A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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States would only accept the best of all possible outcomes, urging Godley to do all hecould to turn Parliament’s focus away from choosing a leader.Stakes so large, for reasons spelled out below, I wish you resort to delaying tacticsalong foregoing lines too soon rather than too late… In discussing reasonsGizenga-led government would be undesirable, you should stress following line.Gizenga would probably prove as disruptive an influence in Congo as Lumumbabecause he does not have the support of majority of the tribally dividedCongolese…On other hand, Gizenga as parliamentary-confirmed Prime Ministerwould have support of large majority of nations and UN would be under pressurerecognize him thus placing US in extremely difficult position. 48For the second time on this subject, Godley disagreed with his superiors at State,this time overtly refusing his orders. Among other considerations, Godley was aware thatthe panic in the Congo had calmed down significantly on July 25, when a moderatecandidate had been elected President of the Senate, evidence that the mood was turningagainst the perennially-absent Gizenga. Godley also attributed this surprising turn ofevents to the news being spread that Gizenga had ordered three more executions inKivu. 49 In the end, though, the most meaningful change in policy resulted from theindependent judgment of Godley, while the advice from Washington was strikinglysimilar to what it had been under Eisenhower.Godley rightly calculated that it would not serve American interests to tieLeopoldville too closely with the widely-reviled regime in Elisabethville, and thatKasavubu would not be likely to respond positively to such coercion, which could evenbe used to the advantage of his radical opponents. He noted that “pressure from US totake positions they are reluctant to assume irritates them immensely and their irrationalreactions frequently are against their best interests,” pointing to the examples of Guinea(where France had been the state to miscalculate this factor) and Cambodia, and even that48 Telegram from Rusk to Godley, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:172-349 Telegram from Goldey to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:17561
of the Tshombe regime in Katanga. 50 He went on to note that a Gizenga victory was farfrom certain, and even if such an undesirable outcome did come to pass, the “ wisestthough perhaps most frustrating course for US now to follow is to lie low in Congo.” 51Godley’s bold stand was made even more nerve-racking by the fact that the members ofParliament were tightly sequestered at Lovanium, with American officials only havingaccess to information from their discussions through a few highly circuitous routes.Godley’s thinking was ultimately vindicated in the aftermath of July 29, whenTshombe arrived in Brazzaville, just across the border from Leopoldville, with a smallretinue not including Katangese members of Parliament. Tshombe made the bizarredecision to stay in Brazzaville only a few days before returning to Elisabethville onAugust 1, having accomplished virtually nothing. He did not meet with Kasavubu or jointhe Parliament at Lovanium, as was widely expected and indeed desired by the U.S.Ironically, this maneuver did much to spur agreement on the government, prompting thedelegates at Lovanium to remain there, and shifting Kasavubu into high gear, seeminglythanks to a shared desire to spite the Katangese delegation. Kasavubu finally forced Ileoto resign and named Adoula Prime Minister, an appointment which was confirmed byboth houses nearly unanimously, much to the surprise of outside observers. To the delightof the U.S. and the U.N., moderates controlled all of the key ministries except Interior,which had been given to Gbenye. Gizenga was installed in the prestigious but nonessentialrole of Deputy Prime Minister, leading Godley to declare that the new50 Telegram from Goldey to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:17551 Telegram from Goldey to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:17662
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TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7:
adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9:
Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11:
in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13:
found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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