A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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A year later, responding to the pressures coming from France’s massive decolonization ofAfrica in 1960, Belgium invited Congolese leaders to participate in a round-tableconference in Belgium. The conference reflected the new, shorter timetable:independence was scheduled for June 30, with parliamentary elections to come evensooner. 3 The need to build a national government under such time constraints wascomplicated by the tribal divisions within the diverse environments of the largest countryin sub-Saharan Africa. British and French leaders had encouraged fledgling states toadopt one or two parties, but the history of Belgian neglect led to a multitude of smalllocal parties, segregated by tribe and region. Lumumba, a figure already regarded withsuspicion by many, including Eisenhower’s team, had been the surprise winner of theparliamentary elections in May, with his MNC winning a small plurality in the politicallydivided legislature: 35 out of 137 seats. 4 Joseph Kasavubu was chosen for the largelyceremonialrole of President at the suggestion of Brussels. The Belgians hoped thatKasavubu might restrain the fiery Prime Minister Lumumba, who had been in a Belgianjail until January 1960 for his role in the previous year’s riots. Lumumba lived up to hisreputation as a thorn in Belgium’s side immediately, delivering an impassioned speech onindependence day. He publicly embarrassed King Baudouin I when he declared that “ourwounds are too fresh to forget.” 5 Only a week later, the Congo crisis began in earnest, asthe Congolese soldiers in Thysville, dangerously close to the capital, mutinied againsttheir officer corps, made up exclusively of white Belgians.3 Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa — From Eisenhower to Kennedy (NewYork: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1982), xxi4 Kalb, The Congo Cables, xxv5 Qtd. in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 315
The rebellious soldiers demanded better pay and promotions, as well as thedismissal of General Emile Janssens, the leader of the Force Publique. Janssens hadhelped to precipitate the mutiny when he made the miscalculation of telling theCongolese enlisted men that nothing would be changing after independence, with a mindto shoring up their discipline. Within a few days, anarchy reigned in Leopoldville; theBritish and French Embassies evacuated nonessential personnel and the U.S. Embassywas encircled by mutinous soldiers, demonstrating their hostility to Western involvementin the country. In Leopoldville, there were rumors of random attacks on white peoplehappening throughout the countryside. 6 Lumumba, in his first test as Prime Minister, hadquickly dispatched Janssens and promoted every single soldier by one rank, which easedtensions but was not enough to end the insubordination. On July 8, Lumumba realized hehad little choice but to accede to demands by discharging all Belgian officers. Hefollowed up that move by flying frantically back and forth across the country withKasavubu, trying to prevail on troops to end their rebellion and return to their barracks.These efforts had only temporary success, and Belgium announced on July 9 that itwould send twelve hundred soldiers to two bases that Belgium still held in the country,one in Kitona on the Atlantic coast and not far from Thysville and another in Katanga.The new arrivals would complement the twenty-five hundred Belgian troops still in theCongo. Brussels paid lip service to Congolese independence, explaining that its soldierswould only intervene to save lives (and probably only European ones at that), but theywent on to act in at least twenty different places in the Congo over the next week. 76 Analytical Chronology 1/25/61, President’s Office Files, Box 114, Folder 147 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 616
Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67: government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69:
he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71:
Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73:
stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75:
eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77:
gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79:
without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81:
also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83:
military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85:
The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87:
pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89:
announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91:
evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93:
after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95:
especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97:
ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99:
Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101:
BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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