A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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took to the airwaves to dismiss Prime Minister Lumumba, who had “betrayed his trust.” 53The key factor in Kasavubu’s action was that Lumumba had secured ten Soviet airplanesto use in his campaign against Katanga, an action which the President felt undermined theinternational position of the Congo. Kasavubu then charged Joseph Ileo, the President ofthe Senate, with the formation of a new government. Lumumba responded almostimmediately, with his own radio address which denied that the President was empoweredto dismiss him and reminded listeners that Kasavubu only held his position because of theelectoral victory of Lumumba’s MNC party. Lumumba accused Kasavubu of “hightreason” as part of a “plot mounted by Belgian and French imperialists,” and declaredthat Kasavubu’s functions as head of state would be assumed by Parliament. 54 It is worthnoting that the Constitution which the Congo inherited from Belgium does provide forthe President to dismiss the Prime Minister at his discretion. 55This confusing back-and-forth was complicated by the fact that the U.N. was inthe process of changing its primary representative in the Congo. The U.N. had neverintended that Ralph Bunche would remain in Leopoldville indefinitely, and he was to bereplaced by Rajeshwar Dayal, a diplomat from non-aligned India and a favorite of PrimeMinister Jawaharlal Nehru. Dayal arrived on September 6 with serious doubts as to thelegality of Kasavubu’s actions, but he was not yet in charge of U.N. operations in theCongo. That job was held on a temporary basis by Andrew Cordier, executive assistant tothe Secretary-General, who was among many U.N. officials relieved to see Lumumbapotentially being replaced. Cordier took the extraordinary step of using U.N. soldiers to53 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 7154 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 71-255 Memo to Kennedy on Legal and Constitutional Positions of Kasavubu and Lumumba, President’s OfficeFiles, Box 114, Folder 733
occupy and hold both the airport and the radio station in Leopoldville, thus denying theiruse to both Kasavubu and Lumumba. Cordier’s move only appeared to be neutral,however, since he was aware that the lack of access would damage Lumumba’s causemore; Kasavubu could use Radio Brazzaville across the Congo River and his supporterswere concentrated around the capital, not in far-off Stanleyville, a plane ride away. 56 Thedecision not only provided ammunition to claims from the Soviet Union or from Africanstates that the U.N. was working to overturn Lumumba’s election, but it also served toestablish a stalemate between Leopoldville and Stanleyville that would last almost a year.Although Lumumba was not in a position to resolve the conflict, he beganreceiving widespread support, both from the Congolese Parliament and from otherindependent states of Africa. The most prominent among those was Ghana, whocontributed the most significant number of troops, which President Kwame Nkrumahthreatened to withdraw if Lumumba was prevented from using the radio station. 57 Dayalalso worked to improve Lumumba’s position after he took over from Cordier onSeptember 8, quickly reopening the radio station and allowing civilian traffic at theairport.Meanwhile, the Americans were souring on Kasavubu almost as fast as they haddone with Lumumba. The President met with Ambassador Timberlake and AverellHarriman, in Africa on a fact-finding mission for the Kennedy campaign, on September9. Harriman expressed his concern that Lumumba had won victories in Parliament, and“declared anti-Lumumba forces had to have courage to stand up and be counted and notcollapse as they appeared to have done in Senate…such parliamentary victory indicated56 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 7557 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 8634
Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83: military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85: The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87:
pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89:
announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91:
evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93:
after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95:
especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97:
ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99:
Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101:
BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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