A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

in the Katanga and who held its economy together.” 14 They were particularlydisappointed with Hammarskjold’s rush to enter Katanga, as it “did not provide any timefor meaningful negotiations between Mr. Bunche and the Katanga authorities.” 15 TheBelgian government felt that Hammarskjold had disregarded its wishes and acceded to aplan that would placate Lumumba, an understanding that would not be borne out byLumumba’s stated response. The United Nations was in the difficult position of resolvinga conflict between two states with a long history of antagonism and diametricallyopposed agendas, each of whom was important to the organization in different ways;Hammarskjold could not afford to lose face in Africa or in Western Europe.The United States faced a similar dilemma, a not uncommon problem ininternational politics when the Cold War ran up against decolonization. However, theEisenhower Administration decided decisively that its interests were primarily alignedwith those of Europe. William Burden, the U.S. Ambassador to Belgium, wrote a letter toSecretary of State Herter to remind him of what was most important. While recognizingthe difficult position that Herter was in, Burden said, “I think the pendulum has nowswung too much in the Congo direction and we must give full consideration to the veryserious damage which our actions are causing to Belgo-American relations andto NATO as a whole.” It was an emerging dilemma in the Cold War foreign policy of theUnited States, as Burden realized: “I am sure that continued problems of this nature willarise because of the inevitable dichotomy of trying to do as much as possible in Africa14 Memo of Conversation between Herter and Louis Scheyven, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:38715 Memo of Conversation between Herter and Louis Scheyven, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:38774