A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
Once again, however, State Department officials needed the presence of all majorfactions for the decisions made to be viewed as legitimate. G. Mennen Williams andChester Bowles were among those at State who felt that the best way to respond to theperceived communist threat in the Congo was to incorporate a few representatives of thatelement and encourage them to participate within the system. This was a clear departurefrom Eisenhower-era thinking, and Kennedy’s improved relations with leftist leaders inGhana and Guinea were the clearest example of this method. However, like many of thechanges in the Kennedy Administration, the reality did not live up to the highexpectations that Kennedy had created with his rhetoric. Indeed, the extent to which thisrepresented a genuine change in perspective is called into question by the StateDepartment recommendation that Gizenga be offered a “non-sensitive post in otherwisemoderate cabinet with strong Prime Minister.” 35 Ambassador Timberlake and officials inthe Defense Department openly questioned whether even this largely ceremonial positionwas not too much of a capitulation to radical forces. As recently as May 10, Bowles hadsaid of Gizenga, “we consider him completely responsive at present to foreign direction,”a sentiment certainly not shared by the Soviets, whose earlier denial of aid meant thattheir influence with the enigmatic leader was minimal. 36Timberlake’s perspective was noted, but little more than that, as he would soon beremoved from his position as part of a deal with Hammarskjold to replace the deeplyunpopular Dayal. Despite his best efforts, Dayal had drawn scorn from virtually allparties, with Mobutu even threatening to assassinate him and use his own forces againstthe U.N. troops if Dayal returned to the Congo. The U.S. State Department had tried to35 Telegram from Bowles to Timberlake, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:14336 Telegram from Bowles to U.S. Mission at U.N., FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:13655
secure his removal “on the ground that he is biased in favor of Lumumba,” a claim thatLumumba would have vigorously denied. 37 Recognizing that discretion was the betterpart of valor, Dayal resigned, but not before Hammarskjold secured the prematureremoval of his rivals, Timberlake and British Ambassador Scott, in exchange. The pro-Africa wing of the State Department must have felt like they had won a double victory byremoving Dayal as well as the obstinate and outspoken Timberlake.Timberlake’s disagreement with Administration policy on the involvement ofGizenga was only the latest in a long line of incidents, including a potentially disastrousrecommendation to move a U.S. Navy task force in the Atlantic to the port of Matadiwithout anyone else’s authorization. 38 It is easy to see the limits of Kennedy’s supposedemphasis on Africa here, that during a period of civil war and fear of a communisttakeover, the U.S. was willing to leave itself with an ambassador all summer. EdmundGullion would succeed Timberlake, but he would be busy working on disarmamentissues until the end of August, so the deputy chief of mission McMurtrie Godley was leftto act in the capacity of ambassador for more than two months.The low priority assigned to Africa was evident in the Vienna meeting betweenKennedy and Khrushchev that June: issues related to the Congo were pushed aside infavor of Laos (where a peaceful settlement was reached) and Berlin (where the lack ofagreement led up to the Berlin crisis and the erection of the Wall). The precedent of aneutral coalition government in Laos did lead the Kennedy team to believe that theSoviets would be willing to accept a similar solution in the Congo, where their positionwas even weaker. At the same time, the Gizengists privately acknowledged that they had37 Analytical Chronology, 1/25/61, President’s Office Files, Box 114, Folder 1438 Memo from McNamara to Rusk, National Security Files, Box 27a, Folder: Congo General 1/61-4/6156
- Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
- Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
- Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
- Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
- Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
- Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
- Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
- Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
- Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
- Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
- Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
- Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
- Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
- Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
- Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
- Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
- Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
- Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
- Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
- Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
- Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
- Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
- Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
- Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
- Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
- Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
- Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
- Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
- Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
- Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
- Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
- Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
- Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
- Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
- Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
- Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
- Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
- Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
- Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
- Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
- Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
- Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
- Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
- Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
- Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
- Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
secure his removal “on <strong>the</strong> ground that he is biased <strong>in</strong> favor of Lumumba,” a claim thatLumumba would have vigorously denied. 37 Recogniz<strong>in</strong>g that discretion was <strong>the</strong> betterpart of valor, Dayal resigned, but not before Hammarskjold secured <strong>the</strong> prematureremoval of his rivals, Timberlake and British Ambassador Scott, <strong>in</strong> exchange. <strong>The</strong> pro-Africa w<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> State Department must have felt like <strong>the</strong>y had won a double victory byremov<strong>in</strong>g Dayal as well as <strong>the</strong> obst<strong>in</strong>ate and outspoken Timberlake.Timberlake’s disagreement with <strong>Adm<strong>in</strong>istration</strong> policy on <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>volvement ofGizenga was only <strong>the</strong> latest <strong>in</strong> a long l<strong>in</strong>e of <strong>in</strong>cidents, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a potentially disastrousrecommendation to move a U.S. Navy task force <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Atlantic to <strong>the</strong> port of Matadiwithout anyone else’s authorization. 38 It is easy to see <strong>the</strong> limits of <strong>Kennedy</strong>’s supposedemphasis on Africa here, that dur<strong>in</strong>g a period of civil war and fear of a communisttakeover, <strong>the</strong> U.S. was will<strong>in</strong>g to leave itself with an ambassador all summer. EdmundGullion would succeed Timberlake, but he would be busy work<strong>in</strong>g on disarmamentissues until <strong>the</strong> end of August, so <strong>the</strong> deputy chief of mission McMurtrie Godley was leftto act <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> capacity of ambassador for more than two months.<strong>The</strong> low priority assigned to Africa was evident <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vienna meet<strong>in</strong>g between<strong>Kennedy</strong> and Khrushchev that June: issues related to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> were pushed aside <strong>in</strong>favor of Laos (where a peaceful settlement was reached) and Berl<strong>in</strong> (where <strong>the</strong> lack ofagreement led up to <strong>the</strong> Berl<strong>in</strong> crisis and <strong>the</strong> erection of <strong>the</strong> Wall). <strong>The</strong> precedent of aneutral coalition government <strong>in</strong> Laos did lead <strong>the</strong> <strong>Kennedy</strong> team to believe that <strong>the</strong>Soviets would be will<strong>in</strong>g to accept a similar solution <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>, where <strong>the</strong>ir positionwas even weaker. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> Gizengists privately acknowledged that <strong>the</strong>y had37 Analytical Chronology, 1/25/61, President’s Office Files, Box 114, Folder 1438 Memo from McNamara to Rusk, National Security Files, Box 27a, Folder: <strong>Congo</strong> General 1/61-4/6156
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