A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

about a greater degree of Congolese unity.” 25 Williams attributed the agreement that “notonly Kasavubu, Ileo, Tshombe and Kalonji but also Gizenga” would attend a summit inTanarive, Madagascar to the Resolution. He suggested that “the threat of disarmament ofthe Congolese factions appeared to be impelling them to try to come to terms.” 26The Tananarive conference of March 8-12, organized by the participantsthemselves and not by U.S. or U.N. representatives, did not end up including the presenceof Gizenga. Instead, Gizenga showed off his instability and lack of political acumen bydenouncing the meeting after previously telling Dayal that he would attend. Tshombeheld sway amongst his supposed equals, with his significant mineral wealth making himthe only leader with cash on hand, a tool which he used to successfully prevail upon theother leaders into agreeing to a plan for a federal system with a much weaker centralgovernment. This system would be of greatest benefit to Katanga, with its unmatchedeconomic strength, but Timberlake rightly noted it was also “better adapted to tribalrealities.” 27Tshombe’s position, and the position of Katanga itself, was a precarious one.Other African states, particularly the more radical group exemplified by Guinea andGhana, looked with suspicion upon the secession of Katanga and its cozy relationshipwith its former Belgian overlords. In a conversation with Kennedy, the leader ofNyasaland, Dr. Hastings K. Banda, expressed his feelings about Tshombe: “everyone inAfrica knew he was a stooge of Belgian and other mining interests in Katanga. He had no25 Analytical Chronology, National Security Files, Box 27a, Folder: Analytical Chronology of the CongoCrisis 3/9/6126 Analytical Chronology, National Security Files, Box 27a, Folder: Analytical Chronology of the CongoCrisis 3/9/6127 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 24651