A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

will place yet another strain on NATO.” 32 Only when these negotiations led to agovernment acceptable to Americans did U.S. and U.N. attention return to the problemscaused by Tshombe’s secession. A member of the National Security Council staffsummarized views expressed to him thusly. One might not like Tshombe, but “it washighly necessary that we be practical and realize that he is all we have; that there will benothing after Tshombe goes.” 33Tshombe’s status among the other Congolese leaders also began to falter after theTananarive conference, with his compatriots recognizing the extent to which Tshombe’splan would undermine their own power in the central government. The next summitmeeting took place on April 24 in Coquilhatville in the Congo, with Gizenga once againdeclining the invitation to participate. The conference’s mandate was further limitedwhen Tshombe left the conference two days later, convinced that the positions of otherdelegates were firmly set against him. In a rare show of unity, soldiers from bothLeopoldville and Stanleyville intercepted him at the airport to prevent him from leavingthe conference without the various leaders coming to an agreement. Tshombe’s status asa prisoner over the next few weeks remained unclear, but it was very telling that he didnot return to Katanga in that time. It was not until May 7 that he was charged with hightreason, specifically for participating in Lumumba’s murder.The remaining Katangese government, including Tshombe’s second-in-command,Interior Minister Godefroid Munongo, sent a letter to Kennedy which reminded thePresident of his stated commitment to ‘Africa for the Africans.’ The letter requested thatthe United States be “faithful to its tradition of fighting for liberty and respect for right”32 Telegram from Rusk to U.S. Embassy in Brussels, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:7933 Memo from Samuel E. Belk to Walt Rostow, National Security Files, Box 27a, Folder: Congo General5/61-9/6153
and act to ensure Tshombe’s liberation “because only in this case can we resumenegotiations with leaders of other countries of former Belgian Congo.” 34 The U.S.government took the position that Katanga was not a recognized independent state, andthus did not reply.The United States was left in a difficult position, and followed the Eisenhowerpolicy of wait and see. Neither Stevenson nor the State Department would do anything toencourage the release of Tshombe until the situation on the ground became clearer.During the same time that Tshombe was being arrested, Gizenga was making steadygains in strength. Gizenga had promised to attend any reconvening of Parliament inwhich his security was guaranteed by U.N. forces, but some officials saw this as a meansof stalling for time, particularly after he had reversed his position on Tananarive.Kasavubu forced Gizenga’s hand on May 12, announcing an imminent Parliamentarysession in Leopoldville under U.N. protection. Gizenga responded by declaringKasavubu’s Parliament illegal and convening his own Parliament at the U.N. base inKamina, with press, foreign diplomats, and Congolese troops all banned from thepremises. It was difficult to take seriously Gizenga’s desire for security, which wascertainly genuine, when his own counterproposal was so preposterous. The consensusamong knowledgeable observers was that Gizenga realized he probably did not haveenough support among the deputies to carry the day, and so sought to discredit the morelegitimate Leopoldville gathering. Again, Gizenga miscalculated, by not understandingthe growing desire for a resolution and obviously stalling at a time where Kasavubu wasmoving toward a real possibility for a decision.34 Letter from Munongo to Kennedy, National Security Files, Box 27a, Folder: Congo General 5/61-9/6154
Page 3:
TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
show all

A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?