A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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On July 11, a few events dramatically changed the situation in the Congo,introducing new players onto the scene. Lumumba and Kasavubu arrived in Luluabourg,the capital of diamond-rich Kasai Province, and immediately recognized the danger ofthe situation there. Fearing for the safety of Europeans in Luluabourg, they authorizedBelgian military intervention “provided their mission was restricted to the protection ofpersons and property,” marking the only time the Congolese would authorize Belgianaction. 8 Even more significantly, Katanga Province seceded from the Republic of theCongo on the same day. The country’s richest province, Katanga controlled most of thecountry’s significant mineral wealth, and its uncertain status had ramifications for theU.S. and its allies in Western Europe. The Katanga secession will be addressed in moredetail in Chapter Three, but it represented a huge blow to Lumumba and Kasavubu,especially as they demonstrated that they could not end the mutiny of the Force Publiquenor put a stop to continued Belgian interference. Those Belgians who were eager tomaintain control of the resources of Katanga found a willing partner in Moise Tshombe,the President of independent Katanga, who relied on muscle from foreign mercenaries tosecure his power. It was not clear that the government in Leopoldville would be able tosustain itself without the economic resources of the Katangese mines to which it had justlost access.Clare Timberlake, the hardheaded U.S. Ambassador in Leopoldville, was left torespond to the crisis largely without instructions from Washington. He concluded rightlythat the likeliest outcomes in the Congo, continued anarchy or obvious reliance onBelgium to quell the disorder, would both undermine the U.S. position there.Accordingly, he encouraged Lumumba to make a request for assistance to Dr. Ralph8 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 617
Bunche, the U.N. Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs, who had been inLeopoldville for the independence celebration and remained there because of the fear oftrouble. Bunche was a widely-respected diplomat and uniquely well-suited to the job; anAfrican-American, he was a vocal supporter of the civil rights movement in the U.S. andhad already won a Nobel Peace Prize for his work negotiating an armistice in Palestine.Things moved slowly from that point, with the bureaucracy of a largeinternational organization unable to match the lightning speed of developments on theground in the Congo. U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold of Sweden, saw theYear of Africa as an exciting opportunity for the United Nations to play a larger rolethrough economic and technical assistance to the newly-independent nations, and wasdisappointed by the outbreak of violence in the Congo. He hoped to handle the requestfor assistance informally without a prolonged standoff between East and West in theSecurity Council. 9 However, the rapidly expanding violence in the Congo made itimpractical, as it started to look like the U.N. was ignoring the growing crisis, andHammarskjold began to fear that the U.S. or U.S.S.R. would intervene unilaterally. Thisanxiety seems misplaced given that neither Eisenhower nor Khrushchev demonstrated theslightest inclination toward sending in troops unilaterally, yet it was on Hammarskjold’smind in July 1960. Impatient with this approach, a number of high-level Congoleseofficials, led by Deputy Premier Antoine Gizenga and Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko,visited Timberlake on July 12 to request a contingent of 2,000 American soldiers.Gizenga and Bomboko represented the extremes of opinion within the Congolesecabinet, and were perhaps chosen for the mission to the U.S. Ambassador accordingly. 109 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 1210 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 818
Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69: he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71:
Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73:
stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75:
eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77:
gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79:
without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81:
also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83:
military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85:
The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87:
pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89:
announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91:
evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93:
after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95:
especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97:
ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99:
Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101:
BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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