A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
eminder of the low priority that Eisenhower placed on Africa as well as of Lumumba’simpetuosity. It was Lumumba’s unwavering devotion to reuniting the Congo andexpelling Belgian troops that precipitated the American-Soviet clash in the Congo.At the same time that Lumumba was in Washington meeting with Secretary ofState Christian Herter and Deputy Secretary of State Max Dillon, the meeting thatinspired the Eisenhower Administration to consider replacing him, Dag Hammarskjoldwas in Brussels negotiating for the removal of Belgian troops. Hammarskjold made someprogress before leaving for his next stop in Leopoldville. The Secretary-General spent thelast few days of July meeting with the Council of Ministers, led by Deputy PremierAntoine Gizenga during Lumumba’s absence. Hammarskjold hoped to make it clear thatthe U.N. did not recognize Katanga’s independence, but that the U.N. did not want toinvolve itself until it could come to some kind of agreement with Belgian and Katangeseofficials. Gizenga followed in the footsteps of his mentor Lumumba by making anembarrassing speech at a dinner in Hammarskjold’s honor, implying that the UnitedNations was only looking out for Belgian interests. 10The impatience demonstrated by Gizenga and the Council of Ministers wasreflected in Lumumba’s actions in New York, sending an aggressive letter to the SecurityCouncil President pushing for faster resolution in Katanga and meeting with the SovietDeputy Foreign Minister, Vasilly Kuznetsov. The Soviets responded dramatically toLumumba’s advances, appointing their first Ambassador to Leopoldville, and threateningexactly the kind of involvement that the U.S. and the U.N. feared. Moscow promisedsignificant economic assistance for the Congo, complete with Soviet technicians, all on abilateral basis outside the U.N. More alarming was the August 1 statement that “In the10 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 4071
event of the aggression against the Congo continuing…the Soviet government will nothesitate to take resolute measures to rebuff the aggressors who…are in fact acting withthe encouragement of all the colonialist powers of NATO.” 11This comment, along with Gizenga’s uncooperativeness, led Hammarskjold tomake a panicked request for American assistance, hoping that the U.S. would be able toprevail upon Brussels to remove their troops in short order. The Secretary-Generalworried that if Belgium did not announce such an intention, the return of Lumumba fromAmerica might herald the outbreak of civil war, giving the Soviets a reason to intervenemilitarily. At this point in the process, the U.S. thought it unlikely the U.S.S.R. wouldinvolve itself in what was still seen as a backwater tribal scuffle. Herter and the rest ofEisenhower’s State Department had advised Hammarskjold to tread carefully in hisdealings with Belgium, afraid to alienate a NATO ally. However, Herter was willing togo along with Hammarskjold to a degree, sending a message to the U.S. Ambassador inBrussels that “Belgium must be prepared accept such withdrawal as fact of life.” Herteroffers the rationale that the “U.S. assumes Belgian long-term interest in Congo is torestore and maintain Belgian economic presence there and deny it to Communists. If thiscorrect, believes troop and base issues must be subordinated economic issue.” He goes onto soften his instructions, saying that the Americans would use their influence withHammarskjold to return many Belgians to the Congo as soon as possible: “U.S. wouldpoint out complexity Congo situation, stating that only long Belgian experience in Congocan hope restore economic and technical situation in short term.” 12 Thus, Herter took a11 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 4112 Telegram from Herter to Burden, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:38272
- Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
- Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
- Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
- Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
- Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
- Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
- Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
- Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
- Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
- Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
- Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
- Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
- Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
- Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
- Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
- Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
- Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
- Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
- Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
- Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
- Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
- Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
- Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
- Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
- Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
- Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
- Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
- Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
- Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
- Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
- Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
- Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
- Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
- Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
- Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
- Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
- Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
- Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
event of <strong>the</strong> aggression aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g…<strong>the</strong> Soviet government will no<strong>the</strong>sitate to take resolute measures to rebuff <strong>the</strong> aggressors who…are <strong>in</strong> fact act<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>the</strong> encouragement of all <strong>the</strong> colonialist powers of NATO.” 11This comment, along with Gizenga’s uncooperativeness, led Hammarskjold tomake a panicked request for American assistance, hop<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> U.S. would be able toprevail upon Brussels to remove <strong>the</strong>ir troops <strong>in</strong> short order. <strong>The</strong> Secretary-Generalworried that if Belgium did not announce such an <strong>in</strong>tention, <strong>the</strong> return of Lumumba fromAmerica might herald <strong>the</strong> outbreak of civil war, giv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Soviets a reason to <strong>in</strong>tervenemilitarily. At this po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process, <strong>the</strong> U.S. thought it unlikely <strong>the</strong> U.S.S.R. would<strong>in</strong>volve itself <strong>in</strong> what was still seen as a backwater tribal scuffle. Herter and <strong>the</strong> rest ofEisenhower’s State Department had advised Hammarskjold to tread carefully <strong>in</strong> hisdeal<strong>in</strong>gs with Belgium, afraid to alienate a NATO ally. However, Herter was will<strong>in</strong>g togo along with Hammarskjold to a degree, send<strong>in</strong>g a message to <strong>the</strong> U.S. Ambassador <strong>in</strong>Brussels that “Belgium must be prepared accept such withdrawal as fact of life.” Herteroffers <strong>the</strong> rationale that <strong>the</strong> “U.S. assumes Belgian long-term <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> is torestore and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> Belgian economic presence <strong>the</strong>re and deny it to Communists. If thiscorrect, believes troop and base issues must be subord<strong>in</strong>ated economic issue.” He goes onto soften his <strong>in</strong>structions, say<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> Americans would use <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>fluence withHammarskjold to return many Belgians to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> as soon as possible: “U.S. wouldpo<strong>in</strong>t out complexity <strong>Congo</strong> situation, stat<strong>in</strong>g that only long Belgian experience <strong>in</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>can hope restore economic and technical situation <strong>in</strong> short term.” 12 Thus, Herter took a11 Qtd. <strong>in</strong> Kalb, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Cables, 4112 Telegram from Herter to Burden, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:38272
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