A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

Assistant for National Security Affairs, Gordon Gray reported that “his associates hadexpressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action inthis situation.” 45 Several officials later testified that “associates” was used as aeuphemistic term for Eisenhower. The Special Group went on to decide “that planningfor the Congo would not necessarily rule out ‘consideration’ of any kind of activity whichmight contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.” 46Devlin explained that in late September, he met a CIA agent identified only as“Joe from Paris,” apparently an accomplished scientist, who delivered a variety ofpoisons to Leopoldville. Joe from Paris explained that Devlin had a great deal of latitudein choosing how to eliminate Lumumba, provided that the U.S. was not implicated. Inresponse to Devlin’s concerned questions, Joe from Paris said that his orders had comefrom “the highest authority,” specifically President Eisenhower. 47 Devlin explained thathe felt “it was morally wrong for me or anyone under my orders to kill Lumumba, an actthat I could not justify by any argument or rationalization.” 48 Devlin’s account of himselfas a lone opponent of violence should invite skepticism, since he never expressed hisqualms to superiors. Ultimately, though, the delays in the program and the fact thatDevlin almost certainly did not participate in Lumumba’s eventual death give somecredence to his story.Ultimately, it is difficult to establish conclusively whether vague comments byEisenhower were intended to be used as assassination orders or not. It is certainly easy toimagine that such a lack of precision was intended to maintain plausible deniability for45 U.S. Senate Select Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, 6046 U.S. Senate Select Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots, 6047 Kalb, The Congo Cables, xi48 Qtd. in Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War, 12530