A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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to outside world that Lumumba was being supported by government.” 58 Timberlake wasparticularly unimpressed by Kasavubu’s weak responses to his and Harriman’s questionsabout how to extend his control given the circumstances. At one point, Kasavubu turnedback on the questioner to ask for advice, and at other he was “vague and could only stateright was on his side.” 59It is telling that the Eisenhower Administration allowed such access to Harriman,even allowing him to participate in discussions between an Ambassador and a foreignhead of state. Harriman was, after all, working for Eisenhower’s Democratic rival andhad run for president as a Democrat in both 1952 and 1956. A memo to Eisenhower,prepared by the President’s Assistant Staff Secretary and son, John S.D. Eisenhower, usesinformation reported by Harriman as valuable intelligence on the country: “Harriman’stalks with Congolese leaders convince him that we can expect little if anything to be donein parliamentary form against Lumumba.” 60 This can perhaps be seen as a sign of a lesspolarized political elite in 1960, but it is also compelling evidence of the similarity of theoutlook of Eisenhower and Kennedy, as both leaders used the same evidence, gatheredduring Harriman’s 1960 tour of Africa, to guide their thinking. Another exampledemonstrating this principle is Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who ran against Kennedy first fora U.S. Senate seat from Massachusetts in 1952, and then as Richard Nixon’s vicepresidentialcandidate in 1960. As Eisenhower’s Ambassador to the United Nations, heplayed a major role in how the U.N. responded to the Congo Crisis, but Kennedy wouldsoon choose him to be Ambassador to South Vietnam, where his criticism of Ngo DinhDiem encouraged Kennedy to support his overthrow in 1963. With the same men58 Telegram from Timberlake to State Department, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:47159 Telegram from Timberlake to State Department, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:47160 Paper Prepared by John S.D. Eisenhower, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:48635
advising both Eisenhower and Kennedy, it is unlikely that their foreign policies wouldend up being dramatically different.Once Harriman left to deliver his report to Kennedy, Timberlake’s frustrationwith Kasavubu boiled over, and he stated things more forcefully with a spectacularlymixed metaphor. “Kasavubu acts more like a vegetable every day while Lumumbacontinues display brilliant broken field running. In spite number of constructivesuggestions given Kasavubu and Ileo, they seem incapable of any actions even when theyhave situation literally in hand.” 61 Lumumba had demonstrated that ability to respond tothe unexpected when he had been arrested and briefly held by army officers who calledfor his resignation. Upon his release, he returned to Parliament, where he was grantedspecial powers in a joint meeting of both houses. His opponents noted that most of theopposition was absent and that armed pro-Lumumba forces inside the building served tointimidate those who were present. In response, Kasavubu adjourned Parliament for amonth and declared its actions illegal.Events in the Congo took another unexpected turn on the night of September 14,when the chief of staff of the army, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, declared that the armywould be taking power. International observers had not pegged Mobutu as a possibleleader up to this point, and he was known more as a lackey of Lumumba than as anindependent thinker. 62 As part of this move, he explained that he was neutralizingKasavubu and Lumumba, and would ask the first generation of Congolese students to goabroad for university study to return home and run the country in a nonpartisan fashionthrough the end of the year. Most crucially in American eyes, Mobutu expelled the61 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 8762 Kalb, 13436
Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87: pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89:
announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91:
evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93:
after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95:
especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97:
ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99:
Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101:
BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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