A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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the President, especially in written documents and group meetings. But whether or notthe order came from Eisenhower, it is clear that Allen Dulles undertook a plan toassassinate Lumumba using CIA resources. On August 26, Dulles sent a cable to Devlinwhich made his position clear. He explains that the top levels of government agree that“the inevitable result” of Lumumba’s continued rule “will at best be chaos and at worstpave the way to communist takeover of the Congo.” He orders that Lumumba’s “removalmust be [a] urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this should be ahigh priority of our covert action.” 49 Dulles made his intentions even clearer ininstructions to Devlin on September 24, shortly before the arrival of Joe from Paris. “Wewish to give every possible support in eliminating Lumumba from every possibility ofresuming governmental position.” 50In 1975, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations withRespect to Intelligence Activities looked into the role of the United States inassassinating Lumumba. The Committee, commonly known as the Church Committeeafter its chairman, Senator Frank Church, offered the following conclusion.The evidence indicates that it is likely that President Eisenhower’s expression ofstrong concern about Lumumba…was taken by Allen Dulles as authority toassassinate Lumumba…the CIA’s clandestine service formulated a plot toassassinate Lumumba. The plot proceeded to the point that lethal substances andinstruments specifically intended for use in an assassination were delivered by theCIA to the Congo Station. There is no evidence that these instruments ofassassination were actually used against Lumumba. 51This is perhaps the greatest difference in the Congo policies of the Eisenhowerand Kennedy Administrations. Under Eisenhower, the CIA was quick to investigate thepossibility of using assassination to deal with an inconvenient foreign leader. There is no49 U.S. Senate Select Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, 1550 Qtd. in Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 12451 U.S. Senate Select Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, 1331

evidence that either Kennedy or his advisers seriously considered the possibility of killingany of the numerous leaders, including Gizenga, Tshombe or Ileo, who caused the UnitedStates trouble from time to time. The CIA did not even inform Kennedy of its old planswhen his Administration took office in January 1961, even though Lumumba was inenemy hands by that point. Indeed, the CIA was not particularly active in the Congoduring Kennedy’s presidency, despite his eagerness to use their skills in other crisis areas.It should be noted that the CIA has sometimes been implicated in the plane crash thatkilled Dag Hammarskjold in September 1961, but such accounts are not credible.At first glance, it is difficult to know what to make of this major discrepancy inCongo policy between two Administrations whose objectives will be shown to have beenso similar. Kennedy, after all, demonstrated a willingness to use assassination to dealwith problematic leaders in Cuba and South Vietnam. One must come to the conclusionthat Kennedy eschewed politically-motivated murder in the Congo not out a sense ofmorality, but because it did not fit his needs. The situation was dramatically differentwhen the Kennedy Administration took office, as Lumumba had been taken prisoner,and, it was later revealed, killed, just before Kennedy’s Inauguration. The United Statesemerged largely unscathed after the revelation of Lumumba’s death, but more suspiciousdeaths would have undoubtedly increased scrutiny of American actions. 52 This was anunacceptable situation for a President whose reputation was based on the support of otherAfrican states.The situation changed dramatically on September 5, although it was notimmediately clear what effect the shift would have on U.S. interests. President Kasavubu52 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 23632

evidence that ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Kennedy</strong> or his advisers seriously considered <strong>the</strong> possibility of kill<strong>in</strong>gany of <strong>the</strong> numerous leaders, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Gizenga, Tshombe or Ileo, who caused <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates trouble from time to time. <strong>The</strong> CIA did not even <strong>in</strong>form <strong>Kennedy</strong> of its old planswhen his <strong>Adm<strong>in</strong>istration</strong> took office <strong>in</strong> January 1961, even though Lumumba was <strong>in</strong>enemy hands by that po<strong>in</strong>t. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> CIA was not particularly active <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Kennedy</strong>’s presidency, despite his eagerness to use <strong>the</strong>ir skills <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r crisis areas.It should be noted that <strong>the</strong> CIA has sometimes been implicated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> plane crash thatkilled Dag Hammarskjold <strong>in</strong> September 1961, but such accounts are not credible.At first glance, it is difficult to know what to make of this major discrepancy <strong>in</strong><strong>Congo</strong> policy between two <strong>Adm<strong>in</strong>istration</strong>s whose objectives will be shown to have beenso similar. <strong>Kennedy</strong>, after all, demonstrated a will<strong>in</strong>gness to use assass<strong>in</strong>ation to dealwith problematic leaders <strong>in</strong> Cuba and South Vietnam. One must come to <strong>the</strong> conclusionthat <strong>Kennedy</strong> eschewed politically-motivated murder <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> not out a sense ofmorality, but because it did not fit his needs. <strong>The</strong> situation was dramatically differentwhen <strong>the</strong> <strong>Kennedy</strong> <strong>Adm<strong>in</strong>istration</strong> took office, as Lumumba had been taken prisoner,and, it was later revealed, killed, just before <strong>Kennedy</strong>’s Inauguration. <strong>The</strong> United Statesemerged largely unsca<strong>the</strong>d after <strong>the</strong> revelation of Lumumba’s death, but more suspiciousdeaths would have undoubtedly <strong>in</strong>creased scrut<strong>in</strong>y of American actions. 52 This was anunacceptable situation for a President whose reputation was based on <strong>the</strong> support of o<strong>the</strong>rAfrican states.<strong>The</strong> situation changed dramatically on September 5, although it was notimmediately clear what effect <strong>the</strong> shift would have on U.S. <strong>in</strong>terests. President Kasavubu52 Kalb, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Cables, 23632

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