A Familiar Frontier: The Kennedy Administration in the Congo ...

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willingness to tolerate him because of his repudiation of Communism. Thus, this chapterwill include a substantial explanation of the historical context as well, this time thebackground of Katanga’s secession in July 1960 and how that drew the U.S. into theCongo Crisis in the first place.Taken together, the three chapters deal with the major policy initiatives of theU.S. during 1961: first, responding to Lumumba’s kidnapping and death; second,organizing a Congolese government more sympathetic to American interests; and third,addressing the Katanga secession and the use of force by U.N. troops. It should be notedthat this is a thesis about American actors, and not primarily about actors in the UnitedNations. Representatives of the U.N. show up frequently in these pages, but only whentheir presence changes the situation on the ground or sheds light on the motivations of theU.S. policy. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold is a frequent participant in thenarrative, mostly because of his enthusiasm for African decolonization, a prospect whichwent so badly awry in the Congo, thanks in part to American actions.11
Chapter One:STANLEYVILLESenator John F. Kennedy, running for the chance to replace President Dwight D.Eisenhower in the 1960 election, took the unprecedented step of including Africa policyas a key element of his campaign strategy. Attempting to capitalize on the upcomingexplosion of newly independent states in Africa, Kennedy delivered a speech before theAfrican diplomatic corps in Washington on June 24. Like his previous speeches onAfrica, Kennedy proposed U.S. aid in education, food and development capital as part ofa program of increased cooperation with Africa. Kennedy was clear with his audience: “Istress the word ‘cooperate.’” 1 The statement was a repudiation of previous Americanpolicy toward Africa, and especially the lack of engagement from Eisenhower. It was aneffective rhetorical device, but it did not serve as a prescription for a change in Americanforeign policy. Kennedy was much more engaged with African issues than Eisenhowerever was, but his Administration did not stress the word ‘cooperate’ in its response to thecrisis that was about to break out in the Congo.The reaction of President Eisenhower and his administration upon the outbreak ofconflict in the Republic of the Congo demonstrates exactly the kind of mindset Kennedywas disparaging on the campaign trail. There is little evidence that Eisenhower or his1 Remarks of Kennedy to African Diplomatic Corps, Pre-Presidential Files, Box 1030, Folder 112
Page 3: TABLE OF CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chap
Page 6 and 7: adical and his party had won a plur
Page 8 and 9: Kennedy intended it to apply to for
Page 10 and 11: in terms of American interest or to
Page 12 and 13: found a precedent in the actions of
Page 16 and 17: advisers were paying much attention
Page 18 and 19: A year later, responding to the pre
Page 20 and 21: On July 11, a few events dramatical
Page 22 and 23: Gizenga was a committed Marxist, mo
Page 24 and 25: Bandung Conference to offer a third
Page 26 and 27: the U.S.S.R. in the Congo: “For t
Page 28 and 29: Indeed, Lumumba was a wild card, an
Page 30 and 31: position from which they conspicuou
Page 32 and 33: Lumumba’s erratic personal added
Page 34 and 35: the President, especially in writte
Page 36 and 37: took to the airwaves to dismiss Pri
Page 38 and 39: to outside world that Lumumba was b
Page 40 and 41: embassies of the U.S.S.R. and Czech
Page 42 and 43: ather than take a ministerial post
Page 44 and 45: Chapter Two:LEOPOLDVILLEEvents in t
Page 46 and 47: assessment is valid, but it had lit
Page 48 and 49: damage to his reputation among Afri
Page 50 and 51: U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake su
Page 52 and 53: would not respond any better to a n
Page 54 and 55: about a greater degree of Congolese
Page 56 and 57: will place yet another strain on NA
Page 58 and 59: Once again, however, State Departme
Page 60 and 61: overstepped their influence by tryi
Page 62 and 63: ecommends that we permit the presen
Page 64 and 65:
States would only accept the best o
Page 66 and 67:
government was “as good as we cou
Page 68 and 69:
he wants Katanga to stay in Congo a
Page 70 and 71:
Chapter Three:ELISABETHVILLEThe Con
Page 72 and 73:
stability in Katanga, and in neighb
Page 74 and 75:
eminder of the low priority that Ei
Page 76 and 77:
gentle and realistic tack with the
Page 78 and 79:
without too much damage in Europe.
Page 80 and 81:
also warned the State Department ab
Page 82 and 83:
military action from turning into a
Page 84 and 85:
The events of August 1960 impressed
Page 86 and 87:
pointed out he had taken major risk
Page 88 and 89:
announced to the press that “this
Page 90 and 91:
evidence for such an outcome. On th
Page 92 and 93:
after the cease-fire, leading to th
Page 94 and 95:
especially by Union Miniére, which
Page 96 and 97:
ConclusionEvents in the Congo turne
Page 98 and 99:
Congo crisis began well before Amer
Page 100 and 101:
BibliographyHoskyns, Catherine. The
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