A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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Gizenga was a committed Marxist, more solidly radical than Lumumba, while Bombokowas probably the most pro-Western figure in the government, and had made a name forhimself a few days earlier, by putting himself in danger to rescue Belgian civilians frommutinous soldiers. Timberlake counseled patience, saying that the U.N. could not movemuch faster, while going on to state that he did not anticipate that the U.S. would bewilling to send troops outside of the U.N. mandate as they were requesting. 11 He adopteda somewhat different position in his telephone call to the State Department, when headvised that two companies of U.S. Army infantry which had been put on stand-by statusin Germany to evacuate refugees “should be flown down to Brazzaville,” across the riverfrom Leopoldville. “Their presence there would have a very desirable effect.” 12In a private telephone call with Secretary of State Christian Herter, PresidentEisenhower echoed Timberlake’s position with the Cabinet ministers, repeating the samelanguage throughout the conversation. Eisenhower explained that “we are always willingto do our duty through the UN but we are not going to unilaterally get into this…wewould be completely in error to go in unilaterally.” 13 Kennedy had well aware of this wayof thinking in the Eisenhower Administration, remarking that when it came to thedeveloping world, there was an “obvious desire not to become involved.” 14 Indeed,Eisenhower’s discomfort was not limited to a unilateral American move: Herter said hewas “very adverse to sending in our troops in these circumstances. The President said thatwas right; that he didn’t think any Western troops should go in.” 15 In this situation, thePresident and the Secretary of State agreed that there was no benefit for America to get11 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 912 Telegram from John S.D. Eisenhower to Andrew Goodpaster, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:29413 Memo of Telephone Conversation between Eisenhower and Herter, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:29614 Qtd. in Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, 2015 Memo of Telephone Conversation between Eisenhower and Herter, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:29619
involved in central Africa, when the United Nations can do that job for them. In fact,when Herter mentioned that the country was experiencing a major food shortage,Eisenhower “commented maybe after this situation some of these people won’t want nowto be independent.” 16 Herter passed this decision on to Timberlake, explaining that theU.S. would not send in troops outside of the U.N. framework, and was hesitant to do soeven within it. 17This would prove to be a moot point, as Lumumba was furious to find out thatGizenga and Bomboko had requested U.S. troops to intervene without his approval. Hehad been out of the capital, working with Kasavubu on a second request to the UnitedNations. This new version altered the terms of their original request so that the Congonow asked for “urgent dispatch” of U.N. soldiers to protect the country from theunauthorized Belgian troops, which represented an “act of aggression.” 18 Belgian forceshad acted on their own initiative to bombard the city of Matadi, in an effort to secure thenation’s chief port from mutinous Congolese soldiers. This attack was particularlydistressing to Lumumba, both because of its proximity to Leopoldville and the high deathtolls being reported, soon revealed to be hugely exaggerated. The attack on Matadiinspired Lumumba’s second dispatch to the U.N., which also attributed the Katangeseseccession to Belgian influence and promised to turn to the “Bandung Treaty Powers” ifthe U.N. did not act without delay. 19 Lumumba refers here to the nascent non-alignedmovement, a bloc of African and Asian states that had started to band together at 1955’s16 Memo of Telephone Conversation between Eisenhower and Herter, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:29617 Telegram from Herter to Timberlake, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:29818 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 9-1019 Memo of Telephone Conversation between Eisenhower and Herter, FRUS, 1958-1960, 14:300, Note 220
Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71: Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73:
stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75:
eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77:
gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79:
without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81:
also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83:
military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85:
The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87:
pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89:
announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91:
evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93:
after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95:
especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97:
ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99:
Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101:
BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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