A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

Once again, however, State Department officials needed the presence of all majorfactions for the decisions made to be viewed as legitimate. G. Mennen Williams andChester Bowles were among those at State who felt that the best way to respond to theperceived communist threat in the Congo was to incorporate a few representatives of thatelement and encourage them to participate within the system. This was a clear departurefrom Eisenhower-era thinking, and Kennedy’s improved relations with leftist leaders inGhana and Guinea were the clearest example of this method. However, like many of thechanges in the Kennedy Administration, the reality did not live up to the highexpectations that Kennedy had created with his rhetoric. Indeed, the extent to which thisrepresented a genuine change in perspective is called into question by the StateDepartment recommendation that Gizenga be offered a “non-sensitive post in otherwisemoderate cabinet with strong Prime Minister.” 35 Ambassador Timberlake and officials inthe Defense Department openly questioned whether even this largely ceremonial positionwas not too much of a capitulation to radical forces. As recently as May 10, Bowles hadsaid of Gizenga, “we consider him completely responsive at present to foreign direction,”a sentiment certainly not shared by the Soviets, whose earlier denial of aid meant thattheir influence with the enigmatic leader was minimal. 36Timberlake’s perspective was noted, but little more than that, as he would soon beremoved from his position as part of a deal with Hammarskjold to replace the deeplyunpopular Dayal. Despite his best efforts, Dayal had drawn scorn from virtually allparties, with Mobutu even threatening to assassinate him and use his own forces againstthe U.N. troops if Dayal returned to the Congo. The U.S. State Department had tried to35 Telegram from Bowles to Timberlake, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:14336 Telegram from Bowles to U.S. Mission at U.N., FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:13655