A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

ecommends that we permit the present situation to continue to develop and thatwe refrain from pushing the "panic button" too soon. 43He also rightly pointed out the difficulty of changing Kasavubu’s mind on such animportant issue on that late date. As such, members of Parliament from the Stanleyvillecontingent began to arrive on July 16, somewhat delayed from the original plans. Forhardly the first time, Gizenga was noticeably absent; at first, his delegation claimed thathe was merely a few days late because of illness but events would reveal that to be anunconvincing ruse.The U.S. and the U.N. had even more reason to fret, as the moderate group hadfailed to coalesce around a single, clear leader. In Gizenga’s absence, the Stanleyvillegroup looked to Christophe Gbenye, Lumumba’s old Interior Minister and Gizenga’sfrequent stand-in. Meanwhile, Ileo continued to refuse to resign his post to make roomfor Adoula, as America desperately hoped. The U.S. and U.N. officials in the Congoacted quickly to resolve these concerns. Godley met with Kasavubu on July 20, andexplained that “moderates were without clear indication of President's wishes and theywere currently group of fine men but who were wallowing in indecision and who did nothave leader designated by Chief State.” At this point, Kasavubu refused to prevail uponIleo to resign against his will, but responded positively when Godley stroked his ego,telling him “there were times in nations' history when leaders such as himself had tolower themselves to negotiate with parliamentarians.” 44A day earlier, Linner had taken the extraordinary step of warning Kasavubu thathe was going to “meddle in internal Congolese affairs” 45 and granted Kasavubu the use of43 Memo from Williams to Rusk, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:16044 Telegram from Godley to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:16845 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 27259