A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
overstepped their influence by trying to dictate so many factors of the Parliamentmeeting, and both of those factors encouraged the Kennedy Administration’s establishedpreference for a broad, legitimate government. Hammarskjold was able to secure ameeting between Adoula and a delegation from Stanleyville about security arrangementsfor Parliament. Adoula was also pursuing Tshombe, at the behest of the Americanembassy, with the understanding that Tshombe would be released from house arrest andgiven a position in the Cabinet if he would send his deputies to Leopoldville. Meanwhile,Mobutu was actively trying to prevent the involvement of Gizenga, hoping to stir uptrouble by arresting numerous soldiers and civilians and cracking down on alleged“underground organizations of Lumumbists.” 39Even as that was happening, the U.N. was somehow able to convince theStanleyville delegation they would be safe and all sides agreed to meet on June 26 atLovanium University near Leopoldville. Mobutu even agreed to disarm his soldiers,explaining that he was willing to accept political decision made by the Kasavubugovernment. Tshombe soon held a press conference alongside Adoula, Mobutu and otherrepresentatives of the Leopoldville faction, announcing his release and furthercooperation. Godley found himself almost immediately in a better position than hispredecessor, with a more agreeable U.N. representative in Sture Linner and nascentalliance of moderate interests in Leopoldville and Elisabethville. Even so, Godley wasconvinced he needed to push the Congolese to act more quickly, as Gizenga continued togather support and a rumor circulated that the Soviet Union had offered to establish an39 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 26857
embassy in Stanleyville. The short-lived Soviet mission in Stanleyville would eventuallybe set up covertly in a hotel room with bedsheets covering the windows. 40The situation seemed to be resolving itself on June 24, when Tshombe leftLeopoldville and signed an agreement with Ileo to end the secession in Katanga.Hammarskjold had explained that he and various Belgian diplomats were puttingpressure on the Katangese delegation to attend so as to decrease the possibility of aGizenga victory. 41 But Tshombe immediately went back on his word once he hadreturned safe to Elisabethville, declaring that the secession would continue and that hemight not even send his deputies and senators to Lovanium. U.S. officials noted that aParliament convened without Tshombe’s delegates had a real chance of granting power toGizenga, so Rusk tried to increase the pressure on Tshombe to show up. Rusk told hisrepresentatives in Elisabethville to pass on his threats, that the U.N. would not accept apermanently separate Katanga and that “if Tshombe plans renege completely onLeopoldville agreement, demonstration such bad faith will cost him dearly ininternational standing.” 42The State Department, backed by the governments of crucial NATO allies Franceand Great Britain, urged caution, but Godley strongly disagreed, preferring thecontinuation of the aggressive pace he had adopted earlier. Williams summarizedGodley’s position for Rusk,He believes that the present situation does not warrant the adoption of dilatorytactics at this time which would have their own dangers. He doubts Gizenga isstrong enough to emerge as the dominant figure in the new government if theLeopoldville moderates adequately organize themselves. He therefore40 Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 16941 Telegram from U.S. Mission at U.N. to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:15042 Telegram from Rusk to Godley, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:15458
- Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
- Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
- Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
- Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
- Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
- Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
- Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
- Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
- Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
- Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
- Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
- Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
- Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
- Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
- Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
- Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
- Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
- Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
- Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
- Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
- Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
- Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
- Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
- Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
- Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
- Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
- Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
- Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
- Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
- Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
- Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
- Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
- Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
- Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
- Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
- Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
- Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
- Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
- Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
- Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
- Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
- Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
- Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
- Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
- Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
embassy <strong>in</strong> Stanleyville. <strong>The</strong> short-lived Soviet mission <strong>in</strong> Stanleyville would eventuallybe set up covertly <strong>in</strong> a hotel room with bedsheets cover<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> w<strong>in</strong>dows. 40<strong>The</strong> situation seemed to be resolv<strong>in</strong>g itself on June 24, when Tshombe leftLeopoldville and signed an agreement with Ileo to end <strong>the</strong> secession <strong>in</strong> Katanga.Hammarskjold had expla<strong>in</strong>ed that he and various Belgian diplomats were putt<strong>in</strong>gpressure on <strong>the</strong> Katangese delegation to attend so as to decrease <strong>the</strong> possibility of aGizenga victory. 41 But Tshombe immediately went back on his word once he hadreturned safe to Elisabethville, declar<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> secession would cont<strong>in</strong>ue and that hemight not even send his deputies and senators to Lovanium. U.S. officials noted that aParliament convened without Tshombe’s delegates had a real chance of grant<strong>in</strong>g power toGizenga, so Rusk tried to <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>the</strong> pressure on Tshombe to show up. Rusk told hisrepresentatives <strong>in</strong> Elisabethville to pass on his threats, that <strong>the</strong> U.N. would not accept apermanently separate Katanga and that “if Tshombe plans renege completely onLeopoldville agreement, demonstration such bad faith will cost him dearly <strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>ternational stand<strong>in</strong>g.” 42<strong>The</strong> State Department, backed by <strong>the</strong> governments of crucial NATO allies Franceand Great Brita<strong>in</strong>, urged caution, but Godley strongly disagreed, preferr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>cont<strong>in</strong>uation of <strong>the</strong> aggressive pace he had adopted earlier. Williams summarizedGodley’s position for Rusk,He believes that <strong>the</strong> present situation does not warrant <strong>the</strong> adoption of dilatorytactics at this time which would have <strong>the</strong>ir own dangers. He doubts Gizenga isstrong enough to emerge as <strong>the</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ant figure <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> new government if <strong>the</strong>Leopoldville moderates adequately organize <strong>the</strong>mselves. He <strong>the</strong>refore40 Mazov, A Distant Front <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cold War, 16941 Telegram from U.S. Mission at U.N. to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:15042 Telegram from Rusk to Godley, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:15458
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