A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
damage to his reputation among Africans. This seeming contradiction is best explainedby Kennedy’s predecessor; Africa had frequently been ignored by Eisenhower, and thepromise of a change under Kennedy was enough to excuse some early indecision in hisPresidency.Indeed, on most of the important issues faced by the United States in the CongoCrisis, the course charted by Kennedy and his State Department owed a great deal toEisenhower’s policies of the previous year. The similarities go beyond the shared fear ofLumumba and exaggerated concern about Soviet intentions in the Congo or the mutualhesitance to place African concerns above European ones. Both Eisenhower and Kennedydetermined that American interests would be best-served by choosing a Congolese PrimeMinister based on U.S. criteria. While Eisenhower had refused tolerate Lumumba andinsisted on his replacement, by any means including murder, Kennedy was almost asdissatisfied with any of the potential leaders to be found in the Congo’s numerousfactions. Kennedy’s Administration instead spent months of effort to prop up CyrilleAdoula, plucking him from relative obscurity even though the several factions alreadyhad established leaders, of which Adoula was not one.Lumumba’s death had meant the destruction, at least for the foreseeable future, ofa unitary national party in the Congo. Tshombe was still ensconced in Katanga,Lumumba’s successor Antoine Gizenga had control of the country around Stanleyville,and the Kasavubu-Mobutu government remained in power in Leopoldville, recognized bythe U.N. as the legitimate government of the Congo. Another province, South Kasai, hadalso declared independence under Albert Kalonji, but it lacked the political or militarystrength of the three main groups. The Kennedy Administration’s first goal was to45
identify an acceptable successor for Lumumba in order to restore national unity. TheTask Force on Africa “insisted on” a restored national government, based on the premisethat a solution that left Katanga to Belgian mining interests would not be “regarded as‘legitimate’ by many new African states.” 10 However, Kennedy proved reluctant toabandon the familiarity of Moise Tshombe’s independent Katanga.The Kennedy Administration’s choice for leadership, Cyrille Adoula, picked fromoutside the group of candidates already squabbling for power, reflected the same kind ofdecision-making that had predominated during the Eisenhower years. Once again, theU.S. would value stability and perceived pro-American tendencies while disregarding thefact that none of the numerous factions had coalesced around their candidate, making theprocess of installing him as Prime Minister an especially arduous task. At the same time,one of the benefits of choosing Adoula was that he was not so closely associated withKasavubu or with the United States as to provoke a negative reaction from theLumumbists under Gizenga or the Katangese.The fragmentation of the Congo into several factions was not new, however, andthe search for a viable candidate to replace Lumumba had begun well before his death.But Eisenhower was not the only one to become fed up with Lumumba, as the PrimeMinister had also succeeded in alienating the United Nations, playing a crucial role tryingto broker peace in the Congo. Lumumba’s intransigence regarding the immediate end ofthe Katanga secession had caused irreparable harm in his relationship with U.N.Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. As early as August 1960, the U.S. and the U.N.had each privately expressed a desire to be rid of the meddlesome Lumumba and replacehim with whomever else they could find.10 Report of Task Force on Africa, Pre-Presidential Files, Box 1073, Folder 246
- Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
- Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
- Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
- Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
- Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
- Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
- Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
- Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
- Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
- Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
- Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
- Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
- Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
- Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
- Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
- Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
- Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
- Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
- Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
- Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
- Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
- Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
- Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
- Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
- Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
- Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
- Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
- Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
- Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
- Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
- Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
- Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
- Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
- Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
- Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
- Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
- Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
- Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
- Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
- Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
- Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
- Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
- Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
- Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
- Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
- Page 96 and 97: ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
identify an acceptable successor for Lumumba <strong>in</strong> order to restore national unity. <strong>The</strong>Task Force on Africa “<strong>in</strong>sisted on” a restored national government, based on <strong>the</strong> premisethat a solution that left Katanga to Belgian m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terests would not be “regarded as‘legitimate’ by many new African states.” 10 However, <strong>Kennedy</strong> proved reluctant toabandon <strong>the</strong> familiarity of Moise Tshombe’s <strong>in</strong>dependent Katanga.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Kennedy</strong> <strong>Adm<strong>in</strong>istration</strong>’s choice for leadership, Cyrille Adoula, picked fromoutside <strong>the</strong> group of candidates already squabbl<strong>in</strong>g for power, reflected <strong>the</strong> same k<strong>in</strong>d ofdecision-mak<strong>in</strong>g that had predom<strong>in</strong>ated dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Eisenhower years. Once aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>the</strong>U.S. would value stability and perceived pro-American tendencies while disregard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>fact that none of <strong>the</strong> numerous factions had coalesced around <strong>the</strong>ir candidate, mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>process of <strong>in</strong>stall<strong>in</strong>g him as Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister an especially arduous task. At <strong>the</strong> same time,one of <strong>the</strong> benefits of choos<strong>in</strong>g Adoula was that he was not so closely associated withKasavubu or with <strong>the</strong> United States as to provoke a negative reaction from <strong>the</strong>Lumumbists under Gizenga or <strong>the</strong> Katangese.<strong>The</strong> fragmentation of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> <strong>in</strong>to several factions was not new, however, and<strong>the</strong> search for a viable candidate to replace Lumumba had begun well before his death.But Eisenhower was not <strong>the</strong> only one to become fed up with Lumumba, as <strong>the</strong> PrimeM<strong>in</strong>ister had also succeeded <strong>in</strong> alienat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> United Nations, play<strong>in</strong>g a crucial role try<strong>in</strong>gto broker peace <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>. Lumumba’s <strong>in</strong>transigence regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> immediate end of<strong>the</strong> Katanga secession had caused irreparable harm <strong>in</strong> his relationship with U.N.Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. As early as August 1960, <strong>the</strong> U.S. and <strong>the</strong> U.N.had each privately expressed a desire to be rid of <strong>the</strong> meddlesome Lumumba and replacehim with whomever else <strong>the</strong>y could f<strong>in</strong>d.10 Report of Task Force on Africa, Pre-Presidential Files, Box 1073, Folder 246
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