A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
ecommends that we permit the present situation to continue to develop and thatwe refrain from pushing the "panic button" too soon. 43He also rightly pointed out the difficulty of changing Kasavubu’s mind on such animportant issue on that late date. As such, members of Parliament from the Stanleyvillecontingent began to arrive on July 16, somewhat delayed from the original plans. Forhardly the first time, Gizenga was noticeably absent; at first, his delegation claimed thathe was merely a few days late because of illness but events would reveal that to be anunconvincing ruse.The U.S. and the U.N. had even more reason to fret, as the moderate group hadfailed to coalesce around a single, clear leader. In Gizenga’s absence, the Stanleyvillegroup looked to Christophe Gbenye, Lumumba’s old Interior Minister and Gizenga’sfrequent stand-in. Meanwhile, Ileo continued to refuse to resign his post to make roomfor Adoula, as America desperately hoped. The U.S. and U.N. officials in the Congoacted quickly to resolve these concerns. Godley met with Kasavubu on July 20, andexplained that “moderates were without clear indication of President's wishes and theywere currently group of fine men but who were wallowing in indecision and who did nothave leader designated by Chief State.” At this point, Kasavubu refused to prevail uponIleo to resign against his will, but responded positively when Godley stroked his ego,telling him “there were times in nations' history when leaders such as himself had tolower themselves to negotiate with parliamentarians.” 44A day earlier, Linner had taken the extraordinary step of warning Kasavubu thathe was going to “meddle in internal Congolese affairs” 45 and granted Kasavubu the use of43 Memo from Williams to Rusk, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:16044 Telegram from Godley to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:16845 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 27259
a U.N. helicopter to go back and forth to Lovanium and steer Parliament towardsaccepting Adoula as head of government. Linner went so far as to encourage Kasavubu tostay in constant contact with U.S. and U.N. representatives, and to heed their advice, towhich the President agreed. Hammarskjold responded with a classic example ofdiplomatic double-talk, telling Linner never to intervene in internal affairs while addingthat he would have done the same thing in the situation. 46On July 24, a member of the Stanleyville delegation was elected President of theAssembly, a development which caused widespread consternation. Mobutu demandedthat the U.N. turn over military control of the airport, a change sure to undermine anyfeeling of safety among the Gizengists, as their route home would have required them topass through hostile armed forces. Linner recognized this and convinced Godley and theState Department to stand firm against Mobutu, at least temporarily. The election alsocaught the attention of Kennedy, and the President belatedly expressed his concern overthe lack of an ambassador in Leopoldville. Rusk was moved to send Godley a messagewhich underscored his concern about Gizenga becoming Prime Minister, and which gaveGodley instructions to pressure Kasavubu to stall proceedings until Tshombe could bebrought into the fold.On July 22, even before these specific concerns arose, Rusk suggested “arrangingfor challenge of those parliamentarians whose credentials are dubious” in order forGodley to “gain time and yet not place upon Leopoldville leaders public blame forsabotaging parliament.” 47 But Rusk’s telegram of July 26 makes it clear that the United46 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 27347 Telegram from Rusk to Godley, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:16960
- Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
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- Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
a U.N. helicopter to go back and forth to Lovanium and steer Parliament towardsaccept<strong>in</strong>g Adoula as head of government. L<strong>in</strong>ner went so far as to encourage Kasavubu tostay <strong>in</strong> constant contact with U.S. and U.N. representatives, and to heed <strong>the</strong>ir advice, towhich <strong>the</strong> President agreed. Hammarskjold responded with a classic example ofdiplomatic double-talk, tell<strong>in</strong>g L<strong>in</strong>ner never to <strong>in</strong>tervene <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal affairs while add<strong>in</strong>gthat he would have done <strong>the</strong> same th<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> situation. 46On July 24, a member of <strong>the</strong> Stanleyville delegation was elected President of <strong>the</strong>Assembly, a development which caused widespread consternation. Mobutu demandedthat <strong>the</strong> U.N. turn over military control of <strong>the</strong> airport, a change sure to underm<strong>in</strong>e anyfeel<strong>in</strong>g of safety among <strong>the</strong> Gizengists, as <strong>the</strong>ir route home would have required <strong>the</strong>m topass through hostile armed forces. L<strong>in</strong>ner recognized this and conv<strong>in</strong>ced Godley and <strong>the</strong>State Department to stand firm aga<strong>in</strong>st Mobutu, at least temporarily. <strong>The</strong> election alsocaught <strong>the</strong> attention of <strong>Kennedy</strong>, and <strong>the</strong> President belatedly expressed his concern over<strong>the</strong> lack of an ambassador <strong>in</strong> Leopoldville. Rusk was moved to send Godley a messagewhich underscored his concern about Gizenga becom<strong>in</strong>g Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, and which gaveGodley <strong>in</strong>structions to pressure Kasavubu to stall proceed<strong>in</strong>gs until Tshombe could bebrought <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> fold.On July 22, even before <strong>the</strong>se specific concerns arose, Rusk suggested “arrang<strong>in</strong>gfor challenge of those parliamentarians whose credentials are dubious” <strong>in</strong> order forGodley to “ga<strong>in</strong> time and yet not place upon Leopoldville leaders public blame forsabotag<strong>in</strong>g parliament.” 47 But Rusk’s telegram of July 26 makes it clear that <strong>the</strong> United46 Kalb, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Cables, 27347 Telegram from Rusk to Godley, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:16960
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