A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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eminder of the low priority that Eisenhower placed on Africa as well as of Lumumba’simpetuosity. It was Lumumba’s unwavering devotion to reuniting the Congo andexpelling Belgian troops that precipitated the American-Soviet clash in the Congo.At the same time that Lumumba was in Washington meeting with Secretary ofState Christian Herter and Deputy Secretary of State Max Dillon, the meeting thatinspired the Eisenhower Administration to consider replacing him, Dag Hammarskjoldwas in Brussels negotiating for the removal of Belgian troops. Hammarskjold made someprogress before leaving for his next stop in Leopoldville. The Secretary-General spent thelast few days of July meeting with the Council of Ministers, led by Deputy PremierAntoine Gizenga during Lumumba’s absence. Hammarskjold hoped to make it clear thatthe U.N. did not recognize Katanga’s independence, but that the U.N. did not want toinvolve itself until it could come to some kind of agreement with Belgian and Katangeseofficials. Gizenga followed in the footsteps of his mentor Lumumba by making anembarrassing speech at a dinner in Hammarskjold’s honor, implying that the UnitedNations was only looking out for Belgian interests. 10The impatience demonstrated by Gizenga and the Council of Ministers wasreflected in Lumumba’s actions in New York, sending an aggressive letter to the SecurityCouncil President pushing for faster resolution in Katanga and meeting with the SovietDeputy Foreign Minister, Vasilly Kuznetsov. The Soviets responded dramatically toLumumba’s advances, appointing their first Ambassador to Leopoldville, and threateningexactly the kind of involvement that the U.S. and the U.N. feared. Moscow promisedsignificant economic assistance for the Congo, complete with Soviet technicians, all on abilateral basis outside the U.N. More alarming was the August 1 statement that “In the10 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 4071
event of the aggression against the Congo continuing…the Soviet government will nothesitate to take resolute measures to rebuff the aggressors who…are in fact acting withthe encouragement of all the colonialist powers of NATO.” 11This comment, along with Gizenga’s uncooperativeness, led Hammarskjold tomake a panicked request for American assistance, hoping that the U.S. would be able toprevail upon Brussels to remove their troops in short order. The Secretary-Generalworried that if Belgium did not announce such an intention, the return of Lumumba fromAmerica might herald the outbreak of civil war, giving the Soviets a reason to intervenemilitarily. At this point in the process, the U.S. thought it unlikely the U.S.S.R. wouldinvolve itself in what was still seen as a backwater tribal scuffle. Herter and the rest ofEisenhower’s State Department had advised Hammarskjold to tread carefully in hisdealings with Belgium, afraid to alienate a NATO ally. However, Herter was willing togo along with Hammarskjold to a degree, sending a message to the U.S. Ambassador inBrussels that “Belgium must be prepared accept such withdrawal as fact of life.” Herteroffers the rationale that the “U.S. assumes Belgian long-term interest in Congo is torestore and maintain Belgian economic presence there and deny it to Communists. If thiscorrect, believes troop and base issues must be subordinated economic issue.” He goes onto soften his instructions, saying that the Americans would use their influence withHammarskjold to return many Belgians to the Congo as soon as possible: “U.S. wouldpoint out complexity Congo situation, stating that only long Belgian experience in Congocan hope restore economic and technical situation in short term.” 12 Thus, Herter took a11 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 4112 Telegram from Herter to Burden, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:38272
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TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7:
adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9:
Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11:
in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13:
found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15:
willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17:
advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19:
A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21:
On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23:
Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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