A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
ather than take a ministerial post in Ileo’s government. 67 Kasavubu was able to stifle therevolt with the promise of a major pay raise, but he was understandably concerned thathis charismatic rival was being held by potentially disloyal soldiers. As such, he orderedLumumba moved to Elisabethville on January 17. The scene when the plane landed inKatanga was grim: six U.N. soldiers from Sweden stood on guard at the airport, notacting when over one hundred Katangese troops surrounded the airplane that had carriedLumumba. Three blindfolded prisoners, including the deposed Prime Minister,disembarked, being abused by the Katangese forces as Belgian officers looked on. AU.N. investigation later concluded that Lumumba was probably killed that night as hearrived in Elisabethville, but Tshombe continued to act as if he was holding Lumumba asa captive until February 13.Between Lumumba’s initial capture on December 2, 1960 and the announcementof his death on February 13, 1961, the framework for American response changed. JohnF. Kennedy was inaugurated as President on January 20, 1961, yet at that point he and themembers of his Administration naturally believed Lumumba to be alive. Thus, the actionsof the Kennedy Administration during its transition period and first month in officeprovide valuable insights into their views of Lumumba and the threat he may have posedto U.S. interests. Kennedy’s Task Force on Africa, writing during this period, concludedthat “currently there is no viable alternative to the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime.” 68 TheTask Force also simplified the Kasavubu-Lumumba schism:In terms of contemporary African political issues, Kasavubu has come tosymbolize the following: federal government based on tribalism; cooperation withBelgium; resistance to the Soviet bloc; suspicion of the Nkrumah approach topan-Africanism. Lumumba, in turn, has symbolized: unitary government based on67 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 18468 Report of Task Force on Africa, Pre-Presidential Files, Box 1073, Folder 239
centralism; hostility to Belgium; a willingness to accept strong Soviet support;warm approval for the pan-African ideal. 69Of course, Kasavubu represented only the positions that the U.S. would support. G.Mennen Williams explained that the situation represented the worst nightmare for U.S.interests: “The consolidation of Gizenga’s power in Orientale province confronted theU.S. with a danger of ‘separatism’ in the Congo which was, this time, not anti-Lumumbaand anti-Communist (as in Katanga and Kasai) but pro-Lumumba and Communistsupported.”70The members of the Task Force mirrored Allen Dulles’ language about thepermanence of Lumumba’s threat. “As long as he is alive, Lumumba promises to be aforce to reckon with.” 71 The conundrum of America’s Congo policy was appropriatelysummed by an official at the State Department’s Congo Desk in January 1961. “We darenot accept new elections in the Congo…We dare not accept the convocation of theParliament…We dare not even see Lumumba included in a coalition government for fearthat he could come to dominate the cabinet. For a country that subscribes to thedemocratic creed, this is a remarkable predicament.” 72 And the predicament would nowrest on John F. Kennedy’s shoulders.69 Report of Task Force on Africa, Pre-Presidential Files, Box 1073, Folder 270 Analytical Chronology 1/25/61, President’s Office Files, Box 114, Folder 1471 Report of Task Force on Africa, Pre-Presidential Files, Box 1073, Folder 272 Qtd. in Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, 3440
- Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
- Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
- Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
- Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
- Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
- Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
- Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
- Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
- Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
- Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
- Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
- Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
- Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
- Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
- Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
- Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
- Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
- Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
- Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
- Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
- Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
- Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
- Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
- Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
- Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
- Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
- Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
- Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
- Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
- Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
- Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
- Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
- Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
- Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
- Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
- Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
- Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
- Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
- Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
- Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
- Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
- Page 88 and 89: announced to the press that “this
- Page 90 and 91: evidence for such an outcome. On th
a<strong>the</strong>r than take a m<strong>in</strong>isterial post <strong>in</strong> Ileo’s government. 67 Kasavubu was able to stifle <strong>the</strong>revolt with <strong>the</strong> promise of a major pay raise, but he was understandably concerned thathis charismatic rival was be<strong>in</strong>g held by potentially disloyal soldiers. As such, he orderedLumumba moved to Elisabethville on January 17. <strong>The</strong> scene when <strong>the</strong> plane landed <strong>in</strong>Katanga was grim: six U.N. soldiers from Sweden stood on guard at <strong>the</strong> airport, notact<strong>in</strong>g when over one hundred Katangese troops surrounded <strong>the</strong> airplane that had carriedLumumba. Three bl<strong>in</strong>dfolded prisoners, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> deposed Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister,disembarked, be<strong>in</strong>g abused by <strong>the</strong> Katangese forces as Belgian officers looked on. AU.N. <strong>in</strong>vestigation later concluded that Lumumba was probably killed that night as hearrived <strong>in</strong> Elisabethville, but Tshombe cont<strong>in</strong>ued to act as if he was hold<strong>in</strong>g Lumumba asa captive until February 13.Between Lumumba’s <strong>in</strong>itial capture on December 2, 1960 and <strong>the</strong> announcementof his death on February 13, 1961, <strong>the</strong> framework for American response changed. JohnF. <strong>Kennedy</strong> was <strong>in</strong>augurated as President on January 20, 1961, yet at that po<strong>in</strong>t he and <strong>the</strong>members of his <strong>Adm<strong>in</strong>istration</strong> naturally believed Lumumba to be alive. Thus, <strong>the</strong> actionsof <strong>the</strong> <strong>Kennedy</strong> <strong>Adm<strong>in</strong>istration</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g its transition period and first month <strong>in</strong> officeprovide valuable <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong>ir views of Lumumba and <strong>the</strong> threat he may have posedto U.S. <strong>in</strong>terests. <strong>Kennedy</strong>’s Task Force on Africa, writ<strong>in</strong>g dur<strong>in</strong>g this period, concludedthat “currently <strong>the</strong>re is no viable alternative to <strong>the</strong> Kasavubu-Mobutu regime.” 68 <strong>The</strong>Task Force also simplified <strong>the</strong> Kasavubu-Lumumba schism:In terms of contemporary African political issues, Kasavubu has come tosymbolize <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g: federal government based on tribalism; cooperation withBelgium; resistance to <strong>the</strong> Soviet bloc; suspicion of <strong>the</strong> Nkrumah approach topan-Africanism. Lumumba, <strong>in</strong> turn, has symbolized: unitary government based on67 Kalb, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Cables, 18468 Report of Task Force on Africa, Pre-Presidential Files, Box 1073, Folder 239
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