A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ... A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...
Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, and the United States began to feel that itsinterests would not be best-served by his continued leadership in the Congo. Thisperspective was first articulated in writing by William Burden, the U.S. Ambassador inBrussels, on July 19, 1960, less than three weeks into the existence of an independentCongo. Burden’s analysis was that Lumumba had established himself as hostile to theWest and defiant towards the U.N., with the result that U.S. interests in the “Congo andAfrica generally” were threatened by his regime. He proposed that “a principal objectiveof our political and diplomatic action must therefore be to destroy [the] Lumumbagovernment as now constituted, but at [the] same time we must find or develop anotherhorse to back which would be acceptable in [the] rest of Africa and defensible againstSoviet political attack.” 27 Burden goes on to suggest that U.S. policy in the Congo shouldfocus on undermining Lumumba in all arenas: among the Congolese citizens, otherAfrican leaders, Parliament and the provincial governments. He does not demonstratemuch concern for the details of replacing the increasingly popular Prime Minister.Burden notes the technical supremacy of the President in the Congolse government andconcludes that even as “weak as [Kasavubu] has shown himself to be, he would seem tobe [the] best bet for [the] immediate future.” 28Allen Dulles would go on to present a less extreme version of these views, tellingthe National Security Council on July 21 that “in Lumumba we were faced with a personwho was a Castro or worse. We believe that he is in the pay of the Soviets.” Dulles wenton to outline his specific suspicions about Lumumba’s motives, saying that the BelgianCommunist Party must be incentivizing his behavior. Dulles declared that “it is safe to go27 Telegram from Burden to State Department, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:33028 Telegram from Burden to State Department, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:33225
on the assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Communists; this also,however, fits with his own orientation.” 29This perspective was not limited to the Eisenhower Administration. W. AverellHarriman, in a 1960 memo to Kennedy, then a candidate, described Lumumba as “arabble rousing speaker. He is a shrewd maneuverer who has clever left wing advisers,with the aid and encouragement of Czech and Soviet ambassadors.” Harriman goes on toexplain that Lumumba believes that he can successfully bring Katanga back into the fold,as “he of course counts on full support from the USSR.” 30 Kennedy certainly valuedHarriman’s opinion; the latter had been U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union duringWorld War II, had been a candidate for the Democrats’ presidential nomination twice,and would go on to become an Ambassador-at-Large and an Assistant Secretary of Stateunder Kennedy.Harriman was far from alone among Kennedy’s closest advisors. G. MennenWilliams, Kennedy’s highly publicized pick for Assistant Secretary of State for AfricanAffairs, called Lumumba “a clever anti-white rabble-rouser” and “foremost among” the“leftist radicals” in the Congo. 31 Williams stops short of labeling Lumumba as acommunist, while noting that it is difficult to tell the difference between communism and“hyper-nationalist, anti-‘colonialist’, Marxist thinking” in Africa. 32 In a section entitled“The Problem of Lumumba,” Kennedy’s Task Force on Africa wrote that “Lumumba isattacked by critics as opportunistic, dishonest, frenetic and a would-be dictator,” a29 Memo of National Security Council Meeting, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:338-930 Memo from Harriman to Kennedy, President’s Office Files, Box 114, Folder 5a31 Analytical Chronology 1/25/61, President’s Office Files, Box 114, Folder 1432 Analytical Chronology 1/25/61, President’s Office Files, Box 114, Folder 1426
- Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
- Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
- Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
- Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
- Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
- Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
- Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
- Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
- Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
- Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
- Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
- Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
- Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
- Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
- Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
- Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
- Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
- Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
- Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
- Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
- Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
- Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
- Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
- Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
- Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
- Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
- Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
- Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
- Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
- Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
- Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
- Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
- Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
- Page 72 and 73: stability in Katanga, and in neighb
- Page 74 and 75: eminder of the low priority that Ei
- Page 76 and 77: gentle and realistic tack with the
on <strong>the</strong> assumption that Lumumba has been bought by <strong>the</strong> Communists; this also,however, fits with his own orientation.” 29This perspective was not limited to <strong>the</strong> Eisenhower <strong>Adm<strong>in</strong>istration</strong>. W. AverellHarriman, <strong>in</strong> a 1960 memo to <strong>Kennedy</strong>, <strong>the</strong>n a candidate, described Lumumba as “arabble rous<strong>in</strong>g speaker. He is a shrewd maneuverer who has clever left w<strong>in</strong>g advisers,with <strong>the</strong> aid and encouragement of Czech and Soviet ambassadors.” Harriman goes on toexpla<strong>in</strong> that Lumumba believes that he can successfully br<strong>in</strong>g Katanga back <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> fold,as “he of course counts on full support from <strong>the</strong> USSR.” 30 <strong>Kennedy</strong> certa<strong>in</strong>ly valuedHarriman’s op<strong>in</strong>ion; <strong>the</strong> latter had been U.S. Ambassador to <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union dur<strong>in</strong>gWorld War II, had been a candidate for <strong>the</strong> Democrats’ presidential nom<strong>in</strong>ation twice,and would go on to become an Ambassador-at-Large and an Assistant Secretary of Stateunder <strong>Kennedy</strong>.Harriman was far from alone among <strong>Kennedy</strong>’s closest advisors. G. MennenWilliams, <strong>Kennedy</strong>’s highly publicized pick for Assistant Secretary of State for AfricanAffairs, called Lumumba “a clever anti-white rabble-rouser” and “foremost among” <strong>the</strong>“leftist radicals” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong>. 31 Williams stops short of label<strong>in</strong>g Lumumba as acommunist, while not<strong>in</strong>g that it is difficult to tell <strong>the</strong> difference between communism and“hyper-nationalist, anti-‘colonialist’, Marxist th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>in</strong> Africa. 32 In a section entitled“<strong>The</strong> Problem of Lumumba,” <strong>Kennedy</strong>’s Task Force on Africa wrote that “Lumumba isattacked by critics as opportunistic, dishonest, frenetic and a would-be dictator,” a29 Memo of National Security Council Meet<strong>in</strong>g, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:338-930 Memo from Harriman to <strong>Kennedy</strong>, President’s Office Files, Box 114, Folder 5a31 Analytical Chronology 1/25/61, President’s Office Files, Box 114, Folder 1432 Analytical Chronology 1/25/61, President’s Office Files, Box 114, Folder 1426
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