A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
gentle and realistic tack with the Belgians, hoping to achieve the desired result of gettingBelgians out of the Congo without alienating their government.On August 2, the same day that Herter sent that telegram to Brussels,Hammarskjold announced that the U.N. force would be allowed to enter Katanga a fewdays later, on August 6. Yet almost immediately, these plans had to be postponed, asTshombe told the Secretary-General’s special representative Ralph Bunche thatregardless of what the Belgian government had agreed, he planned to stop U.N.intervention using force. Bunche agreed with Hammarskjold that the likelihood ofviolence was now so high that the U.N. would require a stronger Security Councilmandate. Hammarskjold hoped that body would pass a resolution, definitively stating thatKatanga was part of the Republic of the Congo, and that the Security Council’s previousresolutions should be applied to even the secessionist provinces, of which there were nowtwo. 13 On August 8, Katanga had been joined by South Kasai, declared independentunder the presidency of Lumumba’s old rival, Albert Kalonji. The secession of SouthKasai provided a buffer zone between troops of the central government in Leopoldvilleand their goal in Katanga.Hammarskjold’s actions had the unfortunate effect of upsetting almost everyone.Lumumba and the Soviets were apoplectic about this further delay, saying that Tshombedid not pose a credible military threat and that the U.N. had fallen victim to a ridiculousbluff. At the same time, the Belgian Ambassador to the United States told Herter that “theBelgians feel they have been abused and Hammarskjold had not acted properly…theeffect of Hammarskjold’s action had been extremely bad on the 23,000 whites who lived13 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 42-4373
in the Katanga and who held its economy together.” 14 They were particularlydisappointed with Hammarskjold’s rush to enter Katanga, as it “did not provide any timefor meaningful negotiations between Mr. Bunche and the Katanga authorities.” 15 TheBelgian government felt that Hammarskjold had disregarded its wishes and acceded to aplan that would placate Lumumba, an understanding that would not be borne out byLumumba’s stated response. The United Nations was in the difficult position of resolvinga conflict between two states with a long history of antagonism and diametricallyopposed agendas, each of whom was important to the organization in different ways;Hammarskjold could not afford to lose face in Africa or in Western Europe.The United States faced a similar dilemma, a not uncommon problem ininternational politics when the Cold War ran up against decolonization. However, theEisenhower Administration decided decisively that its interests were primarily alignedwith those of Europe. William Burden, the U.S. Ambassador to Belgium, wrote a letter toSecretary of State Herter to remind him of what was most important. While recognizingthe difficult position that Herter was in, Burden said, “I think the pendulum has nowswung too much in the Congo direction and we must give full consideration to the veryserious damage which our actions are causing to Belgo-American relations andto NATO as a whole.” It was an emerging dilemma in the Cold War foreign policy of theUnited States, as Burden realized: “I am sure that continued problems of this nature willarise because of the inevitable dichotomy of trying to do as much as possible in Africa14 Memo of Conversation between Herter and Louis Scheyven, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:38715 Memo of Conversation between Herter and Louis Scheyven, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:38774
- Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
- Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
- Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
- Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
- Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
- Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
- Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
- Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
- Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
- Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
- Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
- Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
- Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
- Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
- Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
- Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
- Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
- Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
- Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
- Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
- Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
- Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
- Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
- Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
- Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
- Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
- Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
- Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
- Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
- Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
- Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
- Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
- Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
- Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
- Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
- Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
- Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
gentle and realistic tack with <strong>the</strong> Belgians, hop<strong>in</strong>g to achieve <strong>the</strong> desired result of gett<strong>in</strong>gBelgians out of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> without alienat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir government.On August 2, <strong>the</strong> same day that Herter sent that telegram to Brussels,Hammarskjold announced that <strong>the</strong> U.N. force would be allowed to enter Katanga a fewdays later, on August 6. Yet almost immediately, <strong>the</strong>se plans had to be postponed, asTshombe told <strong>the</strong> Secretary-General’s special representative Ralph Bunche thatregardless of what <strong>the</strong> Belgian government had agreed, he planned to stop U.N.<strong>in</strong>tervention us<strong>in</strong>g force. Bunche agreed with Hammarskjold that <strong>the</strong> likelihood ofviolence was now so high that <strong>the</strong> U.N. would require a stronger Security Councilmandate. Hammarskjold hoped that body would pass a resolution, def<strong>in</strong>itively stat<strong>in</strong>g thatKatanga was part of <strong>the</strong> Republic of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>, and that <strong>the</strong> Security Council’s previousresolutions should be applied to even <strong>the</strong> secessionist prov<strong>in</strong>ces, of which <strong>the</strong>re were nowtwo. 13 On August 8, Katanga had been jo<strong>in</strong>ed by South Kasai, declared <strong>in</strong>dependentunder <strong>the</strong> presidency of Lumumba’s old rival, Albert Kalonji. <strong>The</strong> secession of SouthKasai provided a buffer zone between troops of <strong>the</strong> central government <strong>in</strong> Leopoldvilleand <strong>the</strong>ir goal <strong>in</strong> Katanga.Hammarskjold’s actions had <strong>the</strong> unfortunate effect of upsett<strong>in</strong>g almost everyone.Lumumba and <strong>the</strong> Soviets were apoplectic about this fur<strong>the</strong>r delay, say<strong>in</strong>g that Tshombedid not pose a credible military threat and that <strong>the</strong> U.N. had fallen victim to a ridiculousbluff. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> Belgian Ambassador to <strong>the</strong> United States told Herter that “<strong>the</strong>Belgians feel <strong>the</strong>y have been abused and Hammarskjold had not acted properly…<strong>the</strong>effect of Hammarskjold’s action had been extremely bad on <strong>the</strong> 23,000 whites who lived13 Kalb, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Cables, 42-4373
Change language