A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

of the Tshombe regime in Katanga. 50 He went on to note that a Gizenga victory was farfrom certain, and even if such an undesirable outcome did come to pass, the “ wisestthough perhaps most frustrating course for US now to follow is to lie low in Congo.” 51Godley’s bold stand was made even more nerve-racking by the fact that the members ofParliament were tightly sequestered at Lovanium, with American officials only havingaccess to information from their discussions through a few highly circuitous routes.Godley’s thinking was ultimately vindicated in the aftermath of July 29, whenTshombe arrived in Brazzaville, just across the border from Leopoldville, with a smallretinue not including Katangese members of Parliament. Tshombe made the bizarredecision to stay in Brazzaville only a few days before returning to Elisabethville onAugust 1, having accomplished virtually nothing. He did not meet with Kasavubu or jointhe Parliament at Lovanium, as was widely expected and indeed desired by the U.S.Ironically, this maneuver did much to spur agreement on the government, prompting thedelegates at Lovanium to remain there, and shifting Kasavubu into high gear, seeminglythanks to a shared desire to spite the Katangese delegation. Kasavubu finally forced Ileoto resign and named Adoula Prime Minister, an appointment which was confirmed byboth houses nearly unanimously, much to the surprise of outside observers. To the delightof the U.S. and the U.N., moderates controlled all of the key ministries except Interior,which had been given to Gbenye. Gizenga was installed in the prestigious but nonessentialrole of Deputy Prime Minister, leading Godley to declare that the new50 Telegram from Goldey to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:17551 Telegram from Goldey to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:17662