A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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advisers were paying much attention when the situation in the Congo started to smolderdirectly after the nation gained its independence on June 30, 1960. To the extent thatofficials at the high levels of U.S. government took notice of the developing crisis, it wasto articulate disdain for Patrice Lumumba, the young, enigmatic Prime Minister of thenew nation. Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence, described Lumumba’sbrand-new government to the National Security Council as “weak” and characterized by“a leftist tinge.” 1 Dulles would prove himself to be one of the most vocal critics ofLumumba, a position for which there was not a small amount of competition. Hissimplistic comments will show not only the blinding power of Cold War anti-Communism, but also his casual treatment of facts. Newly-appointed Ambassador ClareTimberlake was another who expressed concern that Lumumba was a wild card, and thatthe Congo was not yet ready to handle its owns affairs as an independent nation. Yetthere is little evidence that Eisenhower or his top aides were putting much effort intounderstanding the particularities of Lumumba or the Congo itself. The muted Americanreaction in the early days of the Congo crisis tends to validate Kennedy’s criticisms.Eisenhower’s disengagement is particularly egregious because violence hadbroken out in an area of which the President, and the vast majority of internationalobservers, had little prior knowledge. The Congo was not controlled by a major imperialpower like France or Great Britain, nor had it been a likely candidate for independence.In the late 1950s, a wide variety of African colonies of European imperial powers beganto agitate seriously for independence, the catalyst having come in 1957 when the Britishcolony of the Gold Coast declared itself the independent nation of Ghana, yet there wasnot yet a noteworthy independence movement in the Congo. French President Charles de1 Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958-1960, 14:28013
Gaulle responded to the broader zeitgeist by offering independence to French West andEquatorial Africa in a speech in Brazzaville in 1958. The speech, given just across theCongo River from Leopoldville, kick-started demands for the Congo’s independencefrom Belgium, which had exploited the huge colony for its natural resources ever sinceKing Leopold established a personal colony there in 1885 and named the capital forhimself. Unlike the French or British, who had tended to look upon their colonies with atleast a degree of responsibility, even if it was overshadowed by paternalism andeconomic exploitation, Belgium had never shown much civic interest in its onlysignificant colony. The wave of decolonization did little to change the situation, as theBelgians did not make much effort to ready the Congo for self-rule, not even organizinglocally-run municipal governments until 1957. As many sources have pointed out, therewere only sixteen Congolese college graduates in 1960. 2It is understandable, then, that the Belgians were caught off-guard when Africa’sdrive for independence resonated so strongly in Leopoldville. After all, Congolesepolitical parties had only been organized since the 1957 municipal elections, which wereheld in only three cities. As a means of comparison, the Mouvement National Congolais(MNC), which would later be the party of Patrice Lumumba, had published a manifestoin 1956 demanding independence, but requiring only that it be granted within thirtyyears. This framework was borrowed from a Belgian academic, who had proposed athirty-year plan in 1955, prompting negative reactions from both sides. ConservativeBelgians opposed granting independence to the Congo even on the thirty-year plan,whereas rioters in the Congo were demanding immediate independence in January 1959.2 A Congo Chronology, National Security Files, Box 28, Folder: Congo General 12/20/61 “CongoChronology”14
Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
Page 14 and 15: willingness to tolerate him because
Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65: States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67:
government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69:
he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71:
Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73:
stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75:
eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77:
gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79:
without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81:
also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83:
military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85:
The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87:
pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89:
announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91:
evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93:
after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95:
especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97:
ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99:
Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101:
BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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