A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
stability in Katanga, and in neighboring and economically-linked Rhodesia, wasdemonstrably a factor in American interest in the region.That said, the economic interests, while present, should not be overstated. Lessthan 3% of U.S. copper imports came from Katanga, and only around one-fourth ofAmerica’s copper needs were imported at all. 5 Katangese and Rhodesian copper mineswere actually more important to U.S. allies in Western Europe, which suggests only anindirect economic interest for the United States, but helps to explain the actions ofBelgium and the U.K. in supporting the independent regime in Katanga. Thisconsideration helps explain the continued interest of Eisenhower and Kennedy, as bothwere reluctant to cause problems with America’s Cold War allies in Europe. Yet it comesas no surprise that American direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa was a tiny portionof all foreign direct investment, and almost all of that went to white-ruled regimes inSouth Africa, Rhodesia and Angola. American direct investment in the Congo in 1960totaled less than $20 million, hardly a substantial figure. 6Even though Katanga was not essential to American interests, the substantial yieldof its mines called into question the economic viability of the Republic of the Congowithout it. Lumumba and Kasavubu planned to land in Elisabethville, capital of Katanga,on July 12 to discuss the situation with Moise Tshombe, the provincial president andleader of independent Katanga. As they approached the runway, a combined force ofKatangese and Belgian troops denied them permission to land. Katanga’s economicinterests were tied closely with those of Belgium, and Tshombe had demonstrated awillingness to allow the Europeans to maintain a presence in Katanga. Even before5 Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 296 Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 3169
declaring independence, he had requested the assistance of Belgian paratroopers inrestoring order in Elisabethville. Lumumba responded by demanding that all Belgianmilitary be withdrawn from the Congo immediately and turning to the United Nations forhelp.The secession of Katanga had broad implications for the nascent Congolese state.Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon told the National Security Council that “if theCongo was to be a viable state, it would need the resources of Katanga.” 7 But in additionto depriving the nation of more than half its revenue, the secession served to encouragedseparatism in neighboring South Kasai, which had its own mineral wealth in the form ofindustrial diamonds. Tshombe, a member of the Lunda tribe, was quick to recognize theindependent regime of Albert Kalonji, in an effort to curry favor with the Balubas, spreadacross South Kasai and northern Katanga. However, the Baluba feared domination by theLunda, and armed resistance to Tshombe’s government swelled up throughout northernKatanga. Tshombe responded by releasing mercenary troops in retaliation, as both sidescommitted terrible atrocities, before the U.N. intervened to save the Baluba fromextermination. 8Lumumba, meanwhile, found the Katangese secession to be totally unacceptable;he declared that it “tore the heart out of Congolese nationhood.” 9 After July 11,Lumumba and Kasavubu did not authorize the use of Belgian soldiers to restore order,but this did not prevent the Europeans from intervening all over the country, sometimesin response to appeals for support from Tshombe. The element that Lumumba foundparticularly outrageous was the length of delays in response from U.S. or U.N., a7 Memo of National Security Council Meeting, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:4238 Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, 92-939 Qtd. in Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, 9470
- Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
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- Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
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- Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
- Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
- Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
- Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
- Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
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- Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
- Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
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- Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
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- Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
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- Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
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- Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
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- Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
- Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
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- Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
- Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
- Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
- Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
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- Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
declar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dependence, he had requested <strong>the</strong> assistance of Belgian paratroopers <strong>in</strong>restor<strong>in</strong>g order <strong>in</strong> Elisabethville. Lumumba responded by demand<strong>in</strong>g that all Belgianmilitary be withdrawn from <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> immediately and turn<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> United Nations forhelp.<strong>The</strong> secession of Katanga had broad implications for <strong>the</strong> nascent <strong>Congo</strong>lese state.Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon told <strong>the</strong> National Security Council that “if <strong>the</strong><strong>Congo</strong> was to be a viable state, it would need <strong>the</strong> resources of Katanga.” 7 But <strong>in</strong> additionto depriv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> nation of more than half its revenue, <strong>the</strong> secession served to encouragedseparatism <strong>in</strong> neighbor<strong>in</strong>g South Kasai, which had its own m<strong>in</strong>eral wealth <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of<strong>in</strong>dustrial diamonds. Tshombe, a member of <strong>the</strong> Lunda tribe, was quick to recognize <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>dependent regime of Albert Kalonji, <strong>in</strong> an effort to curry favor with <strong>the</strong> Balubas, spreadacross South Kasai and nor<strong>the</strong>rn Katanga. However, <strong>the</strong> Baluba feared dom<strong>in</strong>ation by <strong>the</strong>Lunda, and armed resistance to Tshombe’s government swelled up throughout nor<strong>the</strong>rnKatanga. Tshombe responded by releas<strong>in</strong>g mercenary troops <strong>in</strong> retaliation, as both sidescommitted terrible atrocities, before <strong>the</strong> U.N. <strong>in</strong>tervened to save <strong>the</strong> Baluba fromexterm<strong>in</strong>ation. 8Lumumba, meanwhile, found <strong>the</strong> Katangese secession to be totally unacceptable;he declared that it “tore <strong>the</strong> heart out of <strong>Congo</strong>lese nationhood.” 9 After July 11,Lumumba and Kasavubu did not authorize <strong>the</strong> use of Belgian soldiers to restore order,but this did not prevent <strong>the</strong> Europeans from <strong>in</strong>terven<strong>in</strong>g all over <strong>the</strong> country, sometimes<strong>in</strong> response to appeals for support from Tshombe. <strong>The</strong> element that Lumumba foundparticularly outrageous was <strong>the</strong> length of delays <strong>in</strong> response from U.S. or U.N., a7 Memo of National Security Council Meet<strong>in</strong>g, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:4238 Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal <strong>in</strong> Africa, 92-939 Qtd. <strong>in</strong> Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal <strong>in</strong> Africa, 9470
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