A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

and act to ensure Tshombe’s liberation “because only in this case can we resumenegotiations with leaders of other countries of former Belgian Congo.” 34 The U.S.government took the position that Katanga was not a recognized independent state, andthus did not reply.The United States was left in a difficult position, and followed the Eisenhowerpolicy of wait and see. Neither Stevenson nor the State Department would do anything toencourage the release of Tshombe until the situation on the ground became clearer.During the same time that Tshombe was being arrested, Gizenga was making steadygains in strength. Gizenga had promised to attend any reconvening of Parliament inwhich his security was guaranteed by U.N. forces, but some officials saw this as a meansof stalling for time, particularly after he had reversed his position on Tananarive.Kasavubu forced Gizenga’s hand on May 12, announcing an imminent Parliamentarysession in Leopoldville under U.N. protection. Gizenga responded by declaringKasavubu’s Parliament illegal and convening his own Parliament at the U.N. base inKamina, with press, foreign diplomats, and Congolese troops all banned from thepremises. It was difficult to take seriously Gizenga’s desire for security, which wascertainly genuine, when his own counterproposal was so preposterous. The consensusamong knowledgeable observers was that Gizenga realized he probably did not haveenough support among the deputies to carry the day, and so sought to discredit the morelegitimate Leopoldville gathering. Again, Gizenga miscalculated, by not understandingthe growing desire for a resolution and obviously stalling at a time where Kasavubu wasmoving toward a real possibility for a decision.34 Letter from Munongo to Kennedy, National Security Files, Box 27a, Folder: Congo General 5/61-9/6154