A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

unning high and Congolese think they doing excellent job.” 55 Meanwhile the U.S.S.R.had realized that Gizenga’s national standing was probably lost when he had stubbornlyrefused to go to Lovanium. Gizenga’s self-defeating move had alienated the Soviets, sothey were well-disposed to accept new leadership in the Congo, choosing to cut ties witha friendly but increasingly ineffective opposition movement. Soviet officials looked at theAdoula government “as the legitimate successor of the government headed byLumumba,” and noted that “followers of Lumumba and Gizenga hold the majority ofposts in it.” 56 Even after the new government was announced, with Gizenga playing asupposedly major role, he remained in Stanleyville amidst rapidly decaying support. AsGodley pointed out, Gizenga’s “physical removal from scene and absence directleadership have incited unfavorable comment many his former ardent supporters.” 57Adoula made the bold decision to go to the stronghold of his adversary, where hereceived a reassuring welcome and convinced Gizenga to publicly recognize hisgovernment. Gizenga conspicuously left out any reference to future plans to go toLeopoldville.Tshombe realized that he had put himself in a bad place, having been left out ofthe new national government while the U.S. and U.N. could finally turn their fullattention to bringing him back to the fold. On August 3, he met with the U.S. consul inElisabethville, William Canup, who observed that “Tshombe seemed shaken andappeared to be seeking desperately for way to protect stability of Katanga which he feelscould be endangered by re-entry into Congo without adequate guarantees or by possiblemilitary action by Leopoldville Government.” He also reported that “Tshombe stated that55 Telegram from Godley to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:19156 Qtd. in Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 17057 Telegram from Godley to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:19064