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A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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In order to understand Patrice Lumumba’s actions as Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, one mustremember <strong>the</strong> myriad problems that faced <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> as soon as it became an <strong>in</strong>dependentnation with him as its first leader. Lumumba believed that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> werebest served by a s<strong>in</strong>gle nation, unit<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> various tribes and regions, and he felt verystrongly that <strong>the</strong> Belgians that had victimized <strong>the</strong> country for so long must not be a partof that set-up, perhaps an unrealistic goal consider<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> depth of Belgian <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>in</strong>Katanga. Unfortunately, Lumumba did not have <strong>the</strong> political or military power to realizethis dream on his own, and his vision did not match up with that of <strong>the</strong> U.S. or U.S.S.R.<strong>The</strong> very existence of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Congo</strong> was threatened by <strong>the</strong> secession of Katanga less thantwo weeks <strong>in</strong>to Lumumba’s term, at which po<strong>in</strong>t he went to extraord<strong>in</strong>ary measures toprotect a unified and <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>Congo</strong>, measures that <strong>in</strong>cluded appeal<strong>in</strong>g to both sidesof <strong>the</strong> Cold War power divide for assistance.It is hard to know whe<strong>the</strong>r Lumumba would have preferred capitalism orcommunism, only that he was will<strong>in</strong>g to accept ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong> exchange for <strong>the</strong> military aid thatwould allow him to recapture Katanga or to face <strong>the</strong> long list of threats to his power thatwould come afterwards. Lumumba was impatient and impetuous, quickly cycl<strong>in</strong>g backand forth between possible sponsors, isolat<strong>in</strong>g himself from so many potential allies. Hedid not understand <strong>the</strong> stakes of <strong>the</strong> Cold War for <strong>the</strong> U.S. or <strong>the</strong> U.N. or <strong>the</strong> SovietUnion well enough to recognize that nei<strong>the</strong>r side would give him what he needed rightaway, and that his vacillations were underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g his goals. Lumumba was not devoted tocommunism <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> way that many U.S. officials under both Eisenhower and <strong>Kennedy</strong>suspected he was, yet his ill-considered threats and s<strong>in</strong>gle-m<strong>in</strong>ded devotion to his owngoals made him an undesirable foreign leader just <strong>the</strong> same.24

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