A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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would not respond any better to a new government without parliamentary legitimacy thanthey had to the last one. He points out that that “Mobutu and CNA represent onlyrelatively stable counter to return Lumumba at present and might have to assertthemselves again if moderates fail” and that he had no desire to weaken the Mobuturegime. 18 He ends by saying that American officials have “continued discussions withMobutu, Ileo, and others” in order to set up a government acceptable to the United Statesand to the Congolese Parliament. 19 It is difficult to say what Timberlake’s ultimate policyproscription is.Rusk would later give Kennedy a biographical sketch of Adoula that is useful inunderstanding how American officials viewed him and why he was chosen as the bestcandidate.He is an intelligent and well-balanced moderate…A forceful and articulatespokesman for the Congo, Adoula is strongly anti-communist. He has talkedopenly with the American Embassy in Leopoldville, which considers him one ofthe best prospects for top leadership in the Congo. He is one of the few leadingCongolese who does not depend considerably on foreign advisers. 20Rusk is also quick to note that Adoula was active in forming the Mouvement NationalCongolais, but had since ended his relationship with Lumumba, something sure to endearhim to many Americans.Although Lumumba’s murder did create an uncomfortable situation for the U.S.,with fringe elements in the Congo suspecting not unreasonably that America had beeninvolved in the killing, neither the United States nor the United Nations saw theircredibility significantly damaged in Africa. Both U.S. and U.N. strove to insulatethemselves even further by moving for immediate action on a U.N. Resolution on the18 Telegram from Timberlake to State Department, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:58819 Telegram from Timberlake to State Department, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:58820 Memo from Rusk to Kennedy, National Security Files, Box 27a, Folder: Congo General 5/61-9/6149
Congo. The Afro-Asian coalition of Ceylon, the U.A.R. and Liberia introduced aresolution to give the U.N. greater authority to act in the Congo. However, this draftresolution had some provisions with which the U.S. was uncomfortable. Chief amongthese was its ban on foreign military personnel, but not materiel, a condition which theU.S. felt was directly unfairly towards Katanga, which needed greater Belgian troopstrength, and not against possible shipment of Soviet Bloc arms to Stanleyville. Theexecution of Lumumba and other prisoners lent a sense of urgency to the SecurityCouncil meetings of February 1961 and prevented Adlai Stevenson from taking the timehe wanted to alter the resolution to more closely mirror American desires. 21 Theresolution allowed for the “use of force, if necessary, in the last resort,” 22 a restrictionwhich Stevenson interpreted to suit American interests: “Clearly, this resolution meansthat force cannot be used until agreement has been sought by negotiation, conciliationand all other peaceful measures.” 23 His British counterpart, Sir Patrick Dean, went evenfurther, saying he understood that force could only be used “to prevent a clash betweenhostile Congolese troops. There can be no question of empowering the United Nations touse its forces to impose a political settlement.” 24U.S. officials were quick to praise the effectiveness of the Resolution in movingthe various anti-communist factions closer together. Williams’ revised AnalyticalChronology noted “that the Security Council resolution of February 21 was bringing21 Analytical Chronology, National Security Files, Box 27a, Folder: Analytical Chronology of the CongoCrisis 3/9/6122 Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo: A Chronology of Events, January 196-December 1961 (Fair Lawn, NJ:Oxford University Press, 1962), 3523 Analytical Chronology, National Security Files, Box 27a, Folder: Analytical Chronology of the CongoCrisis 3/9/6124 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 23650
Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101: BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The

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