governmentwas necessary to unite the huge country, with its numerous tribal and linguistic divisions;the examples of Katanga and then South Kasai opened the possibility for furtherfragmentation. Lumumba also decided that he had no choice but to stand up to theBelgian business interests that he identified as being behind the Katanga secession in thefirst place. If he did not assert his right as elected Prime Minister to determine the futurefor all of the Congo, his rule would never be valid and the nation would remain at themercy of wealthy Europeans. The tragedy of Patrice Lumumba’s fall is that he wascorrect on all counts; the U.N. and the U.S. should have recognized that Lumumba’serratic behavior was partially a response to a legitimate crisis of existence for the nationthat he had just been chosen to lead. However, the U.N. and the U.S. had their owninterests to protect, and neither was willing to alienate Belgium or accelerate their plans.The Secretary-General entered Elisabethville on August 12, bringing only 240Swedish soldiers in the famous blue U.N. helmets, a force which Tshombe referred to16 Letter from Burden to Herter, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:38475
only as Hammarskjold’s bodyguard. 17 On August 14, the Belgians formally turned powerover to the new U.N. force, with troops from neutral African countries joining theSwedes in Katanga in a matter of days. Hammarskjold felt that bringing the U.N. force toElisabethville without bloodshed had been a tremendous achievement, but Lumumba didnot feel the same way. Lumumba had wanted to accompany Hammarskjold toElisabethville and to use U.N. planes to bring his own troops in to crush the insurrection.Instead, Hammarskjold had chosen to sidestep Lumumba and confer directly withTshombe, seeming to grant legitimacy to an independent Katanga.Lumumba wrote the Secretary-General a series of angry letters, accusing the U.N.of “acting as though my government…did not exist” and declaring ostentatiously that“the government and people of the Congo have lost their confidence in the Secretary-General.” 18 Lumumba was also extremely critical of the U.N. for using only Swedishtroops at the outset. “How can you imagine, just like that, a hat painted blue is enough toeliminate the complexes of conservative officers from Sweden or Canada or GreatBritain?” he asked a journalist. It was clear to Lumumba that the U.N. soldiers wouldtake the Belgian side, since they shared “the same past, the same history, the same tastefor our riches.” 19 At a meeting of the National Security Council, the view was advancedthat the letters may have been written as part of a communist conspiracy: “Hammarskjoldbelieves that they were written by a Belgian Communist who is Lumumba’s chief ofcabinet. Others, however, think that a Soviet attaché in the Congo, who has hadextensive UN experience, may have been the author.” 20 The U.S. Embassy in Brussels17 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 4818 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 4819 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 49-5020 Memo of National Security Meeting, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:42276
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TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7:
adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9:
Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11:
in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13:
found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15:
willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17:
advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19:
A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21:
On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23:
Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25:
Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27:
the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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