A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
the President, especially in written documents and group meetings. But whether or notthe order came from Eisenhower, it is clear that Allen Dulles undertook a plan toassassinate Lumumba using CIA resources. On August 26, Dulles sent a cable to Devlinwhich made his position clear. He explains that the top levels of government agree that“the inevitable result” of Lumumba’s continued rule “will at best be chaos and at worstpave the way to communist takeover of the Congo.” He orders that Lumumba’s “removalmust be [a] urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this should be ahigh priority of our covert action.” 49 Dulles made his intentions even clearer ininstructions to Devlin on September 24, shortly before the arrival of Joe from Paris. “Wewish to give every possible support in eliminating Lumumba from every possibility ofresuming governmental position.” 50In 1975, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations withRespect to Intelligence Activities looked into the role of the United States inassassinating Lumumba. The Committee, commonly known as the Church Committeeafter its chairman, Senator Frank Church, offered the following conclusion.The evidence indicates that it is likely that President Eisenhower’s expression ofstrong concern about Lumumba…was taken by Allen Dulles as authority toassassinate Lumumba…the CIA’s clandestine service formulated a plot toassassinate Lumumba. The plot proceeded to the point that lethal substances andinstruments specifically intended for use in an assassination were delivered by theCIA to the Congo Station. There is no evidence that these instruments ofassassination were actually used against Lumumba. 51This is perhaps the greatest difference in the Congo policies of the Eisenhowerand Kennedy Administrations. Under Eisenhower, the CIA was quick to investigate thepossibility of using assassination to deal with an inconvenient foreign leader. There is no49 U.S. Senate Select Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, 1550 Qtd. in Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 12451 U.S. Senate Select Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, 1331
evidence that either Kennedy or his advisers seriously considered the possibility of killingany of the numerous leaders, including Gizenga, Tshombe or Ileo, who caused the UnitedStates trouble from time to time. The CIA did not even inform Kennedy of its old planswhen his Administration took office in January 1961, even though Lumumba was inenemy hands by that point. Indeed, the CIA was not particularly active in the Congoduring Kennedy’s presidency, despite his eagerness to use their skills in other crisis areas.It should be noted that the CIA has sometimes been implicated in the plane crash thatkilled Dag Hammarskjold in September 1961, but such accounts are not credible.At first glance, it is difficult to know what to make of this major discrepancy inCongo policy between two Administrations whose objectives will be shown to have beenso similar. Kennedy, after all, demonstrated a willingness to use assassination to dealwith problematic leaders in Cuba and South Vietnam. One must come to the conclusionthat Kennedy eschewed politically-motivated murder in the Congo not out a sense ofmorality, but because it did not fit his needs. The situation was dramatically differentwhen the Kennedy Administration took office, as Lumumba had been taken prisoner,and, it was later revealed, killed, just before Kennedy’s Inauguration. The United Statesemerged largely unscathed after the revelation of Lumumba’s death, but more suspiciousdeaths would have undoubtedly increased scrutiny of American actions. 52 This was anunacceptable situation for a President whose reputation was based on the support of otherAfrican states.The situation changed dramatically on September 5, although it was notimmediately clear what effect the shift would have on U.S. interests. President Kasavubu52 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 23632
- Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
- Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
- Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
- Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
- Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
- Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
- Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
- Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
- Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
- Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
- Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
- Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
- Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
- Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
- Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
- Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
- Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
- Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
- Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
- Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
- Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
- Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
- Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
- Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
- Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
- Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
- Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
- Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
- Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
- Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
- Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
- Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
- Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
- Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
- Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
- Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
- Page 78 and 79: without too much damage in Europe.
- Page 80 and 81: also warned the State Department ab
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evidence that ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Kennedy</strong> or his advisers seriously considered <strong>the</strong> possibility of kill<strong>in</strong>gany of <strong>the</strong> numerous leaders, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Gizenga, Tshombe or Ileo, who caused <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates trouble from time to time. <strong>The</strong> CIA did not even <strong>in</strong>form <strong>Kennedy</strong> of its old planswhen his <strong>Adm<strong>in</strong>istration</strong> took office <strong>in</strong> January 1961, even though Lumumba was <strong>in</strong>enemy hands by that po<strong>in</strong>t. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> CIA was not particularly active <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Kennedy</strong>’s presidency, despite his eagerness to use <strong>the</strong>ir skills <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r crisis areas.It should be noted that <strong>the</strong> CIA has sometimes been implicated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> plane crash thatkilled Dag Hammarskjold <strong>in</strong> September 1961, but such accounts are not credible.At first glance, it is difficult to know what to make of this major discrepancy <strong>in</strong><strong>Congo</strong> policy between two <strong>Adm<strong>in</strong>istration</strong>s whose objectives will be shown to have beenso similar. <strong>Kennedy</strong>, after all, demonstrated a will<strong>in</strong>gness to use assass<strong>in</strong>ation to dealwith problematic leaders <strong>in</strong> Cuba and South Vietnam. One must come to <strong>the</strong> conclusionthat <strong>Kennedy</strong> eschewed politically-motivated murder <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> not out a sense ofmorality, but because it did not fit his needs. <strong>The</strong> situation was dramatically differentwhen <strong>the</strong> <strong>Kennedy</strong> <strong>Adm<strong>in</strong>istration</strong> took office, as Lumumba had been taken prisoner,and, it was later revealed, killed, just before <strong>Kennedy</strong>’s Inauguration. <strong>The</strong> United Statesemerged largely unsca<strong>the</strong>d after <strong>the</strong> revelation of Lumumba’s death, but more suspiciousdeaths would have undoubtedly <strong>in</strong>creased scrut<strong>in</strong>y of American actions. 52 This was anunacceptable situation for a President whose reputation was based on <strong>the</strong> support of o<strong>the</strong>rAfrican states.<strong>The</strong> situation changed dramatically on September 5, although it was notimmediately clear what effect <strong>the</strong> shift would have on U.S. <strong>in</strong>terests. President Kasavubu52 Kalb, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> Cables, 23632