A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
about a greater degree of Congolese unity.” 25 Williams attributed the agreement that “notonly Kasavubu, Ileo, Tshombe and Kalonji but also Gizenga” would attend a summit inTanarive, Madagascar to the Resolution. He suggested that “the threat of disarmament ofthe Congolese factions appeared to be impelling them to try to come to terms.” 26The Tananarive conference of March 8-12, organized by the participantsthemselves and not by U.S. or U.N. representatives, did not end up including the presenceof Gizenga. Instead, Gizenga showed off his instability and lack of political acumen bydenouncing the meeting after previously telling Dayal that he would attend. Tshombeheld sway amongst his supposed equals, with his significant mineral wealth making himthe only leader with cash on hand, a tool which he used to successfully prevail upon theother leaders into agreeing to a plan for a federal system with a much weaker centralgovernment. This system would be of greatest benefit to Katanga, with its unmatchedeconomic strength, but Timberlake rightly noted it was also “better adapted to tribalrealities.” 27Tshombe’s position, and the position of Katanga itself, was a precarious one.Other African states, particularly the more radical group exemplified by Guinea andGhana, looked with suspicion upon the secession of Katanga and its cozy relationshipwith its former Belgian overlords. In a conversation with Kennedy, the leader ofNyasaland, Dr. Hastings K. Banda, expressed his feelings about Tshombe: “everyone inAfrica knew he was a stooge of Belgian and other mining interests in Katanga. He had no25 Analytical Chronology, National Security Files, Box 27a, Folder: Analytical Chronology of the CongoCrisis 3/9/6126 Analytical Chronology, National Security Files, Box 27a, Folder: Analytical Chronology of the CongoCrisis 3/9/6127 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 24651
standing as an African leader.” 28 The American ambassador in Moscow characterizedKhrushchev’s assessment in much the same terms: “He seemed particularly bitterabout Tshombe, whom he characterized as stooge of Belgian mining monopoly.” 29At the same time, American officials in both the Eisenhower and KennedyAdministrations looked favorably on Katanga, as its friendship with the West wasthought to guarantee a better position for the U.S. Eisenhower’s State Department hadworked with Belgium to provide suggestions for Tshombe to improve his internationalimage, by publicizing attempts to confer with other Congolese leaders and by“minimizing more visible aspects Belgian influence Katanga.” 30 Until later in 1961, thereaction of Kennedy officials remained the same. Timberlake thought it better to focusfirst on ending the Katanga secession, with the expectation that Gizenga would not beable to stand up to a united Leopoldville-Elisabethville bloc. As he puts it, “If that did notmake Gizenga realize his game was up and bring him back, he would eventually be underpressure which I doubt he could long resist.” 31The rest of the Administration did not agree with Timberlake’s assessment,however. With so much chaos in the rest of the Congo, and the United States dedicated toencouraging Adoula’s candidacy, American officials did not focus attention on therelatively stable and prosperous Tshombe regime in Katanga, where the threat to stabilitywas more nebulous and long-term. Kennedy had already shown reluctance to upset theBelgians. The State Department realized that criticizing the Belgian military in Katangawould cause problems: “Ineluctably this will give us serious problems with Belgians and28 Memo of Conversation between Kennedy and Banda, FRUS, 1961-1963, 21:508-929 Telegram from U.S. Embassy in Moscow to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:10130 Telegram from Canup to State Department, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:51331 Telegram from Timberlake to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:13152
- Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
- Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
- Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
- Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
- Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
- Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
- Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
- Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
- Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
- Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
- Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
- Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
- Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
- Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
- Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
- Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
- Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
- Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
- Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
- Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
- Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
- Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
- Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
- Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
- Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
- Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
- Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
- Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
- Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
- Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
- Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
- Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
- Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
- Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
- Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
- Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
- Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
- Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
- Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
- Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
- Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
- Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
- Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
- Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
- Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
- Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
- Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
- Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
stand<strong>in</strong>g as an African leader.” 28 <strong>The</strong> American ambassador <strong>in</strong> Moscow characterizedKhrushchev’s assessment <strong>in</strong> much <strong>the</strong> same terms: “He seemed particularly bitterabout Tshombe, whom he characterized as stooge of Belgian m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g monopoly.” 29At <strong>the</strong> same time, American officials <strong>in</strong> both <strong>the</strong> Eisenhower and <strong>Kennedy</strong><strong>Adm<strong>in</strong>istration</strong>s looked favorably on Katanga, as its friendship with <strong>the</strong> West wasthought to guarantee a better position for <strong>the</strong> U.S. Eisenhower’s State Department hadworked with Belgium to provide suggestions for Tshombe to improve his <strong>in</strong>ternationalimage, by publiciz<strong>in</strong>g attempts to confer with o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Congo</strong>lese leaders and by“m<strong>in</strong>imiz<strong>in</strong>g more visible aspects Belgian <strong>in</strong>fluence Katanga.” 30 Until later <strong>in</strong> 1961, <strong>the</strong>reaction of <strong>Kennedy</strong> officials rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> same. Timberlake thought it better to focusfirst on end<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Katanga secession, with <strong>the</strong> expectation that Gizenga would not beable to stand up to a united Leopoldville-Elisabethville bloc. As he puts it, “If that did notmake Gizenga realize his game was up and br<strong>in</strong>g him back, he would eventually be underpressure which I doubt he could long resist.” 31<strong>The</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Adm<strong>in</strong>istration</strong> did not agree with Timberlake’s assessment,however. With so much chaos <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>, and <strong>the</strong> United States dedicated toencourag<strong>in</strong>g Adoula’s candidacy, American officials did not focus attention on <strong>the</strong>relatively stable and prosperous Tshombe regime <strong>in</strong> Katanga, where <strong>the</strong> threat to stabilitywas more nebulous and long-term. <strong>Kennedy</strong> had already shown reluctance to upset <strong>the</strong>Belgians. <strong>The</strong> State Department realized that criticiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Belgian military <strong>in</strong> Katangawould cause problems: “Ineluctably this will give us serious problems with Belgians and28 Memo of Conversation between <strong>Kennedy</strong> and Banda, FRUS, 1961-1963, 21:508-929 Telegram from U.S. Embassy <strong>in</strong> Moscow to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:10130 Telegram from Canup to State Department, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:51331 Telegram from Timberlake to State Department, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:13152
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