A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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government was “as good as we could reasonably expect” and that their side had givenaway “the absolute minimum” needed to secure victory. 52Rusk’s memo for the President reflected similar thinking, saying “we consideredthat the risks of Gizengist inclusion…would be less of a risk than leaving Gizenga in hisOrientale redoubt where he is a standing invitation to Communist penetration and wherehis isolation tends to drive him closer to the Soviet Bloc.” Rusk set the stage for anotherhurdle in setting up a Congolese state acceptable to American interests, as “the nextmajor task, would be greatly facilitated if the mineral-rich Katanga were to included insome workable way.” He ended with a response to Kennedy’s stated concern, bypromising the imminent arrival of Gullion while describing Godley’s work in the absenceof a permanent Ambassador as “excellent.” 53 Kennedy’s Deputy Special Assistant forNational Security Affairs Walt Rostow added a supplement, laying out the possibility that“if Gizenga and the Katanga group agree to participate in the Adoula government in arelatively constructive manner…we could be witnessing the most encouraging newdevelopment since you became President.” Although Rostow acknowledged that theactions of leaders in Stanleyville and Elisabethville are unpredictable, “you should knowthat there is optimism all over town that the Congo situation is on its way towardsolution.” 54Reactions from the superpowers were restrained: the U.S. did not want toundermine the relatively neutral perception of Adoula, either in the Congo or in theinternational community. Godley recommended that the U.S. “assiduously avoid actionsthat might be interpreted locally as meddling internal Congolese affairs now nationalism52 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 27653 Memo from Rusk to Kennedy, National Security Files, Box 27a, Folder: Congo General 5/61-9/6154 Memo from Rostow to Kennedy, National Security Files, Box 27a, Folder: Congo General 5/61-9/6163
unning high and Congolese think they doing excellent job.” 55 Meanwhile the U.S.S.R.had realized that Gizenga’s national standing was probably lost when he had stubbornlyrefused to go to Lovanium. Gizenga’s self-defeating move had alienated the Soviets, sothey were well-disposed to accept new leadership in the Congo, choosing to cut ties witha friendly but increasingly ineffective opposition movement. Soviet officials looked at theAdoula government “as the legitimate successor of the government headed byLumumba,” and noted that “followers of Lumumba and Gizenga hold the majority ofposts in it.” 56 Even after the new government was announced, with Gizenga playing asupposedly major role, he remained in Stanleyville amidst rapidly decaying support. AsGodley pointed out, Gizenga’s “physical removal from scene and absence directleadership have incited unfavorable comment many his former ardent supporters.” 57Adoula made the bold decision to go to the stronghold of his adversary, where hereceived a reassuring welcome and convinced Gizenga to publicly recognize hisgovernment. Gizenga conspicuously left out any reference to future plans to go toLeopoldville.Tshombe realized that he had put himself in a bad place, having been left out ofthe new national government while the U.S. and U.N. could finally turn their fullattention to bringing him back to the fold. On August 3, he met with the U.S. consul inElisabethville, William Canup, who observed that “Tshombe seemed shaken andappeared to be seeking desperately for way to protect stability of Katanga which he feelscould be endangered by re-entry into Congo without adequate guarantees or by possiblemilitary action by Leopoldville Government.” He also reported that “Tshombe stated that55 Telegram from Godley to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:19156 Qtd. in Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 17057 Telegram from Godley to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:19064
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TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7:
adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9:
Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11:
in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13:
found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15:
willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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