A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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assessment is valid, but it had little relevance to the new situation in the Congo anddemonstrated a dangerous way of thinking about neutralism, which closely resembledSecretary of State John Foster Dulles’ previous judgment, in 1956, that neutralism in thedeveloping world was “a transitional stage to communism.” 4In their aforementioned report, dated December 30, 1960, the members of theTask Force concluded that “the Soviet Union is ready to give unilateral assistance (quiteapart from the UN) to any regime friendly to its advances. It is probably givingsubstantial aid to the pro-Lumumba government in Stanleyville.” 5 However, Sovietsources reveal that Khrushchev refused to provide aid to Gizenga after Lumumba’simprisonment despite frantic requests for “direct Soviet interference.” On December 14,1960, only days after setting up his government in Stanleyville, Gizenga asked theSoviets “immediately, without delay, to help us in military equipment and foodstuffs,” as“Stanleyville Province is in serious danger.” 6 Not receiving a satisfactory response, asubsequent telegram called out the Russians for their “passivity” and asked “Why can theUSSR not help the legitimate and democratic government that enjoys the support of theCongolese?” 7 One can understand why the Task Force would have expected continuedSoviet involvement, since they did not have access to these revealing exchanges, but inoverestimating the danger of communist takeover, they were just continuing the mistakesof the previous Administration.The first months of 1961 also saw the United States continue its policy of timidlyexpressing dissatisfaction with Belgium for keeping so many of its advisers in Katanga.4 Qtd. in Thomas J. Noer, “New Frontiers and Old Priorities in Africa,” in Kennedy’s Quest for Victory:American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 2555 Report of Task Force on Africa, Pre-Presidential Files, Box 1073, Folder 26 Qtd. in Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 1277 Qtd. in Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 12943
George Allen, Assistant Secretary of State under Eisenhower, had stated in 1956 that “allof the so-called colonial powers are our friends in the worldwide contest between theFree and Communist worlds.” 8 While largely true, it is a problematic statement,reflecting a worldview destined to alienate the emerging nations of Africa against theEisenhower Administration. It is just another reminder why so many in Africa were gladto see Kennedy, who had so effectively scored points against the Republicans for theirrecord on the continent, take over as leader of the free world. Unfortunately, the KennedyAdministration did not live up to the hopes for a New Frontier in Africa. In the months ofFebruary to May 1961, Kennedy allowed the situation in the Congo to play out, whileexpressing reluctance to upset NATO allies in Brussels by pushing too hard on Katanga.It was only during the summer, when the Belgians elected a new government thatrecognized the tide was turning against Tshombe, that the U.N. began to take action withtacit American approval. 9Although Kennedy would later demonstrate his discomfort with a BelgiansupportedKatanga, he showed a willingness to accept Tshombe’s unpopular secessionistregime in Elisabethville that belied his pre-inauguration reputation of strong opposition tocontinued European imperialism in Africa. But, like their predecessors underEisenhower, officials in the Kennedy Administration were ready to deal with Tshombe,and even court him at times, because of the moderate, anti-radical presence that he couldprovide until the emergence of a permanent government acceptable to the U.S. It iscurious that his decision not to address the problem of Belgium and Katanga for so long,particularly after Tshombe was implicated in Lumumba’s murder, did not do more8 Qtd in Noer, “New Frontiers and Old Priorities in Africa,” 2559 Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 14744
Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95: especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97:
ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99:
Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101:
BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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