A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

stability in Katanga, and in neighboring and economically-linked Rhodesia, wasdemonstrably a factor in American interest in the region.That said, the economic interests, while present, should not be overstated. Lessthan 3% of U.S. copper imports came from Katanga, and only around one-fourth ofAmerica’s copper needs were imported at all. 5 Katangese and Rhodesian copper mineswere actually more important to U.S. allies in Western Europe, which suggests only anindirect economic interest for the United States, but helps to explain the actions ofBelgium and the U.K. in supporting the independent regime in Katanga. Thisconsideration helps explain the continued interest of Eisenhower and Kennedy, as bothwere reluctant to cause problems with America’s Cold War allies in Europe. Yet it comesas no surprise that American direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa was a tiny portionof all foreign direct investment, and almost all of that went to white-ruled regimes inSouth Africa, Rhodesia and Angola. American direct investment in the Congo in 1960totaled less than $20 million, hardly a substantial figure. 6Even though Katanga was not essential to American interests, the substantial yieldof its mines called into question the economic viability of the Republic of the Congowithout it. Lumumba and Kasavubu planned to land in Elisabethville, capital of Katanga,on July 12 to discuss the situation with Moise Tshombe, the provincial president andleader of independent Katanga. As they approached the runway, a combined force ofKatangese and Belgian troops denied them permission to land. Katanga’s economicinterests were tied closely with those of Belgium, and Tshombe had demonstrated awillingness to allow the Europeans to maintain a presence in Katanga. Even before5 Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 296 Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 3169