A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in the first month of 1961 might have prompted outside observers topredict a dramatically different course for the U.S. in the Congo going forward. Theleadership situations of both nations changed with the election of John F. Kennedy andthe assassination of Patrice Lumumba, in all likelihood taking place just a few days apartin January 1961, seeming to reshape the landscape in the Congo fundamentally. Yetbetween January and August 1961, the Kennedy Administration followed in the footstepsof its predecessor by misjudging communist (and particularly Soviet) strength, failing toconfront Belgium and, most crucially, dictating from Washington which candidate shouldtake over the leadership of the Congo. These moves demonstrate that the primary concernof the United States throughout this period was its own interest, no matter who wasserving as its president.The fact that the transition of power in both the United States and the Congo didnot lead to major changes bears explanation. As Kennedy’s Task Force on Africa toldhim, “the advent of a new Administration” marked an excellent chance to reevaluate U.S.41
policy in the Congo. 1 That is especially true as the death of Lumumba, beloved by veryfew of the Westerners who came into contact with him, should have allowed Kennedy tochart a new path free of the perceived threat of a Lumumbist state in the heart of Africa.Yet the expulsion of Soviet diplomats and the murder of the leading radical voice in theCongo did little to assuage fears of a communist takeover. Frustrating communistadvances was still the primary goal of America’s policy toward the Congo.The similarities are even more surprising considering that the two Administrationsarrived at their policies from different precedents that they simply elided into a singlethreat: Eisenhower’s advisers feared the specter of communism in Europe, whileKennedy’s saw it advancing in the developing world. 2 In responding to the Congo, topgovernment officials found precedent for the situation there in nations that had beenvictim to communist insurgents (Czechoslovakia or Greece for Eisenhower’s men, Laosand Cuba for the younger generation), perhaps not even considering that there wasvirtually no Eastern Bloc presence in the Congo after the ascent of Mobutu. Even thisdistinction might have led to a different perspective on the Congo, a state where theradical elements were not directed from Moscow as they had been in Eastern Europe, yetAmerican officials once again imagined communism as monolithic. On the eve of hisinauguration, Kennedy’s advisers in the Task Force on Africa looked at the Sovietstrategy “to pull a growing number of African states toward pro-Bloc neutralism…theBloc will intervene whenever opportunities develop to disrupt existing relationshipsbetween African states and the West, and to support dissident or radical leaders.” 3 This1 Report of Task Force on Africa, Pre-Presidential Files, Box 1073, Folder 22 Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964 (Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1974), 1343 Report of Task Force on Africa, Pre-Presidential Files, Box 1073, Folder 242
- Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
- Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
- Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
- Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
- Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
- Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
- Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
- Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
- Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
- Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
- Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
- Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
- Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
- Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
- Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
- Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
- Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
- Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
- Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
- Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
- Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
- Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
- Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
- Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
- Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
- Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
- Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
- Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
- Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
- Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
- Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
- Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
- Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
- Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
- Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
- Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
- Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
- Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
- Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
- Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
- Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
- Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
- Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
- Page 92 and 93: after the cease-fire, leading to th
policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>. 1 That is especially true as <strong>the</strong> death of Lumumba, beloved by veryfew of <strong>the</strong> Westerners who came <strong>in</strong>to contact with him, should have allowed <strong>Kennedy</strong> tochart a new path free of <strong>the</strong> perceived threat of a Lumumbist state <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> heart of Africa.Yet <strong>the</strong> expulsion of Soviet diplomats and <strong>the</strong> murder of <strong>the</strong> lead<strong>in</strong>g radical voice <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>Congo</strong> did little to assuage fears of a communist takeover. Frustrat<strong>in</strong>g communistadvances was still <strong>the</strong> primary goal of America’s policy toward <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>.<strong>The</strong> similarities are even more surpris<strong>in</strong>g consider<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> two <strong>Adm<strong>in</strong>istration</strong>sarrived at <strong>the</strong>ir policies from different precedents that <strong>the</strong>y simply elided <strong>in</strong>to a s<strong>in</strong>glethreat: Eisenhower’s advisers feared <strong>the</strong> specter of communism <strong>in</strong> Europe, while<strong>Kennedy</strong>’s saw it advanc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g world. 2 In respond<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>, topgovernment officials found precedent for <strong>the</strong> situation <strong>the</strong>re <strong>in</strong> nations that had beenvictim to communist <strong>in</strong>surgents (Czechoslovakia or Greece for Eisenhower’s men, Laosand Cuba for <strong>the</strong> younger generation), perhaps not even consider<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong>re wasvirtually no Eastern Bloc presence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> after <strong>the</strong> ascent of Mobutu. Even thisdist<strong>in</strong>ction might have led to a different perspective on <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>, a state where <strong>the</strong>radical elements were not directed from Moscow as <strong>the</strong>y had been <strong>in</strong> Eastern Europe, yetAmerican officials once aga<strong>in</strong> imag<strong>in</strong>ed communism as monolithic. On <strong>the</strong> eve of his<strong>in</strong>auguration, <strong>Kennedy</strong>’s advisers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Task Force on Africa looked at <strong>the</strong> Sovietstrategy “to pull a grow<strong>in</strong>g number of African states toward pro-Bloc neutralism…<strong>the</strong>Bloc will <strong>in</strong>tervene whenever opportunities develop to disrupt exist<strong>in</strong>g relationshipsbetween African states and <strong>the</strong> West, and to support dissident or radical leaders.” 3 This1 Report of Task Force on Africa, Pre-Presidential Files, Box 1073, Folder 22 Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>, 1960-1964 (Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1974), 1343 Report of Task Force on Africa, Pre-Presidential Files, Box 1073, Folder 242
Change language