A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake surveyed the national scene, only to discover“no one with national stature” as an alternative to Lumumba. He went on to describe themost likely candidate, Kasavubu, as “a political zero” and “naïve, not very bright, lazy.” 11At the same time, there was growing animosity between Hammarskjold’s representativeRajeshwar Dayal and a number of influential parties in the Congo, including foreigndiplomats like Timberlake and British Ambassador Ian Scott. Timberlake had earliercautioned his superiors at State not to acquiesce to the U.N. plan for an “acceleratedParliamentary solution in the Congo.” 12 Instead, the Eisenhower Administration wouldonly be willing to consider a moderate, anti-communist government. Critically, bothAdministrations discounted concerns about Congolese self-determination and afunctional state before fear of communist domination, either by the Soviets or by radicalelements in the Congo itself.As the Eisenhower Administration was leaving office, with Lumumba imprisonedbut his death not yet announced, a Special National Intelligence Estimate found thesituation to be very grim: “There is no indication that the Congo is developing a nationalleader, a national party, or a national consciousness. Political instability on a grand scale,probably leading to increased violence and other excesses, both organized anddisorganized, appears to be the most likely prospect for the Congo for some time tocome.” 13 In the early days of January, it seemed that the hoped-for round table conferenceto decide on a new direction might materialize, but Kasavubu and Tshombe could notagree on a location. As such, Timberlake suggested that the Kasavubu faction in the11 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 51-5212 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 14613 Special National Intelligence Estimate, FRUS, 1961-1963, 20:347
Congo could privately form a cabinet to put in place as soon as Parliament met again. 14Earlier in the process, when the U.S. and the U.N. first began to organize replacementsfor Lumumba in earnest, the consensus choice had been for Joseph Ileo to continue on asPrime Minister. By January, Timberlake was pushing for an alternative choice, laborleader Cyrille Adoula, but acknowledged that he did not have “broad political support.” 15It is worth noting that Timberlake would declare that even the “most sympatheticobservers know this country cannot govern itself in an intelligent fashion,” saying that theCongo was nowhere near achieving anything other than a “façade of democracy.” 16 Hissuggestion was greeted with skepticism, as the State Department suggested anothercandidate, Justin Bomboko, while the revitalization of Ileo’s government, with aprominent military role for Mobutu, would be the back-up plan.Timberlake’s defense of Adoula was a masterpiece of mismatched and apparentlycontradictory pieces of advice for the State Department. He opens by expressing hissupport for Adoula, noting he was just “as anti-Lumumbaist [sic] as the others includingBomboko, is energetic and has better general position among parliamentarians.” Next,Timberlake reminds the State Department of the limitations of America’s role. “In lastanalysis it will be Kasavubu and other Congolese who should and will decide makeup,” acurious comment from someone who did not accept that the Congolese could governthemselves and had actively pushed his chosen candidate in the preceding sentence. 17Finally, Timberlake openly wondered whether a change of government would even be inthe United States’ interest. He suggested that the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations14 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 17815 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 14516 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 14617 Telegram from Timberlake to State Department, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:58648
- Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
- Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
- Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
- Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
- Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
- Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
- Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
- Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
- Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
- Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
- Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
- Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
- Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
- Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
- Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
- Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
- Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
- Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
- Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
- Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
- Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
- Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
- Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
- Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
- Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
- Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
- Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
- Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
- Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
- Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
- Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
- Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
- Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
- Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
- Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
- Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
- Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
- Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
- Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
- Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
- Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
- Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
- Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
- Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
- Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
- Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
- Page 98 and 99: Congo crisis began well before Amer
<strong>Congo</strong> could privately form a cab<strong>in</strong>et to put <strong>in</strong> place as soon as Parliament met aga<strong>in</strong>. 14Earlier <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process, when <strong>the</strong> U.S. and <strong>the</strong> U.N. first began to organize replacementsfor Lumumba <strong>in</strong> earnest, <strong>the</strong> consensus choice had been for Joseph Ileo to cont<strong>in</strong>ue on asPrime M<strong>in</strong>ister. By January, Timberlake was push<strong>in</strong>g for an alternative choice, laborleader Cyrille Adoula, but acknowledged that he did not have “broad political support.” 15It is worth not<strong>in</strong>g that Timberlake would declare that even <strong>the</strong> “most sympa<strong>the</strong>ticobservers know this country cannot govern itself <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>telligent fashion,” say<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong><strong>Congo</strong> was nowhere near achiev<strong>in</strong>g anyth<strong>in</strong>g o<strong>the</strong>r than a “façade of democracy.” 16 Hissuggestion was greeted with skepticism, as <strong>the</strong> State Department suggested ano<strong>the</strong>rcandidate, Just<strong>in</strong> Bomboko, while <strong>the</strong> revitalization of Ileo’s government, with aprom<strong>in</strong>ent military role for Mobutu, would be <strong>the</strong> back-up plan.Timberlake’s defense of Adoula was a masterpiece of mismatched and apparentlycontradictory pieces of advice for <strong>the</strong> State Department. He opens by express<strong>in</strong>g hissupport for Adoula, not<strong>in</strong>g he was just “as anti-Lumumbaist [sic] as <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gBomboko, is energetic and has better general position among parliamentarians.” Next,Timberlake rem<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>the</strong> State Department of <strong>the</strong> limitations of America’s role. “In lastanalysis it will be Kasavubu and o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Congo</strong>lese who should and will decide makeup,” acurious comment from someone who did not accept that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>lese could govern<strong>the</strong>mselves and had actively pushed his chosen candidate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> preced<strong>in</strong>g sentence. 17F<strong>in</strong>ally, Timberlake openly wondered whe<strong>the</strong>r a change of government would even be <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> United States’ <strong>in</strong>terest. He suggested that <strong>the</strong> Afro-Asian bloc <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> United Nations14 Kalb, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Cables, 17815 Qtd. <strong>in</strong> Kalb, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Cables, 14516 Qtd. <strong>in</strong> Kalb, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Cables, 14617 Telegram from Timberlake to State Department, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:58648
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